Pakistan has faced serious internal security challenges since its inception, therefore any review of the present situation must be considered in a historical perspective.
By
Shahwar Junaid
Abstract
Several security problems were embedded in various dispensations at the time of Partition and were never resolved satisfactorily. A number of security challenges Pakistan has faced, and will continue to face, are a result of fault lines created by the nature of the geographical and administrative division of the sub-continent into two independent states. The administrative machinery, physical assets and economic and human resources available to Pakistan, as well as the manner in which they were utilized by successive political and military governments, have been an important factor impinging on internal security. The discourse that follows should reveal how cleverly the future of the Muslims of the sub-continent was shackled to the limitations within the dispensations of Partition and how astutely the limited potential of the political leadership that would be available to Pakistan after the physically frail Quaid passed away, was judged. Author.
Pakistan has faced serious internal security challenges since its inception therefore any review of the present situation must be considered in a historical perspective. The forces that contributed to the evolution of a national character after Partition must also be considered for they continue to influence the security environment: the internal security problems encountered by Pakistan today have been compounded by the weaknesses and the vagaries in its leadership. Some of the internal security problems Pakistan faced at the outset were the result of the environment created by the Partition of the sub-continent into two independent dominions, and had to be dealt with urgently. These problems included the influx of about two million refugees, lawlessness, loot and arson, killing and civil disturbance by those displaced as a result of the boundary awards. The civil administration lacked the competent personnel to deal with the situation.
Disorderly accession and delays in the division of assets meant severe economic limitations that made it extremely difficult to deal with the immediate needs of the population. Defence capability was almost non- existent. Soldiers assigned to protect the trains and convoys of refugees moving towards Pakistan often ran out of ammunition when fending off attackers while the civil authorities of the Indian Union in the areas through which these refugees were passing did not extend any help to them.1 This is illustrated by the following report datelined Amritsar, 23
September 1947: “Another Muslim Refugee Train…At about 5 p.m. the second train went through but was halted near Khalsa College as it was found that the lines had been removed by the mob. Immediately the train had halted a Sikh-Hindu Jatha of about 8000 in number made determined attacks on the train with rifles, Stens, kirpans, spears and other weapons. The military picket with the help of escort…..were able to hold them off, but it was soon found that the picket was running short of ammunition, so they had to withdraw after expending all but one Sten magazine.
“A Dogra company of the Baluch Regt. was sent out as soon as possible but by the time they had arrived at the scene the mob had overpowered the escort…attacked the evacuees, killing and injuring almost all.
“It may be noted that the civil authorities here had done absolutely nothing in the way of organising medical aid or giving the few remaining live evacuees any water….I and another officer assisted. I do not think I have ever witnessed such cold-bloodedness by any human beings as I witnessed last night from the civil authorities.”2
This was the situation at the time of Partition.3
At the time Pakistan was governed by the amended Government of India Act of 1935.4 This amended version was called the India Independence Act of 1947.5 It provided for a Governor General and head of state to succeed the British Viceroy. This Governor General was to have authority over both the newly independent countries. The Constituent Assembly of each country was given the task of preparing a constitution and was to serve as the federal legislature until the new constitutions of each country became effective.
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was of the view that the British Viceroy would not be able to secure the interests of Pakistan while serving as Governor General of India. One concern was that adjustments advantageous to India might be made after Independence under such a Governor General. He was a statesman and he had learnt during negotiations leading up to Partition, that any territorial or other demands he made had to be carefully calculated and timed otherwise the entire plan for the creation of a nation state for the Muslims of the sub- continent could be called off at any point prior to the actual announcement of Partition. Mr. Jinnah enjoyed a unique position by virtue of having spearheaded the political movement that led to the creation of Pakistan within a short while. He decided to become Governor General as well as the President of Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the country in order to safeguard its interests. Because he was discreet about his intentions his demand shocked the British.
