1971-Lessons Et Cetera

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Iqbal Ahmad Khan*


(The 1971 debacle represented a turning point in the history of Pakistan. There were many lessons Pakistan could have learnt from this national trauma. Regrettably, we chose to ignore these. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, the most authoritative account of the factors which led to the catastrophe, was not made public. The Report’s recommendations were not implemented. We continue to pay the price of ignoring the lessons of history. Some of the episodes related to the crisis also continue to be debated. Foremost among them the famous

‘American Tilt’ and Bhutto’s alleged remark ‘Udhar Tum, Idhar Hum.’ At times, it appears that the debate surrounding these developments is colored by prejudice and pre-conceived notions, rather than hard facts. Author)

The 1971 civil war, the secession of East Pakistan, the third Indo- Pakistan war and creation of the independent state of Bangladesh represents the most tragic period in the 62 year volatile history of Pakistan. That the unbelievable savagery, bloodletting and suffering which accompanied the partition of British India would be re-enacted barely 24 years later was unimaginable. A wide array of factors contributed to the great tragedy. Among the major ones were a growing sense of deprivation within East Pakistan, the demand for provincial autonomy and a greater share in the resources of the country. There was the belief among Bengalis that for some reason their modesty, appearance and love for the arts was mistaken for weakness leading to its corollary that their legitimate demands could be ignored with impunity. The absence of democracy which stifled the aspirations of the biggest province in terms of population and the existence of a neighbor ever willing to exploit internal weaknesses in the body-politic of its adversary further compounded the situation. The military government of the time, divorced from reality and unable to grasp the complexities of the political situation, was totally mistaken in its assessment of the depth of Bengali resentment. It grossly underestimated the strength and determination of its foe, India, and overestimated its own power and  cohesiveness  thereby  leading  the  nation  through  incompetence and lies to perdition. The result, as expected by everyone, including Pakistan’s foreign allies, was the inevitable disintegration of the country and the humiliation of the nation, nay the entire Islamic fraternity. The capitulation of the Pakistan army, the highly unfavorable reports and commentaries in the Western media and the revelation by Bangladeshi leaders of the atrocities committed in erstwhile East Pakistan greatly distraught our friends.

Prior to delving into the lessons that need to be learnt from the separation of East Pakistan, it would be appropriate to examine the ‘et cetera’ portion of this article’s title.  There were two intensely debated developments in the crisis. Unfortunately, the heat of the debate seems to have obscured the facts leaving behind views based on limited knowledge and that too colored by personal prejudice. One aspect of the crisis pertains to the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was then Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the other relates to the perception of the so-called ‘American tilt.’

Despite the passage of 38 years and the publication of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, the part played by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the events leading to the break-up of Pakistan continues to be debated passionately. While space does not permit a comprehensive account of  Bhutto’s role, it is important for the sake of objectivity and history to respond to those who remain unswervingly convinced that the responsibility for the disintegration of the country lies at his doorstep. In support of their claim they do not tire of incessantly recalling Bhutto’s pronouncement of ‘Udhar tum, Idhar hum’ at a public meeting in Karachi a few days before army action in East Pakistan. There could not be a more glaring example of a quote torn out of context and perversely distorted to malign a national leader and his political party for working towards the country’s disintegration.

