By
Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal TI (M)[1]
Abstract
Jihadi organizations have their variants under various brands such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Fatah, etc. They are struggling for political rights and or independence in disputed territories, recognized as conflicts by the UN. The Muslim character of these organizations does not imply that such struggles have an inherent Muslim character. History is replete with examples of such struggles by non-Muslim entities as well. Most of the Jihadi tactics have been practiced by their non–Muslim equivalents. Academic inquiry needs to grant similar allowances to Jihad and Jihadis while making a comparative evaluation. – Author)
Introduction
War is an organized, armed, and often a prolonged conflict that is carried on between states, nations, or other parties typified by extreme aggression, social disruption, and usually high mortality[i]. War should be understood as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities, and therefore is defined as a form of political violence. The set of techniques used by a group to carry out war is known as warfare. An absence of war (and other violence) is usually called peace. In 1832, Carl Von Clausewitz, in his treatise ‘On War’, defined war as follows: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”.[ii] There are many ways of categorizing war, for example: by expanse (total or limited war); by medium (land, sea, air war); by weapon (atomic, biological, chemical etc); by cause (humanitarian, holy, preventive etc).[iii]
Evolution of Warfare: A Fast Forward Preview
Since the last decade of the 20th century, strategists have witnessed profound changes in the world. There has not been any decade in history in which the changes have been more pronounced than the two commencing 1991. Causes behind these changes are numerous. Nevertheless, only a few reasons are pointed out rather frequently. One such reason is the first Gulf War (1991)[iv]. This war changed the world significantly. Such a generalized conclusion about a war which occurred one time in, a limited area, and which only lasted 42 days seems like a gross exaggeration[v]—indeed breaching the boundaries of fiction. The second one is America led invasion of Afghanistan in 2010. War is on for over a decade, with no victory in sight.
In the wake of the First Gulf war, a whole generation of new terminologies began to surface after January 17,1991: the former Soviet Union; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Kosovo; cloning; Microsoft; hackers; the Internet; the Southeast Asian financial crisis; the Euro; as well as the world’s final and only superpower — the United States, etc[vi]. These tags, ever-since, constitute the main subjects. All these are related to that war, either directly or indirectly. However, caution is due; intent is not to mythicize war, and romanticize a lopsided war in which there was such a great difference in the actual power of the opposing parties. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the war has itself not changed, rather, it has transformed from those wars which could be described in glorious and dominating terms, which people originally felt was one of the more important roles to be played out on the world stage, has at once taken the seat of a B actor[vii]. However, a war which changed the world, ultimately changed war itself–not the changes in the instruments of war, the technology of war, the modes of war, or the forms of war but the function of warfare[viii].
In the aftermath of “Desert Storm,” America has not been able to achieve a comprehensive victory[ix]. Whether it was in Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, the second invasion of Iraq or occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, this has invariably been the case. It did win tactical battles, however these did not translate in to strategic victory—durable peace. The only certain point is that, from Desert storm onwards, war was no longer poised to follow its traditional trajectory and format. Each embarrassment augmented frustration and addition of more power, in terms of quality and quantity—the surge strategy. Lethality increased many folds and the list of achievable objectives shrank with each new experience.
Faced with political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, ethnic, and religious issues which are more complex in reality than the foggy perception in the minds of most of the current military men in the world, the limitations of the military means, which had earlier on been successful, suddenly became apparent.
The issues of ‘Asabiyya’[x], alongside it’s all attendant manifestations, under focus by Ibn-e- Khaldoon, back in the 14th century[xi] have come back to haunt the 20th century warrior, redefining the extent to which military power could be employed in the traditional sense and the limitation of the objectives which could be achieved through such application of the military component in a national strategy. Enormity of committed means no longer bears a traditional linear relationship with the achieved ends. Law of diminishing returns became more and more relevant. Wars have resulted in more and more destruction with no clear cut victory in sight. The process that began in Vietnam appears to be culminating in Afghanistan.