Under the India Independence Act of 1947, a plebiscite was held to decide the future of areas directly administered by the British (British Provinces) but the 562 princely states were at liberty to accede to either of the two independent dominions in the sub-continent. They were expected to be mindful of the wishes of their people. However, their decisions were influenced6 by many other considerations including the advice of the British Agents assigned to them. By August 1947 nearly all of these had formally opted for either India or Pakistan. However, the princes of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir had not. Under the law in force they also became independent on 15 August 1947. A month later Junagadh, with a predominantly Hindu population, opted for Pakistan
– India annexed the territory pending a plebiscite. Hyderabad Deccan, with a predominantly Hindu population, postponed a final decision and began negotiations with both India and Pakistan; it was asking for a semi-independent status with direct links to the Commonwealth when it was annexed by India in September 1948. The Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, which had a predominantly Muslim population (85%) decided to opt for India after signing letters of accession to both India and Pakistan: Pakistan objected and war broke out. On 24 October
1947 Muslim volunteers, including those from the North West Frontier Province, announced the establishment of a ‘Provisional Government of Kashmir.’ The United Nations intervened and resolved to hold a plebiscite under UN auspices. India agreed to a plebiscite. Subsequently, New Delhi refused to honour its pledge and continued to occupy two- thirds of the state.7 This and a number of other disputes that were born with the territorial dispensation at the time of Partition, created a regional environment in which the destabilisation of civil order and the manipulation of the internal security situation in Pakistan became possible.
A boundary commission was established prior to Partition but a rough outline of the swathes of territory that were to be a part of Pakistan, was on official maps and being studied long before that. Mr. Jinnah was aware of all this and appeared to go along with the plans being made. He kept his counsel while developing a strategy to safeguard the future of Pakistan. Plebiscite or no plebiscite, regardless of the expressed future intentions and the negotiations of the princely states with representatives of the Muslim League and Congress, the territories assigned to Pakistan were initially in three large patches that were separated from each other by Indian territory.8 The status of the Northern Areas and Kashmir was, ostensibly, not decided: theoretically the princely states were free to opt for either country. However, there was no doubt that the British could, and would, use their influence and advise the princes to go one way or the other in order to create a new power equation in the independent sub-continent. The princely states of Dir, Chitral, Amb and Hunza were well-advised by the British agent there and acceded to Pakistan promptly. They retained substantial autonomy in administration and customary law and continue to be a bulwark against conspiracies against Pakistan. According to off-the-record accounts, it did not appear to be the intention of the British government to allow these areas, particularly Kashmir, to become part of Pakistan as this would have strengthened the new state territorially and politically to an extent that did not fit in with their plans for the future of the sub-continent.
According to the territorial dispensation at the time of Partition the source of rivers supplying water to argi-based Pakistan’s vital irrigation system was to remain under Indian control. During the first few years, waters were apportioned under the 4 May 1948 inter-dominion accord which met immediate needs: after intense negotiations that were broken off several times, the World Bank facilitated dialogue, a limited settlement of the water dispute was reached and the Indus Basin Waters Treaty was signed (16 September 1960).9 The terms of the Treaty were such that without building a number of medium-sized dams and reservoirs at strategic locations, West Pakistan could not safeguard its interests with regard to water security. Instead of building medium-sized dams and reservoirs, Pakistan built the mammoth Tarbela Dam, which besides being a drain on the economy for decades, is a security risk: according to one calculation, if anything were to happen to it a large part of Pakistan would be under water. East Pakistan was surrounded by Indian territory on three sides and buffeted by Bay of Bengal cyclones on the third.
Bahawalpur and Khairpur also acceded to Pakistan. The people of the North West Frontier Province voted for Pakistan in the plebiscite that was held there but the Congress government in the province was hostile to the concept of Pakistan: it had even asked its followers not to take part in the plebiscite. Afghanistan and the Indian government cultivated hostile elements within the province and to this day, they continue to use the remnants of such elements to destabilise the area and weaken Pakistan from within. The only country to cast a vote against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations in 1947 was Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a problem. Its claims on Pakistani territory were based on the ethnic proclivity of tribes on both sides of the border. Pakistan upheld the treaties that Afghanistan and Britain had signed and refused further discussion on the Durand Line. The issue of a porous western border with an ethnically related population has plagued Pakistan since it came into existence: there appears to be little doubt that it has been used by a number of external forces, both national and sub-national, to influence the security environment in Pakistan.