On 14 March 1971 Bhutto met President Yahya Khan in Karachi. The latter was on his way to Dacca to discuss the fast evolving political situation in the country with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League which had swept the polls in East Pakistan. The purpose of the meeting was to brief Yahya Khan on the position of the Pakistan People’s Party regarding issues confronting the country in the post- election period.  Bhutto contended that the PPP was the majority party in West Pakistan and the people expected it to safeguard the interests of the province. The same day i.e., 14 March the PPP Chairman addressed a public meeting in Karachi where he essentially reiterated what he had earlier conveyed to the president. In his speech he said that the 1970 elections had thrown up two major political parties – the Awami League in East Pakistan and the PPP in West Pakistan. Unfortunately, neither did the Awami League win a single seat in West Pakistan nor did the PPP in East Pakistan. There was thus a polarization of political forces. It, therefore, seemed logical to assume that if the Awami League were to form the government at the centre it could face serious problems in gaining acceptance in West Pakistan. Given the charged political atmosphere in the country the wise course appeared to be that a national government be formed comprising the Awami League and the PPP. He repeated that a government of solely the Awami League would not be viable because, and here he injected the words ‘Udhar tum, Idhar hum’ meaning that you are restricted to East Pakistan and the PPP to West Pakistan. By no stretch of the imagination did Bhutto mean that the Awami League should rule in an independent East Pakistan and the PPP in an independent West Pakistan. The Urdu daily ‘Azad’ ran the sensational headline ‘Udhar tum, Idhar hum’ which was picked up by Bhutto’s opponents and used to portray him as an advocate of two Pakistans. Ever mindful of history and hence of setting the record straight, Bhutto addressed a press conference the next day to rebut the insidious propaganda being spread by mischievous elements. He strongly condemned the deliberate distortion of his speech and reiterated his position that power be transferred at the Centre to the majority parties of both wings and in the provinces to the majority party in each province.1

The other issue which has greatly exercised Pakistani emotions and continues to be cited as yet another example of American perfidy was the allegation that the United States failed to live up to its assurances to Pakistan regarding its security. In the events leading up to the war the government of Pakistan officially, both in Islamabad and in Washington, urged the US government to come to its assistance in view of Indian threats to Pakistan and subsequently on account of India’s actual invasion of East Pakistan. In this respect they cited the US-Pakistan Agreement of Cooperation concluded between the two countries on 5

March 1959. Its preamble stated that the “Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan.” The agreement obligated the US to take appropriate action “as may be mutually agreed upon” to defend Pakistan against aggression.2  The agreement was concluded in the aftermath of the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East adopted by the US Congress on 9 March 1957. This resolution is cited in the US-Pakistan agreement. The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things, the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by “any country controlled by international communism” so long as such use of force was consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the United States.

Interestingly, during a telephone conversation President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry Kissinger suggested to the Pakistan ambassador in Washington General (Retd.) N.A.M. Raza that he should, in his contacts with the State Department, invoke apart from the treaties the unsigned aide memoire and the secret clauses as well.3  According to a footnote to the document No.164 the assurance offered to Pakistan in 1962 cited by Kissinger during the crisis, pertained to United States assistance to Pakistan in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The assurance was delivered in an aide-mémoire presented to Pakistani President Ayub Khan on 5 November 1962. The aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any qualification relating to constitutional constraints. A Department of State press release issued on 17 November 1962 declared that the United States had assured Pakistan that, if India misused United States military assistance in aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take “immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action to thwart such aggression.”4

The fact that Kissinger had to advise the Pakistan ambassador to proceed along these lines was reflective of the differences within the Nixon administration on the policy and strategy that the US needed to adopt in addressing the South Asian crisis. In the top echelons of the US government President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger advocated tangible US political, diplomatic and military assistance to Pakistan, whereas the State Department was of the view that US should continue to urge Pakistan to move towards a political solution rather than settle the issue through use of force. This becomes apparent when in a telephone conversation Dr. Kissinger tells the Secretary of State Rogers that “there is a shade of difference between State’s and the President’s view. He would like to tilt towards Pakistan and not India and your people go the other way.5 Even though Secretary Rogers differed from Kissinger’s assessment the divergences in approach surfaced from time to time as the crisis in South Asia evolved.