It is premature to determine whether this trend would lead to making large armies obsolete. Nevertheless, it will not cause war to vanish from this world; its form would certainly change. In this sense, there is reason for us to maintain that the financial attack by George Soros on East Asia, the terrorist attack on the US embassy by Osama Bin Laden, the gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the havoc wreaked by the likes of Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree of destruction was by no means second to that of a war represent semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of warfare. Even in the so-called post-modern, post-industrial age, warfare will not be totally dismantled. It has only re-invaded human society in a more complex, more extensive, concealed, and subtle manner.
While we forecast a relative reduction in military violence, at the same time we definitely also see an increase in political, economic, cultural and technological, violence. However, regardless of the form violence takes, war is war, and a change in the external appearance does not keep any war from abiding by the principles of war. If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means, including armed force or non armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests”, then this represents change; indeed a change in war and a change in the modes of war[xii].
On 9/11, planes carrying innocent non-combatant civilians rammed into the ill-fated towers and other targets, killing over 3500 civilians. Barring a handful of hijackers, the rest were never a part of the planning and execution of these attacks. They wanted to live and let others live. All hijackers were of Arab origin, yet Afghanistan was chosen for occupation. Such facets of contemporary warfare haunt the human conscience. It raises many questions, to which there is no satisfactory answer.
Generational Models of War and Jihad
Though one could take various routes for a comparative study of modern war and Jihad, generational models of warfare present an ‘easy to comprehend methodology’. Jihad has striking resemblances with 3 GW when we consider it from an interstate warfare perspective; and has amazing resemblances with 4 GW and 5 GW models in the context of today’s asymmetric episodes.
Robert David Steele, who has written extensively about unconventional and non-traditional threats, was amongst the first ones to speak of “5th Generation Warfare.” He says, “The US is stuck between 2nd Generation “mass” warfare and 3rd Generation “maneuver” or precision warfare[xiii]. We have not adjusted to 4th Generation or “asymmetric” warfare—suicidal volunteers able to blow up buildings, pipelines, and transmission towers. We are simply not trained, equipped, nor organized to find, fix, and fight individuals or sub-state networked organizations…The Bush Administration has elevated terrorism to a six-front hundred-year war (which) we may lose.” [xiv]
“5th Generation or “holistic warfare” requires a coherent global security strategy that places its primary emphasis on nurturing legitimate governance everywhere. Only legitimate governments can be effective for providing internal security against the minority seeking to be terrorist.” [xv]Good governance itself is not an entity hung in vacuum. It has sound grounding in ideological and cultural roots and it oozes out of socio-political justice[xvi].
“5th Generation warfare is total war through total engagement, and it demands that the first priority be on both homeland education and infrastructure, followed by very high investments in global peaceful preventive measures (what Joe Nye calls ‘soft power’), with narrowly focused military intervention being a last resort. Absent a Berlin Airlift for Afghanistan and an immediate Marshall Plan for Iraq, we will ultimately be forced out of both countries on unfavourable terms.”[xvii]
Almost all civilizations, cultures and religions have been using war as instrument of policy; they have been glorifying their acts of war as well as warriors, while at the same time demonizing those of the adversary. Rival states have been fighting each other and states have even been unleashing lethal weapons against their own dissenting citizens. Political struggle by dissident ethno-religious individuals and entities has a long history. Intra-state conflicts at times did surpass inter-state conflicts in terms of atrocities.
Some representative non-Muslim cousins of Jihadi organizations are: LTTE, IRA, Shiv Sena, Naxalites, Vietcong, Khmer Rouge, Babbar Khalsa, Red Indians etc. Some succeeded in their struggles; others were extinguished in the process. Likewise, Crusades and Maha-Bharat are non-Muslim equivalents of Jihad.
Nevertheless, the core questions are whether all that is being labeled as Jihad falls within its preview or is the terminology being used as umbrella coverage for additional ulterior motives as well? Likewise, does all that is being bracketed as terrorism fall within the scope of terrorism or is the context being used to advance other politico- strategic objectives?
At the highest levels of civilizational discourse, the antipathy between historical perceptions of Islam and the Muslim historical and psychological perceptions of the west still persist and await a satisfactory resolution.