In Balochistan the Khan of Kalat exploited some clauses of Kalat’s 1876 treaty with the British and declared independence on 15 August 1947. His real objective in doing so appeared to be the negotiation of favourable terms with Pakistan. A number of other sardars followed suit. In 1948 the matter was settled when the Khan signed formal merger documents. This was followed by his final removal from power and abolition of the state’s boundaries in 1955. In 1958 the Sultan of Oman sold Gwadar, which had been given to one of his ancestors by the Khan of Kalat, back to Pakistan.10
After Partition the Quaid sent official emissaries and then travelled to Balochistan to meet the erstwhile sardars himself. These included Nawab Akbar Bugti, with whom he was photographed shaking hands. Those government officials who went to Balochistan for the first time after Partition and were more familiar with the developed provinces of the sub-continent, were shocked by the inertia and total lack of economic activity in the province and resolved to do something about it: it was not by chance that the Quaid spent his last days in Ziarat.
The development of Balochistan with its rich natural resource base, unspoiled coastline, sparse, economically weak population and feudal environment, has remained problematic. The sardars have enduring personal and political links with the states of the Gulf, Afghanistan and Iran and informal trade with all three which is an important source of income in the area.11 This continues to create foreign policy issues for the federal government. It also makes policing the area difficult.
The recommendations of the Boundary Commission were a refined version of earlier maps and met little opposition in Bengal, where Mahatma Gandhi was present and used his influence to control communal violence. He hoped that by avoiding bloodshed there would be a chance for some degree of reunification of the sub-continent at some point in the future. Mahatma Gandhi could not be in two places at the same time: demarcation in the Punjab was resented by the Sikhs. Although the actual boundaries of the two states were not known until the 17 August announcement by the boundary commission, large scale violence began soon after the announcement of the date for independence. Muslim majority areas were expected to go to Pakistan and Hindu majority areas were to be merged with the Indian Union but the demarcation lines left large segments of the Muslim population in India and Hindu and Sikh population in territory that was to be Pakistan. Vicious communal rioting, massacres and a mass movement of population began shortly after the 3 June 1947 announcement of the date of the transfer of power on 14-15 August 1947.
The administrative machinery, physical assets and economic and human resources available to Pakistan, as well as the manner in which they were utilized by successive political and military governments, have been an important factor impinging on internal security. The division of the assets of British India between Pakistan and the Indian Union was at a ratio of 5:17 respectively by decision of the Viceroy’s Council in June 1947.12 Division was difficult to negotiate and implement. Although an agreement was reached in December 1948, the actual settlement of various financial disputes went on till 1960. Division of the Indian Civil and Police service was also hard on Pakistan: only 101 of the 1157 officers of the Indian civil service were Muslims. Of these just 95 opted for Pakistan. One Christian, eleven military officers transferring to the civil service and fifty British officers also came to Pakistan as did a small number of professionals. Most had less than ten years of experience.13 The weakness of the administrative setup, relative lack of oversight and poor possibility of recourse to the law due to the chaotic conditions prevailing in the new country, was tempting for the corrupt. In the civil disorder that followed the migration of about two million Muslims from the territories of the Indian Union to Pakistan and the departure of Hindus and Sikhs for Indian Union territories, the plunder and unauthorized occupation of evacuee properties came to the notice of the Quaid, who warned civil servants not to succumb to greed.
There were few Muslim officers in the British Indian army. One major-general, two brigadiers and six colonels opted for Pakistan. Including the middle and junior ranks there were just 2500 officers. 500
British officers were retained by Pakistan during the period of transition. Most of those in the technical services were under qualified. The first two commanders-in-chief of the Pakistan army were British. Similarly the navy and the air force were commanded by British officers until 1953 and 1957 respectively. There were only nine regular officers in the navy and sixty-five pilots in the air force. The army was expected to be 150,000 strong. Most of the ordnance factories were in areas that became part of the Indian Union. Pakistan’s share of military material had to be wrested from India despite the division of assets agreement. There were no ships and only two of the ten squadrons of the Royal Indian Air Force were given to Pakistan. In fact, during the first few months after Partition, Pakistan had no armed forces to speak of and was not really in a position to counter India’s aggressive takeovers of territory, hence the need to call for volunteers to counter Indian aggression in Kashmir.