President Nixon’s tilt towards Pakistan came as a consequence of his appreciation that India was using Pakistan’s predicament (no doubt the result of Pakistan’s own short-sighted policies) to dismember its neighbor and to establish its pre-eminent position in South Asia. In this venture India had the complete support of its long-time ally the Soviet Union. On 9 August 1971 both countries concluded a twenty year treaty of peace and friendship. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, an academician and a former US ambassador to the United Nations believes that the Indo- Soviet treaty provided concrete benefits to both parties. “For India, the treaty explicitly provided for Soviet diplomatic support and implicitly laid the basis for the continuing flow of military hardware that had already started to arrive on a massive scale in the months preceding the treaty. The signing of the treaty, coupled with the presence of a million- man Soviet army on the Chinese border, served as a crucial guarantee to India against any overt Chinese action to help Pakistan in India’s forthcoming action against Pakistan.”6

The Indian plan was spelled out by Kissinger on 8 December. He believed that an Indian victory in East Pakistan was inevitable. Once East Pakistan had been overrun it would transfer its forces to West Pakistan, smash its land and air forces and annex Pakistan’s part of Kashmir. Kissinger believed that such a move would unleash centrifugal forces in West Pakistan with Balochistan and NWFP going their separate ways. This view was endorsed by the CIA which had obtained reliable information that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had laid down three objectives for the Indian forces. These comprised:

(i)                  Liberation of Bangladesh.

(ii)           The incorporation into India of the southern area of Azad (Pakistan-held) Kashmir.

(iii)  The destruction of the Pakistani armored and air force so that Pakistan can never threaten India again.7

Thus  the  Indian  objective  was  to  cut  Pakistan  down  to  a  size which would sue for peace and respect unquestionably India’s regional supremacy. The Soviet Union’s goal was to deliver a blow at the US alliance system in the region and to humiliate China. The Soviet Union also wanted to teach Pakistan a lesson for having acted as a facilitator in the establishment of relations between the US and China.

President Nixon believed that the US could not allow a country which had provided significant help in the strategic opening to China to be targeted in such a fashion. He also felt that the United States should supplement Chinese political, diplomatic and military support to Pakistan by adopting measures to thwart the Indo-Soviet designs in the region. “I felt it was important to discourage both Indian aggression and Soviet adventurism, and I agreed with Kissinger’s recommendation that we should demonstrate our displeasure with India and our support for Pakistan,” wrote Nixon in his memoirs.8

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During an official visit to the United States in November 1971, a couple of weeks prior to the Indian Army marching into East Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi was received in the Oval office by President Nixon. In the meeting Indira Gandhi assured him that India was not motivated in any way by anti-Pakistan attitudes. She told the US President, “India has never wished the destruction of Pakistan or its permanent crippling. Above all, India seeks the restoration of stability. We want to eliminate chaos at all costs.” Nixon writes in his memoirs that, at the very time, Mrs. Gandhi was conveying these assurances to him, her generals and advisors were planning to intervene in East Pakistan and were considering contingency plans for attacking West Pakistan as well.9  Later in the month when the Indian army crossed into East Pakistan, Nixon believed that the Indian Prime Minister had purposely deceived him. In his memoirs, he reproduces a brief reflection that he wrote in his diary:

As I saw Gandhi’s assassination and heard his words on violence, I realized how hypocritical the present Indian leaders are, with Indira Gandhi talking about India’s victory wings being clipped when Shastri went to Tashkent, and her duplicitous attitude towards us when she actually had made up her mind to attack Pakistan at the time she saw me in and assured me she would not. Those who resort to force without making excuses are bad enough – but those who resort to force while preaching to others about their use of force deserve no sympathy whatever.10

It was in these circumstances and in the context of the above indicated attitudes and assessments that the US government took two major initiatives, one diplomatic and the other military. In a letter to the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, President Nixon asserted that Indian military forces were being used to impose political demands and to dismember the sovereign state of Pakistan. He further stated that the Soviet Union had aligned itself with this Indian policy. Nixon urged utmost restraint on the part of both the US and the Soviet Union and urgent action towards ending the conflict and restoration of the territorial follow up action to President Nixon’s letter to the Soviet authorities.

