Yasser Latif Hamdani
(It is stated often that many of Jinnah’s actions as Governor General of Pakistan were undemocratic or unconstitutional. Four accusations in particular seem to stick. First, that Jinnah chose to be the Governor-General instead of prime minister; second, that he concentrated power in his own hands; third, that he dismissed the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly); and fourth, that Jinnah chose Urdu as the ‘national’ language. These were contrasted with Nehru in India. In this article I will address the issue of his decision to become the Governor-General, the issue of the dismissal of the NWFP ministry versus the repeated use of Section 93 powers by Nehru, the so called annexation of Kalat and last but not least, I will address the language issue. – Author)
The reason why Jinnah chose to be Governor-General instead of prime minister is plain enough. The Times of London wrote in its editorial of July 11, 1947: “Yet those who will be called to rule Pakistan may hold that relatively undeveloped qualities that make up much of its territory must be guided by a governor general capable of exercising the functions of higher control and co-ordination which formerly vested in a Canning or a Curzon.”[i] The powers Jinnah enjoyed were far less than those enjoyed by either Canning or Curzon, and when compared to, say, powers vested in and assumed by President Abraham Lincoln in the aftermath of the civil war, Jinnah’s powers were toothless[ii].
Even Lord Mountbatten, who never made any effort to hide his ambitions, had more power as Governor-General than Jinnah. Mountbatten was handed — allegedly — a blank piece of paper by Nehru for cabinet selection. Mountbatten presided over not just every major decision of the Indian government but he even commanded and directed the Indian troops in Kashmir. This was far beyond the powers Jinnah had.
As a student of law and constitution, I must state here that in the Empire’s history, a powerful politician like Jinnah taking over as the first Governor-General of a self-governing dominion is the norm and not the exception. Lord Elgin and Lord Dufferin were two such political Governors-General, both instrumental in the formative phase of Canada. Ireland’s first Governor-General of the Dominion was an active party politician (Jinnah on the other hand had resigned from the presidency of the Muslim League soon after independence stating that he could not as Governor-General remain at the head of an avowedly communal organisation). So if Jinnah is to be called autocratic, then from Lincoln to Roosevelt every US president as well as every Dominion Governor-General was autocratic, including India’s first Governor-General.[iii]
So why did Nehru choose to become prime minister instead of Governor-General? Important as Nehru was, he was just one party leader and at best a stalwart amongst at least three others. There was no question of Congress forwarding Nehru’s name for the Governor-General given that he was not a neutral arbiter for the various party factions. He had a major rival in Patel and his position in the Indian pantheon was by no means as absolute as Jinnah’s. Jinnah was — as Nehru wrote in his book, Discovery of India — the only Muslim League politician of noted ability, and entirely without the lure of office. Nehru’s role in India was to be that of a respected party politician and not that of an impartial arbiter that Jinnah’s followers expected.
There are many myths that are woven around Jinnah’s period as Governor-General of Pakistan, one of which was forwarded by Campbell Johnson who inaccurately claimed in his book Mission With Mountbatten that Jinnah applied for powers under the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act 1935 (GOIA 1935). It was the Ninth Schedule of the GOIA 1935 that strengthened the Governor-General and gave him powers to ensure passage of bills in a form that had been recommended by the Governor-General. From July 19, 1947 onwards, the Ninth Schedule was no longer available.