The recent rise of Jihadi mindset can be viewed as a result of the historic Muslim perception of being victims at the hands of a dominant West on various counts. Like the failures of the western dominated international organizations, say the UN, to deliver a fair deal to Muslims, examples are: Kashmir, Palestine and Cyprus conflicts. Muslims also feel that when non-Muslims are likely to be the beneficiaries of a settlement, western countries and their affiliate institutions manage a quick settlement, examples they quote are: East Timor, Ireland, Sudan etc.
At our domestic level, one set of Jihadis proclaim Jihad against other states; some entities also view the Pakistani state and its institutions and agencies as legitimate targets of Jihad. In the context of Pakistan, Jihadi organizations emerged as a result of Indian occupation of Kashmir through military intervention justified by a dubious instrument of accession by the Maharaja of Kashmir[xviii]. The matter was taken to the United Nations by India where it pledged to hold a plebiscite to ascertain the aspirations of the Kashmiris. Later, India reneged and has persistently worked to erode the legitimacy of the plebiscite. The Kashmir dispute continues to be on the UN agenda; UN observers are stationed on the ‘Line of Control’. The first group of United Nations military observers arrived in the mission area on 24 January of 1949 to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. These observers, under the command of the Military Adviser appointed by the UN Secretary-General, formed the nucleus of the ‘United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan’ (UNMOGIP)[xix]. The mission continues to date[xx].
Furthermore, the rise of the Jihadi phenomena in Pakistan is also attributed to the state’s abdication of its fundamental social security obligations like education, health cover, provision and administration of places for worship, disaster management, etc; the void has been filled by non-government entities, which have proliferated their sphere of influence at the cost of the state’s writ. This encroachment has reached a critical point, whereby these outfits tend to take over the vital state function of War in the name of Jihad.
The concept of modern ‘War’ has gone through a process of evolution. Warfare is a violent conflict between armed enemies. Methods of warfare change continually. 3rd Generation warfare evolved during WWI, it represents inter-state warfare where armies are pitched against armies. Warring States have control over their armies. It is characterized by the tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy’s combat forces rather than seeking to close on and destroy the adversary. Strategies are: indirect approach, maneuver warfare, defence in depth, by-passing the enemy to attack his rear. Victory required the ability to instill madness — to mess with the enemy’s minds, paralyze the enemy with doubt. An example is the Second World War[xxi]. Characteristics are: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next. Methods of fighting: tanks/bombers pitched against cities and armies.
The fourth – generation model of war represents a framework covering warfare between the state and non-state entities. Likewise, the concept of fifth- generation warfare has enabled the scope of ‘war’ to expand considerably, and yet remain an undeclared activity; hence a war may end without the adversary even realizing that there ever was one!
Moreover, the concept of synthesizing kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare, in various combinations, to achieve optimum synergy goes well beyond the scope of a traditional concept of military strategy. The use of soft power for influence peddling, regularization of intrigue and acceptance of proxy war as, at least, quasi-legitimate means of furthering national strategic objectives has blurred the distinction between the traditional concept and the in-vogue concept of war. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the bias of a just war shifted from those oppressed by colonists to those persecuted by their own government anywhere. Strong doctrinal support has evolved for legitimizing forcible interventions on the pretext of preventing violations of international human rights. This interpretation has been stretched beyond the intended mandate and has been misused to paddle efforts for forcible regime changes by inciting dissident elements within various states. Likewise, UNSCR 1973 and 1979 were misinterpreted and the mandate to establish a no-fly zone was illegitimately expanded to impose a full fledged war on Libya, that ended with the killing of President Qaddafi.
4 GW represents a situation where a typical nation state is pitched against non-state actors, like LTTE, Hezbollah, etc. It describes warfare’s return to a decentralized form. It is characterized by blurring the distinction between war and politics, soldier and civilian, state and society – having no definable battlefields or fronts. 4 GW is widely dispersed and largely undefined. Actions occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society, as a cultural, not just a physical entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters become rarities because of their vulnerability. The same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, industrial complexes, etc[xxii].
4 GW signifies the nation states’ loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times. The simplest definition includes any ‘war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent non-state actor.’ It follows classical tactics to weaken the advantaged opponent’s will to win. Chairman Mao Zedong was the founder of the modern version of 4 GW. The Vietnam War was also a 4 G war. Ancient examples include: the assassination of Julius Caesar by members of the Roman Senate & the martyrdom of early Muslim caliphs.