Simultaneously, a naval task force of ten ships led by the aircraft carrier, Enterprise, was dispatched from the US Seventh Fleet off South Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal. This was meant to be a signal from the US regarding its commitment to the continued territorial integrity of West Pakistan. According to Shirin Tahir-Kheli, “this move, ordered by Nixon, coupled with Kissinger’s ‘background’ briefing to the press that Moscow’s inability to restrain the Indians could jeopardize the entire fabric of East-West relations, was meant to ensure that both New Delhi and Moscow understood the seriousness of any Indian move into West Pakistan.”11

In response to these moves, the Soviet Union’s initial reaction was not encouraging from the US and Pakistani standpoints. However, following a number of demarches from the US government the senior Soviet diplomat, Vorontsov, assured the US that it was prepared unconditionally to guarantee that there would be no Indian attack on West Pakistan or on Kashmir. This assurance was extended on 15 December the day the US naval task force steamed into the Bay of Bengal. The next day the Pakistani forces surrendered in East Pakistan but on 17 December India offered a cease-fire on the western front which was promptly accepted by Pakistan. The acceptance of the Indian offer came only a day after General Yahya had vowed to carry on the war against India until victory was achieved. According to President Nixon, “The Indo-Pakistan war involved stakes much higher than the future of Pakistan – and that was high enough. It involved the principle of whether big nations supported by the Soviet Union would be permitted to dismember their smaller neighbors. Once that principle was allowed, the world would have become more unstable and unsafe.”12

The American “tilt” towards Pakistan during the East Pakistan crisis and the Indo-Pak war was quite evident. It did not and was never meant to save East Pakistan, because developments there had reached a stage where it was simply not tenable that the province could exist as part of Pakistan. The tilt however did prevent further disintegration of the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his interview with Sulzberger which appeared in the New York Times of 13 February 1972.13

The surrender to the Indian forces in East Pakistan represented the most tragic and the most humiliating episode in the 24 year history of Pakistan. According to Sisson and Rose, “The terms of surrender were initiated by General Manekshaw, presented to General Niazi and Aurora at the Ramna Race Course, the scene of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s most significant political moments. Ironically, it was here too that General Niazi, commander of the forces of Muslim Pakistan, surrendered his arms to three generals of “Hindu” India – one a Parsi, another a Sikh and the third a Jew.”14

The document of surrender sealed the disintegration of Pakistan. Half the country was lost. Pakistan suffered 9183 total casualties. It had 3132 officers, JCOs, and soldiers killed or missing and India took over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war from East Pakistan.15

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who replaced Yahya Khan as the president of Pakistan, established a commission of enquiry on 26 December 1971 to enquire into the circumstances that had led to the surrender of the armed forces in East Pakistan and to the ordering of the cease-fire in West Pakistan. The commission was headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Hamoodur Rahman. The other two members of the commission were Justice Anwarul Haq and Justice Tufail Ali Abdur Rahman of the Supreme Court.

In its report the commission came, inter alia, to the conclusion that there was an imperative need “to book those senior Army Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and willful neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy.” disciplinary action, and not merely retirement from service, is necessary to ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war.  We believe that such action would not only satisfy the nation’s demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also serve to emphasize the concept of professional accountability which appears to have been forgotten by senior army officers since their involvement in politics, civil administration and Martial Law duties.”

The Commission concluded that the process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces began with their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958 and these were intensified when Martial Law was re-imposed in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan. There was indeed “substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army officers had not only indulged in large scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership.”16

The Commission succeeded in its avowed objective of putting the record straight on most questions agitating the minds of the Pakistani nation with regard to the debacle in East Pakistan. The report of the Commission was regrettably not published. It is generally believed that it was on the request of the army that Mr. Bhutto decided not to make the report public. The army contended that its surrender in East Pakistan had caused tremendous disappointment among the people and demoralization within the armed forces. The publication of the report, which was extremely  critical  of  the  army’s  top  brass,  its  overall  performance and had spelled out in detail its shortcomings, would exacerbate the situation.  Bhutto acquiesced to the army’s request, even though it was in his personal interest to have the report published. At that time there was a widespread belief among certain sections of the population that the report had placed the onus for the debacle on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. When the report did eventually see the light of day, this impression turned out to be totally baseless. Neither was the report published, nor its recommendations adopted and no lessons learnt. Having not learnt the lessons of history, the likelihood was that history would repeat itself.