Jinnah’s conduct as the Governor General especially with respect to the provincial legislatures was extremely proper. SM Yusuf, Jinnah’s secretary, writes: “A Provincial Government once wanted then Quaid-e-Azam’s assent to the promulgation of an Ordinance a few days before its Legislature was due to meet. Assent was refused, for bypassing the Legislature was not to be countenanced.”[iv]
A constitutional point of divergence between the Dominion of Pakistan and the Dominion of India was Section 93, which empowered the Governor-General to dismiss provincial legislatures. It was Pakistan that omitted Section 93 and India that adopted it. Therefore, the Pakistani Governor-General could not, in contrast to the Indian Governor-General, dismiss a legislature. This is very relevant in the context of the Khan Ministry dismissal, for that dismissal was not the dissolution of a legislature but simply constitutional maneuvering. The governor of NWFP, after concluding that Dr Khan Sahib no longer commanded the confidence of the House, invited Abdul Qayyum Khan to form the government, which he did. After this, the House was prorogued and reconvened when Qayyum had established a majority before the budget session. Technicality?Perhaps. However, the Canadian Governor-General as late as December 2008 used the same constitutional device to save Prime Minister Harper’s government and no one accused her of being undemocratic.
The dismissal of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) government has long been cited as an example of an early streak of authoritarianism in Pakistan’s history. It is said much of Pakistan’s later crisis of democracy has its roots in this decision. This sound bite has been used by many critics of Jinnah as being one grave example of lack of statesmanship at a critical juncture. I have a different view and I will endeavour to explain why.
Howard Donovan, the Counselor for US Embassy in Delhi, in his periodic report of 26th June, 1948 addressed to US Secretary of State George Marshall, points out that “observers in New Delhi believe that the Muslim League will win the forthcoming referendum and that it is a foregone conclusion that the NWFP will join Pakistan. This is unpalatable to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his recent talks with Jinnah and Gandhi in Delhi were an effort to forestall… Gandhi has supported Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan… Nehru, Patel, and other Congress members of the Government are understood to be opposed to the idea of Pathanistan. It is of course ridiculous for the Congress to oppose independence of Travancore and at the same time espouse the cause of independence for the North West Frontier Province… Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s action will further complicate the situation in the North West Frontier Province and it will in all probability lead to further strife and bloodshed”
On 27th June, 1947, Ghaffar Khan announced that “we have decided to establish Pathanistan which will be an independent state of all Pathans”. He also announced that the British were planning on making NWFP the base of operations against Russia and that the “arrival of Gen Montogomery and his meetings with Mr. M A Jinnah are significant”. Taking a leaf out of Jinnah’s own political vocabulary, he told the Pathans “Let us all organize ourselves and work under the discipline”. He also announced the boycott of the upcoming referendum. The editorial of the decidedly Indian nationalist newspaper “Statesman” for 28th June, 1947 stated that this amounted to an admission that the Frontier Congressmen who had been claiming that they had killed the Pakistan idea in the elections were now “afraid to meet its ghost”. It went on to say “Nor can it be regarded simply as a provincial affair; it carries grave all India implications. It is the first breach in the Mountbatten plan… To that plan the Congress was pledged by Pandit Nehru and AICC. Frontier Gandhi’s boycott then suggests one of the two unpleasant things; either the Congress High Command during the recent New Delhi confabulations possessed insufficient authority to get its decision accepted by its Pathan followers or else it abstained from exercising that authority to the extent which its June 3rd commitments morally required. Perhaps, however, Mahatma Gandhi operating to some extent independently has been a complicating factor. This seems a reasonable deduction from recent comings and goings in the capital… his advocacy of Pathanistan with its Balkanizing implications has involved him in some logical difficulty because of his simultaneous strong denunciation of independence for the state of Travoncore. Of the possible consequences of boycotting the referendum, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his colleagues cannot be unaware. Under June 3 plan it was to be the lynchpin of all future constitutional change in the province. Refusal to participate thus looks like an attempt to disintegrate the procedure before it has begun… That the difficult process of the referendum should be followed not long after by general election might cause grave disorder even chaos. Yet if the votes recorded next month result in the province joining Pakistan – as now seems inevitable- it is not easy to see how a ministry which has always opposed and derided Pakistan should remain in office.”
On 2nd July, 1947, Pakistan Times carried a story by API with Peshawar Dateline of 30th June which said that “The idea of an independent Afghan state between Punjab and Afghanistan is supported by the Kabul newspaper, Islah, the semi-official organ of the Afghan Government which says there is no reason why these Afghans should be forced to live under the domination of Indians of Pakistan or Hindustan as slaves.”