Prior to Independence, the police and paramilitary forces of British India were used to further the political objectives of the government besides being responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Their duties were specified in Article 23 of the Indian Police Act of 1861 with revisions made in 1888 and the Police Rules of 1934. By and large these legal instruments continue to be the basis for internal security services in Pakistan.14 Law and order continues to be the responsibility of the provincial governments and there is no doubt that the police is still used to further the political objectives of sitting governments. Centrally administered areas and the tribal areas in the north and northwest are under the Frontier Crime Regulations that have been amended recently.15
The central government controls a number of forces such as the railroad police and airport security force, anti-corruption and anti-narcotics force. The central government also has a number of paramilitary organizations such as frontier corps, frontier constabulary, rangers and other paramilitary organizations that have a link with government intelligence agencies and the military, and these tend to serve the political interests of governments in power.
Traditions in law enforcement handed down by the British colonists of the sub-continent continued in the worst possible form in Pakistan, an independent state: protection of the public and law enforcement have taken second place to enforcement of the political agenda of the government in power. Successive governments have established police agencies with special powers, such as the FSF (Federal Security Force) set up by Z. A. Bhutto and the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) set up by Musharraf in order to intimidate any opposition to their rule and further their own political agenda under the guise of law enforcement. Each successive military government was more brutal than the previous one in its efforts to break the spirit of the civilian public – and all used the police and paramilitary forces to intimidate and harass the people.
This was the strength of the administrative core that had to deal with complex internal and external security problems in the new state of Pakistan. At the outset there were severe economic, logistic and administrative challenges since the territorial dispensation did not allow for complementarities in the division of assets. Food security was an enormous issue. Excess wheat produced in West Pakistan was traditionally used in areas that were now part of the Indian Union. Cotton produced there was used by mills in Bombay and other Indian cities. Out of the four major ports in British India, Pakistan got only Karachi. Commodities were in short supply. Initially, Pakistan and the Indian Union allowed the free movement of goods, persons and capital for a year but this agreement broke down in November 1947. Pakistan levied export duties on jute, India on other items.
When the British Pound was devalued in September 1949, India followed suit but Pakistan did not; India severed trade relations with Pakistan. There was a rise in the prices of commodities produced in Pakistan after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. These commodities included jute and cotton. Pakistan quickly constructed jute and cotton mills and established trade relations with new partners. Although trade relations with India were restored in 1951 they were never critical to Pakistan’s existence. Those early years saw the construction of a powerful, self-sufficient economic base – but restraint and self-sacrifice was required to strengthen it. Similar opportunities to strengthen the
Pakistan economy have arisen during the past three decades as a result of changes in the global and regional security environment. Unfortunately, politicians working with the military in the country have only used such opportunities to increase their own personal wealth, not the wealth of the nation. The common civilian has been left with a bankrupt economy where only occasional pockets of prosperity exist.
Several security problems were thus embedded in various dispensations at the time of Partition and were never resolved satisfactorily. A number of security challenges Pakistan has faced, and will continue to face, are a result of fault lines created by the nature of the geographical and administrative division of the sub-continent into two independent states. Studies reveal that, from time to time, these fault lines have been activated, exploited and manipulated to create crises and security issues. This has been done by highly motivated and ambitious individuals and groups working with external forces in order to seize control of and exploit the country, its resources and the geo-strategic environment in their own interest: the poor quality and moral corruption of the leadership has been, and continues to be, a major cause of security problems in Pakistan. The discourse that follows should reveal how cleverly the future of the Muslims of the sub-continent was shackled to the limitations within the dispensations of Partition, and how astutely the limited potential of the political leadership that would be available to Pakistan after the physically frail Quaid passed away, was judged.
The economic, political and external security challenges faced by Pakistan during the early years were compounded by the swift degradation of the political environment after the death of the Quaid. By that time about 50 percent of the population in urban areas consisted of Muslim refugees. Even before the assassination of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, his Muslim League was losing control of the country and was unable to meet the expectations of the people. The politicians and bureaucracy alike had become absorbed in enjoying the trappings of office and power instead of pursuing the public weal. As early as 1949 the need to use laws of preventive detention and those prohibiting the gathering of more than five persons were being used again. In 1949 the Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA) was enacted to allow the government to disqualify persons found guilty of ‘misconduct,’ a broad term that could be interpreted in many ways. In 1952, the Security of Pakistan Act expanded the powers of the government in the interests of public order. The first attempted military coup d’etat in Pakistan took place in March 1951. The Chief of General Staff of the Army and fourteen other officers were caught in Rawalpindi, conspiring to overthrow the government. They were tried and convicted but subsequently set free.