Six years later another general staged a coup, usurped power, dismissed the legitimately elected government, told the nation a pack of lies, formed an alliance with the clergy and sent, arguably the most popular Pakistani prime minister to the gallows. The hope of the report’s authors that their work would teach the nation some fundamental and important lessons could unfortunately not be realized. To illustrate, in the rump Pakistan the size of the Pakistan army was more than when East and West Pakistan were together.

There were a host of reasons which led to the collapse of Pakistan and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Fundamental to these was the inability of the military government to comprehend the complex situation, its incapability to formulate and to effectively implement a sound strategy and finally the proclivity of the military cabal to take major decisions without an understanding of the wishes of the people and sans civilian input. The usurpation of power at gunpoint by General Yahya Khan and the complete control over national resources this entailed generated the perception that the junta would not let go and this handicapped the military government right from the outset.

The principal recommendation of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission was to take a hard look into the subversion of the constitution by the generals, the usurpation of power and professional incompetence. This regrettably was not done and the price had to be paid by the nation as later events would demonstrate. Admittedly, article 6 was incorporated in the 1973 constitution which made any attempt to subvert the constitution by the show or use of force an act of high treason.17

Pakistan should have imbibed a lesson from the Greek experience. In the 1970s a democratically elected and a confident civilian government in Greece charged, tried and found guilty some colonels who had made a mockery of law by staging coups and counter-coups and expropriating the national resources of the state. Those found guilty were sentenced to prison terms as provided for under the law of the land. This was nearly forty years ago. Since then Greece has been a coup-free country and has been contributing constructively to the political and economic growth of the European community.

It needs to be noted that all major setbacks that Pakistan has suffered in the past have occurred either during the tenure of military governments or were triggered by the military. These include the 1965 Indo-Pak war, the disastrous Pakistan-India conflagration of 1971, the loss of Siachin and the Kargil misadventure. That democracy is the form of government best suited to the conditions and the genius of the people of Pakistan and that Bonapartism needs to be preempted at all cost is the important lesson that the county ought to learn from the 1971 disaster.

The differences between the Awami League and the military government swirled out of control on the former’s demand for provincial autonomy as epitomized by the party’s Six Points. Point 2 of the Six Point formula envisaged that the federal government would deal with only two subjects, namely defense and foreign affairs and also currency subject to certain conditions. All the other residuary subjects would vest in the federating states. The tension was exacerbated by the differences in political culture of East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan was accommodative towards India whereas in West Pakistan, particularly within the military, the attitude bordered on hostility. The Awami League felt that a significant devolution of power from the centre to the provinces was essential for the acquiring of resources and economic development. Similarly, it was opposed to military pacts and desired a scaling down of the defense expenditure. India was watching hawk-like the fast evolving situation in its neighborhood, waiting to pounce when the right opportunity presented itself. The grossly incompetent military leadership in Pakistan led by an alcoholic and sexually intemperate leader who during working hours had very few lucid moments provided the Indians not one but many opportunities. The government thus ended up fighting its own people within and the external enemy without. The armed forces were hampered by poor leadership. Externally Pakistan became increasingly isolated. The inevitable happened on 16 December 1971 with the surrender at Paltan Maidan. The threat to Pakistan’s security did not come from an external source, but was essentially internal – the inability of successive governments, in particular the military and quasi-military ones, to provide for the political and economic needs of the people and their welfare and security. This is only possible if democratically elected governments continue to hold sway and there is a paradigm shift from a national security to a welfare state.