Henry Grady of the US Embassy in Delhi in his report of 1st July to the Secretary of State wrote: “Jinnah’s charge in June 28 statement that Frontier Congress’ resolution demanding free Pathan state is ‘direct breach’ of Congress acceptance [of] His Majesty’s Government’s June 3rd Plan seems fully justified. Frontier Congress Resolution favored establishment of a ‘Free Pathan State of all Pakhtoons; constitution based on Islamic conceptions of democracy; and refusal by all Pathans to submit to any non Pakhtoon authority’. Jinnah pointed out Gandhi speaking at AICC meeting urged acceptance June 3rd Plan which provided for referendum to decide whether Frontier should join Hindustan or Pakistan; Frontier Congress was bound to honor agreement. Gandhi, however, has encouraged Khan Brothers ‘to sabotage’ plan and sudden volte-face is ‘pure political chicanery’, Jinnah said only constitution which Pakistan CA could frame would provide for ‘autonomous unit’ but Khan brothers have made false charge that Pakistan CA would ‘disregard fundamental principles of Shariat and Quranic laws’… Gandhi’s decision to effect boycott of NWFP referendum appears to be deliberate effort to embarrass League… While the Afghan Government must realize it is not in a position to control the tribes, it might be tempted to annex the tribal territories and NWFP… Therefore while League will obviously win referendum current Congress campaign, based on wholly on party considerations with no regard for international angle, could produce conditions in NWFP more precarious than at present.” Prophetic words for what we have been witnessing till today.
On 3rd July, in a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Atlee himself, the India and Burma committee met to discuss inter alia the situation in NWFP. Here the League’s position as expressed to Mountbatten that the League was not ready to give any assurances regarding the continuation of treaty obligations of the British Raj was cited as irresponsible and it must be pointed out to the League that this would weaken its case on the NWFP considerably. On 4th of July, the Indian Cabinet met with Nehru, Patel, Rajagopalachari and Liaquat Ali Khan amongst others where the Government of India refuted Afghan Government’s claims on NWFP declaring that it had no locus standi. Thus both Muslim League and Congress high command were on the face of it aligned with each other on this fundamental question. In private the Frontier Congressmen were already conceding that a fair referendum would yield a favorable result for Pakistan. Yet their insistence on boycott of the referendum continued for public consumption. Rob Lockhart wrote to Mountbatten on 3rd July, 1947 saying “Although the Ministers admitted that there was no question of the North West Frontier Province wishing to join the Hindustan constituent assembly and appeared to agree that there was no way of putting any other alternative before the people except Pakistan or Hindustan without changing the plan of 3rd June, 1947, they would not agree to modify their statement.”
Defending the indefensible, Nehru wrote, in a telegram addressed to one M K Vellodi on 4th July, ” no breach of pledge involved in abstention from referendum by Frontier Congress” but admitting that “quite clear that there is no demand for separate sovereign state as everyone realizes Frontier province too small and weak for such existence”. Apparently Nehru sahib was not reading the resolutions tabled by the Khan brothers and their followers.
As had been predicted from every corner, the referendum, to decide between Pakistan CA and Hindustan CA, held under an impartial governor who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress, with a Congress government in the province, still resulted in a landslide victory for the Muslim League on the Pakistan question. Even though, the Congress had itself expected this outcome, its Frontier leaders denounced it as being rigged, though without any real basis. The referendum was held to be largely fair by independent observers and reaffirmed what had been expected by all quarters – quite unlike the referenda that have followed in Pakistan under our military.
We must examine whether Jinnah’s actions vis-à-vis the NWFP Assembly in that first week of independence were unconstitutional. If these actions were not unconstitutional, were these undemocratic and malicious under a veil of constitutionality? Finally, if we conclude that these actions were either unconstitutional or undemocratic, were these actions responsible for Pakistan’s subsequent crisis of constitutionalism and democracy, which manifested itself in the form of prolonged periods of direct military rule in the country.