4 GW are complex and long term wars. Violence by non-state actors, also referred to as terrorism, is one of the tactics, having a non-national or transnational base. This type of warfare lacks formal hierarchy as well as C&C structures and involves a direct attack on the enemy’s culture, civilization, ideology, etc. It incorporates highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through media manipulation. All available pressures are employed, i.e. political, economic, social, military, etc.
4GW is a low intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks. Non-combatants are a tactical dilemma. The elements involved are small in size but widely spread out in terms of networks of communication and financial support.
Contemporary usage of 4 GW can be traced to the cold war period, as major powers struggled to retain grip over colonies and captured territories. Unable to withstand direct combat against regular armed forces, non-state entities used tactics of persuasion, movement-building, secrecy, terror, and/or confusion to overcome the force and technological gaps. It may involve insurgent groups / violent non-state actor(s), trying to implement their own government or to reestablish an old government over the current ruling power.
The aim of the 4 G warrior is to force the state adversary to expand manpower and money in an attempt to establish order, ideally in such a highhanded way that it merely increases disorder and the struggle continues till the state is overstretched, surrenders or withdraws.
If the older generation wars were like fluids, 4 GW is like a gas. It spreads everywhere yet regular armies have a hard time even finding the battle fields[xxiii]. Like 3 GW, 4 GW focuses on the picture inside the enemy’s head. But while 3 GW tries to destroy the picture, 4 GW builds a new one. While 3 GW tries to paralyze the enemy with doubt, 4 GW tries to deny him even that much — 4 GW drains the will of the enemy so he “waits and sees,” robbing him of his ability to want to do anything. In practice, this means: 4GW tries to destroy an enemy’s civil society, turning his population into mindless cowards. Example: Vietnam War. Characteristic: dispiriting the enemy. Method of fighting: propagandists-to-populations[xxiv].
4 GW tends to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The battle is for “hearts and minds” and winning is defined as controlling the levers of state power. While 4 GW is “messy” in terms of tactics as it primarily attacks soft targets, it is “neat” in terms of grand strategy[xxv]. It entails two well-defined sides, each of whom wishes to win. Recent history is replete with powerful military forces tied up by weaker rivals like: Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, etc.
If traditional war centered on the enemy’s physical strength, and 4 GW on his moral strength, 5 GW focuses on his intellectual strength. War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. One side may remain completely ignorant about whether there ever was a war. 4GW is executed over a very long time frame, sometimes decades. 5GW is conceived in terms of strategic vision over an even longer time frame, sometimes before an opponent realizes that they will be opponents but the execution time may be very short in comparison to 4 GW[xxvi].
It co-opts the enemy by manipulating the enemy’s decision making process so that he becomes “entangled” without being aware of what entangled him; a scenario in which multiple, seemingly unrelated events hurt one nation or a group of nations repeatedly, as if ‘the hand of God’ were behind those events”. [xxvii]
5 GW fighters need not influence all members of a target population but only need to influence the most powerful within that population or those members of the population who are in a position to institute policy changes. The fighter tries to hurt without being hurt — at all. If the world knows the Secret Warrior exists, he loses. 5th Generation War allows very weak fighters to attack, because the world does not know about them. Warriors may implement changes “from above” but not as a result of revolution; rather, “by moving up through legitimate channels to implement an invisible evolution from above.”[xxviii]
In 4GW the enemy attempts to use the target country’s media as a vehicle to sap the people’s and political leaders’ will to fight. In 5GW the enemy actually becomes the media and the political leadership[xxix].
In 4 GW a terrorist organization might attack a school or a court house in order to show that the government can’t defend itself; in 5 GW the enemy would become the teacher and the judge[xxx].
5 GW (unrestricted) may be described as the employer of “all means whatsoever – means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the force of arms, means that involve military power and means that do not involve military power, means that entail casualties, and means that do not entail casualties[xxxi].