By April 1953, in a wrangle over limitations on executive power, the Governor General had installed a cabinet in which one serving General and one Major General on civilian duty, were ministers. This provided the military with an opportunity to play a direct role in politics. Twenty days after his appointment on 7 October 1958 as Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Ayub replaced Iskander Mirza and took control of the country. Thereafter a cycle of long periods of oppressive, spirit- shattering military dictatorship followed. These were interspersed by intervals of managed democracy characterised by carefully engineered crises and chaos.
The results of the indirect presidential elections of 2 January1965 were revealing because only the younger sister of the Quaid-e-Azam, Miss Fatima Jinnah, was the candidate of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) and was seen to enjoy overwhelming support in both East and West Pakistan. But she had to be defeated, one way or other (she eventually died in mysterious circumstances in Karachi on 8 July 1967) in order to keep Ayub Khan in power. This was done by rigging the elections. Language riots during the 1960s targeted the so-called Mohajir community which had sided with the Miss Fatima Jinnah and the COP during the 1964 election campaign.16
The September 1965 war with India, for which the ground had not really been prepared in Kashmir, and from which few expected results by way of territory in Kashmir, was aimed to win goodwill for the Ayub regime and bolster support for the armed forces. However growing discontent compelled Ayub Khan to step down and he handed over power to General Yahya Khan who organized elections in 1970. However he refused to allow the Awami League of East Pakistan which had won a majority of the seats in the National Assembly to form the government.
This and the unpopularity of the regime paved the way for the uprising in East Pakistan that would eventually lead to war and an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Indian army that landed more than 90,000 Pakistanis, including approximately 60,000 hapless soldiers, in Indian prisoner of war camps and the break-up of the country.
During the 1950s and 1960s Pashtun nationalist elements continued to be active in the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Some elements on both side of the Pak-Afghan border favoured the creation of a Pashtun state regardless of the impractical nature of such a proposal. However, Pashtuns were well represented in the civil service as well as the armed forces and succeeding generations had relatively moderate political views.17 The collapse of the Afghan state, its invasion by the Soviet Union, the influx of 1.5 million Afghan refugees, the cross-border US war with the Soviets, the radicalization of the Jihadis and the disorder they created in the area, as well as India’s increasingly intrusive policy created an environment in which the most radical demand in recent years has been for a change of name for the province. Nationalist elements themselves are in power, and they are now responsible for controlling the activities of militants in the area.
The military operations in the tribal areas, as well as Swat and Dir have been viewed with scepticism in some quarters. Many locals are of the view that the problem was created by elements within the military itself, as a strategic diversion within the war on terror. Others believe that the radicalization of Islam in this area has taken place under military patronage. About two million people were displaced as a result of the military operation in Swat and Buner and are now moving back to rebuild their shattered lives.18
In Baluchistan there were periods of armed conflict in 1948 and 1958. Between 1973 and 1977 there was a nationalist insurgency that was subdued by the army and this resulted in thousands of deaths. India and Afghanistan were accused of providing support to the nationalists.
The Baluchistan Liberation Army established in 1980 by Khairbux Marri has re-surfaced recently. All this should never have happened. Once the gas fields had been discovered the local population should have been closely involved in their development and subsequent operation. A settlement on royalty should have been based on formulae acceptable to all parties: in many parts of the world electricity, oil and gas produced in one region is utilized at subsidized rates in other parts of the country but exported at higher rates. The construction of the Gwader port was another opportunity to provide the fruits of development to the people of Baluchistan but that opportunity was also lost when even the semi- skilled labour for the task was brought in from other provinces and the local population was ignored. The same thing happened when deep sea fishing contracts were awarded to foreign firms. This not only depleted the marine resources, but also impoverished the local population still further because they were deprived of their traditional source of food and income. This intolerable situation has been compounded by repression and even target killing of those who voiced their opposition and sought redress of their grievances.