An analysis of the decision making process reveals that at best, it was restricted to a few generals a thousand miles away from the theatre of conflict. At worst, it was the product of the president’s own limited thinking. General Yahya Khan’s principal adviser reportedly told the Hamoodur Rahman Commission that often Yahya would postpone decisions when faced with arguments that did not accord with his views, and then later on he would come up with whatever solution he felt comfortable with.18  Shuja Nawaz’s comments on various institutions set up specifically to address the likes of the East Pakistan crisis are revealing. In his book, Crossed Swords, he states that the Defense Committee of the Cabinet, comprising the president and ministers involved with defense planning existed on paper but had not met more than two times in the five years preceding the 1971 war. Similarly, the Secretaries Coordination Committee on defense planning that afforded civilian officials an opportunity to contribute to the overall coordination of defense strategies and plans and produce a War Book had remained largely dormant.19

To a large extent, as a consequence of the methodology of decision- making, the decisions which were finally taken had little grounding in reality. General Yahya Khan presented a pathetic picture when he testified before the Hamoodur Rahman Commission. He blamed his colleagues, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, politicians including Mr.Bhutto and the Russians for aiding India. The most amazing portion of his testimony was his assertion that “I can confidently say that no military historian would call this a military defeat.” This divorce from reality and resort to hyperbole was also evident in the field. Towards the end of November 1971 General Niazi replied thus to a communication received from General Hamid. “Reassuring you and pledging afresh at this critical juncture of our history we will Inshallah fully honor the great confidence that has been reposed in us and no sacrifice will be considered too great in defending our sacred fatherland….God willing we will take the war onto Indian soil to finally crush the very spirit of non-believers through the supreme force of Islam. Pray and believe that ultimate victory will be ours. Inshallah.” 20 Two weeks later the general had surrendered ignominiously, staining the glorious religion that he invoked and the fair name of his country.

Despite the warnings given by the authors of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report on the pitfalls of the army’s encroachment into the civilian domain, there have since been two disastrous interventions by the military. Between them they cover twenty years of the country’s history.  The  democratically  elected  but  weak  civilian  governments had the unenviable task of cleaning the mess left behind by military dictators. Even when civilian governments have been in power they have worked under the shadow of the military which has continued to operate with impunity outside its jurisdiction. As a consequence there exists considerable resentment among the people as they are deeply concerned at the democratic process being repeatedly derailed.

It is in the smaller and backward provinces that the suffering is the greatest when the military takes over. The demand by the Balochis for provincial autonomy, for a greater share of the resources of Balochistan and opposition to the establishment of cantonments in the province is reminiscent of East Pakistan prior to its transformation into Bangladesh. On the positive side the country now has a democratically elected representative government functioning in Islamabad, the international community is fully supportive of the democratic dispensation and the hope is that the army might have learnt its lessons.


1     Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; The Great Tragedy; p.36.

2     US-Pakistan Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, 5 March 1959.

3    Declassified State Department document No. 164 on South Asia. Transcript of the telephone conversation between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistan Ambassador (Raza), Washington, 8 December 1971.

4     Footnote to State Department declassified document No. 164 on South Asia.

5    Declassified State  Department document No. 155: Transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 23 November 1971.

6    Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, Dr.; The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship.

7              CIA Memorandum on “Implications of an Indian Victory over Pakistan” dated 9 December 1971, as cited on p. 308 by Shuja Nawaz in his book Crossed Swords.

8              Nixon, Richard: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon; Vol. 1.

9              Ibid.

10   Ibid.; p. 658.

11   Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, Dr.; The United States and Pakistan: Evolution of an Influence Relationship; p.44.

12   Nixon, Richard; The Memoirs of Richard Nixon; p.657.

13   Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, Dr.; The United States and Pakistan: Evolution of an Influence Relationship; p.49.

14   Sisson and Rose; War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh; p.234.

15   Nawaz,  Shuja;  Crossed  Swords,  Pakistan,  its  Army  and  the  Wars  Within;  Oxford University Press,2008; p.310.

16   Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report.

17   Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

18   Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report.

19   Nawaz, Shuja; Crossed Swords, Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within; p.312.

20   Sisson and Rose; War and Secession p.230