Given the rate at which change in warfare is accelerating it is reasonable to accept that 5 GW is already making its appearance. It took hundreds of years from the development of the musket and cannon for 1 GW or Formation Warfare to evolve. Trench Warfare or 2 GW evolved and peaked in the 100 years, between Waterloo and Verdun. Maneuver Warfare (3 GW) came to maturity in less than 25 years. Fourth Generation or Insurgency Warfare was implemented immediately upon its conception in China around the same time that Third Generation Warfare was implemented in Europe[xxxii].
It includes the appearance of super-empowered individuals and groups with access to modern knowledge, technology, and means to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual and group interests. It has also given rise to interesting terminologies like ‘Strategic NCO’, ‘Tactical General’, etc, in terms of respective impact they could have on the situation and in the context of the effects they could generate. Arguably, its first identifiable manifestations occurred in the United States during the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the ricin attacks of 2004. Both sets of attacks required specialized knowledge, included attacks upon federal government offices and facilities, succeeded in disrupting governmental processes, and created widespread fear in the public. The attacks were quite successful in disrupting government processes and creating public fear but, thus far, their motivation remains unknown. Today’s computer hackers, capable of disrupting governments and corporations on a global scale by attacking the Internet with malicious computer programs, may also be forerunners of super-empowered individuals and groups. They have already demonstrated that they are capable of single-handedly waging technological campaigns with overtones of 5GW[xxxiii].
The writings of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, one of the Islamic jihad prime theorists, provide insight into not only the emergence of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare, but also the evolution of al Qaeda as the forerunner of United States adversaries.[xxxiv]
Abu Musab al-Suri’s “The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance,” draws heavily on lessons from past conflicts. It serves as a strategy guide for uniting isolated groups of radical Muslims for a common cause. It proposes a strategy for a truly global conflict on as many fronts as possible and in the form of resistance by super-empowered small cells or individuals, rather than traditional guerrilla warfare. To avoid penetration and defeat by security services, he says, organizational links should be kept to an absolute minimum. He says it would be a mistake for the global movement to pin its hopes on a single group or set of leaders. He clearly says that al-Qaeda was an important step but is not the end step and is not sufficient in itself. His theories of war call for the most deadly weapons possible, and offer a new model aimed at drawing individuals and small groups into a global jihad. Manifestation of these theories can be seen in Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. In each case, the perpetrators organized themselves into local, self-sustaining cells that acted on their own, but also accepted guidance from visiting emissaries of the global movement.[xxxv]
A successful national strategy, as well as transformation of that strategy to match the emergence of a 5 GW threat in the information age is necessary if future attacks are to be defeated or prevented. In a protracted and continuous war of finite conventional resources arrayed against infinite asymmetrical threats, the victim states must strive to comprehensively understand the character of the emerging threat and adapt accordingly.[xxxvi]
Motivation for 5 GW is as likely to be micro-economic as it could be ideological, and may be social or–most likely–some blend of these. To conflate these under any label, be it “jihadists”, “losers and dead-enders” or “militias” is to misunderstand them completely.
Modern weapons and technologies have conferred tremendous power on small actors. One person with a kilo of plastic explosive and a simple detonator can do millions of dollars in damage to key infrastructure. 5 GW is a “holistic” warfare, total war through total engagement[xxxvii].
Countering 5GW requires a coherent global security strategy: legitimate governance and internal security, education and infrastructure, high investments in global peaceful preventive measures. Narrowly focused military intervention is a last resort. 5 GW means systemic liquidation of enemy networks and their sympathizers; it is essentially a total war on a society or subsection of a society[xxxviii].
Comparison
If we treat Jihad as a synonym of war, inclusive of an assortment of contemporary facets of warfare, and a Jihadi as a typical insurgent; many questions stand answered. Through equivalence of Jihad with interstate warfare and, going by the 3G model, we accept that at interstate level Jihad is primarily a function of the state. Only a legitimate state has the authority of declaring Jihad upon another state. The government executing such war bears responsibility for its outcomes and is held accountable for it. There is a mechanism for punishing defaulters of the law of war through the ‘International Criminal Court’. The ‘International Law of War’ binds the belligerents to abide by certain norms and obligations.