The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti resulted in bitter resentment among the people of the area against the Pakistan government. Tensions continue to simmer and a war-like situation prevails. The Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad was another avoidable episode. The religious seminary attached to the mosque had been constructed with the knowledge of the government. It was surrounded by the armed forces and hundreds of its resident students, men, women and children died in the subsequent firing. The two men running the seminary had obviously been brainwashed over a period of time and did not appear to be in their senses. The intervention of religious scholars who had offered to mediate was rejected just as it was about to bear fruit. There was a spate of suicide bombings after the tragedy. The people who came to collect the bodies of their dead children were mostly from the NWFP and FATA. Most were very poor. They were broken and shattered. This again generated bitterness and the society was further radicalized.19
Sectarian tension was exacerbated and found expression in bomb attacks time and again on Shia and Sunni mosques, as well as target killing of scholars and religious leaders of both sects. It was suggested that the Ulema of the two sects should, without reservation, condemn any such incident and be seen standing together for instance, at funeral prayers for the victims of sectarian violence to pre-empt serious civil disorder. This did not materialize.
The Islamic Revolution of Iran had an enormous impact on the political psyche of the West Asian region. In essence, the region moved out of the effective sphere of influence of Western governments. Afghanistan became a crucible of international intrigue during the late 1970s and 1980s. The Soviet Union had occupied Afghanistan and the United States launched cross-border operations from Pakistan to dislodge the Soviets. This cross-border military activity radicalized the culture of the tribal belt and the Muslim mercenaries entering to wage Jihad under the United States acquired the military sophistication and the technical know-how that they never could have acquired in any other way. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan was left in the lurch and had to contend with armed jihadis who sought to impose their own interpretation of Islam in the region. This continued till the fateful events of 9/11.
September 11, 2001 was a heaven-sent opportunity for the military rulers who seized power in 1999 from the elected government of Nawaz Sharif. The Musharraf regime had been shunned by the Clinton Administration. 9/11 provided the military-dominated government an opportunity to ingratiate itself with the Bush Administration by offering unconditional support for its war on terror and invasion of Afghanistan. The regime could now ask for restoration of assistance that had been blocked when the country conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, in response to those of India earlier in that month. It could also look forward to years of fruitful and rewarding cooperation in security in the style of Zia-ul-Haq. The beneficiaries were the members and associates of the regime. The cost, of course, would be paid by the demonising the tribal belt and Islam. The new regime was ruthless in enforcing corporate values in governance for ‘profit maximisation’ and returns that it then applied in its own interest. However, their activities discredited the armed forces in the eyes of the civilian public.
In an introduction to a research paper on Pakistan’s political and security challenges 20 (House of Commons Library, London), the authors state, ‘Pakistan has had a central role as an incubator of militant Islam since the 1980s. Equally, despite the fact that there have been several periods of civilian rule, democracy has failed to put down roots in the country. The military has been a powerful player within the polity and economy since independence.’ The truth of the matter is that the people of Pakistan have, time and again, dislodged military dictators through street power only to find a new one prepared and ready in the wings. The desire for justice, a democratic dispensation and a belief in representative rule, one vote for one person, is very powerful in Pakistan and has enabled the public to strive for these goals under the most oppressive conditions. What we need to check is who, or what, emboldens adventurers who create internal security crises in Pakistan. In the same research paper (quoted above) the authors observe, ‘The US and EU member Governments have been strong supporters of President Musharraf since September 11, 2001, donating billions in military, humanitarian and development assistance….’ Since a record numbers of civilians live below the poverty line today none of the humanitarian and development assistance appears to have reached the civilian public in Pakistan. According to one report virtually all the money, USD 5 billion, was routed through the Department of Defence Coalition Support Funds to reimburse key allies in the global war on terror and there is little documentation of how the money was used.21 There are several other US programs with little oversight, under which the Pakistan military leadership is said to have benefited enormously.
The answer to internal security challenges in Pakistan lies in identifying a statesman who has never taken anything from Pakistan, who needs nothing from Pakistan, who has everything and who is only interested in the public weal. In fact the real answer to Pakistan’s internal security challenges is another Quaid. Only then will the games that lesser men have been playing in this country stop.
References:
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2 Tuker, Lieut- General. Sir Francis, While Memory Serves: Cassell & Company Ltd- London:1950.
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18 A Job Well Done, Editorial, The Nation, July 20, 2009
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20 House of Commons Library, Research Paper 07/68; 13 September 2007.
21 The Center for Public Integrity: Billions in Aid With No Accountability Pakistan re- ceives the most post 9/11 U.S military funding; 5/31/2007.