Jihadi organizations are not the same as armed forces of a state. These are non- government entities; hence international public law is not applicable to them. However if a state employs these entities as a declared policy, it is accountable for the foreseen or unforeseen consequences of such an application. Nevertheless, such obligations are limited in the case of an internationally recognized dispute to which such a state(s) is a party. If such organizations operate within the boundaries of a state and confine themselves to intra-state militant activities then these would be treated as mutinous elements and the government would confront them through its law- enforcing agencies. The problem becomes complex when these entities are employed by another state without openly acknowledging such application. In such cases, though the state using these entities is responsible for hurting another fellow state, it refuses to become accountable for the effects created by these outfits.
Jihadi organizations have their variants under various brands such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Fatah, etc. They are struggling for political rights and or independence in disputed territories, recognized as conflicts by the UN. The Muslim character of these organizations does not imply that such struggles have an inherent Muslim character. History is replete with examples of such struggles by non-Muslim entities as well. Most of the Jihadi tactics have been practiced by their non–Muslim equivalents. Academic inquiry needs to grant similar allowances to Jihad and Jihadis while making a comparative evaluation.
Conclusion
To conclude lets ponder over how a Jihadi performs differently from his non-Muslim equivalent in 4 & 5 GW? If nothing, then why attach tags to a typical insurgency & insurgent and categorize them as Jihad and Jihadis, just because the terminology and its operatives belongs to a particular faith? Let’s also try to find an answer as to whose war are we fighting? And last but certainly not the least, if the international political disputes leading to emergence of Jihadi/ insurgent organizations find just solutions, such organizations would certainly melt away. This is where the comity of nations needs to put its act together; otherwise, the entire effort would just be an exercise in lawn mowing. Moreover, Muslin academia needs to take a fresh look at Jihad in terms of what it is intended to be as a tenant of Islam, what it has become and how the gap could be bridged so that ‘Jihad’ is not loosely interpreted and erratically practiced.
[1] The author is a Consultant at Islamabad Policy Research Institute on Policy and Strategic Response. He is a former assistant chief of air staff, Pakistan Air Force.
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War ( accessed on June 22, 2012)
[iii] John M. Collins, “Grand Strategy Principles and Practices”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1973.
[iv] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), p.4
[x] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Khaldun (accessed on June 26, 2012. `Asabiyya or asabiyah, an Arabic word, refers to social solidarity with an emphasis on unity, group consciousness, and social cohesion, originally in a context of “tribalism” and “clanism “, but sometimes used for modern nationalism. it is described as the fundamental bond of human society and the basic motive force of history. `Asabiyya is neither necessarily nomadic nor based on blood relations; rather, it resembles philosophy of classical republicanism. In the modern period, the term is generally analogous to solidarity.
[xiii] The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation,
[xiv] Robert Steele; OSS.NET-0- 08/19/2003/, Web sites: www.oss.net .Robert David Steele is a former Marine, former spy, founder of the USMC Intelligence Command, founder of OSS.NET, and author or editor of three books on intelligence.
[xvi] Fifth Generation Warfare?, William S. Lind (February 3, 2004), Article (electronic) published by William S. Lind on February 3, 2004. Site: Defense and the National Interest, Permalink to original: “Fifth Generation Warfare?”
[xviii] A G Noorani, Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir ( Karachi: Oxford University Press ). As excerpted by Books & Authors, Dawn, March 25, 2012.
[xix]UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/ (accessed on June 26, 2012).
[xxi] 5GW Theory Timeline (June 2010), (Originally appeared online at http://timeline.dreaming5gw.com). (accessed on march 13, 2012).
[xxv] The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. http://www.d-n-i.net & http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm
[xxvii] Thomas PM Barnett, ‘System Administration’ based Global Transaction Strategy”, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/
[xxxii] Dr Somnath, Default Is india prepared for 5th generation warfare, July 07,2011. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.indiandefence.com/forums/indian-strategic-forces/9248-india-prepared-5th-generation-warfare.html, (accessed on June 22. 2012)
[xxxvii] Unto the Fifth Generation of War, Mark Safranski (July 17, 2005)
Blog Post published by Mark Safranski on July 17, 2005; Site: ZenPundit, Permalink to original: “Unto the Fifth Generation of War.