To begin with, it is important to note again that Pakistan opted to omit Section 93 powers, which allowed the central government to dismiss provincial legislatures (though a watered down version in form of Section 92-A was adopted later). India, on the other hand, retained these powers and used the same on several occasions to dismiss provincial legislatures. The dismissal of the Khan Ministry in NWFP, however, was not a dismissal of the legislature. The governor of NWFP, Sir George Cunningham, acting on the advice of the Governor-General under Section 51(5), dismissed Dr Khan Sahib as the chief minister and invited Abdul Qayyum Khan of the Muslim League to form the government. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality of the action does not arise per se.
It must be remembered Dr. Khan Sahib had refused to take the oath of loyalty to Pakistan.[v] Now the real question is whether this meant a dismissal of a democratically elected government and whether this action taken at the behest of Jinnah was indeed undemocratic or malicious. To address whether the decision was democratic or not, let us consider the facts. Dr Khan Sahib became the premier after the 1946 election on the basis of 30 members in a House of 50. Out of these 30 members, 12 were Hindu MLAs. It may be pointed out that the weightage given to the Hindu community was 24 percent against an actual population of six percent in the province; 11 of these 12 Hindu members moved to India at independence. Of the remaining 19, two belonged to the JamiatUlema-i-Hind, an ally of the Congress Party. Congress proper had won only 16 seats out of a total of 38 Muslim seats. Therefore, Dr Khan Sahib enjoyed the support of 19 members in a House of 39, already a minority government. Later the JamiatUlema-i-Hind members also parted company and so did a Congress member MianJaffar Shah, leaving Dr Khan Sahib with only 16 members in a House of 39. As for the procedure adopted to effect a ministry and get the requisite support, the newly formed League ministry had to show its numbers by the next budget session, which it did.
Even otherwise Dr Khan Sahib had lost all moral authority to govern after the referendum a couple of months before independence, which had returned 51 percent votes in the Muslim League’s favour. While in recent years some have tried to argue that the referendum was questionable, the truth is that Congress had not only endorsed the referendum but had successfully procured the removal of Sir Olaf Caroe, who it deemed inaccurately as pro-League, as governor, replacing him with Sir Robert Lockhart to preside over the said referendum. Even Dr Khan Sahib had confidently declared that if the League received 30 percent of the votes in the election, he would resign. Dr Khan Sahib himself agreed that the referendum was as proper or improper as the election that had gotten him into power and this was promptly reported to the Viceroy by Rob Lockhart, Congress’ governor of choice. Lockhart went on to advise Dr Khan Sahib that the right and proper thing to do was to resign immediately. The governor also expressed concern that the continuation of a ministry so utterly hostile to the new state would be untenable and that the Viceroy should consider dismissing the NWFP government under section 93, which would be the best course available. In public, of course, both Dr Khan Sahib and Bacha Khan continued to declare that the referendum was improper and fraudulent. To this end, it is important to quote Kanji Dwarkadas, who in his letter of July 26, 1947 said: “An American journalist who has returned to Delhi from the Frontier has told me that…the Frontier referendum was run on fair lines and not as Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan have explained it. He found Dr Khan Sahib to be muddled headed and both Khan brothers are now rather sore with the Congress for having let them down.”[vi]
On August 1st, 1947, Mountbatten and Rob Lockhart had a meeting with the newly appointed Pakistani cabinet minus Jinnah. These included Liaqat Ali Khan, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, JogindranathMandal, Ch. Mohammad Ali, Abdul RabNishtar and Osman Ali in which Mountbatten stated that the only course of action left was to ask Dr. Khan Sahib and his ministry to resign, failing which he would dismiss the NWFP ministry and invite the leader of the opposition to form a new ministry. The second option was to use section 93 and bring NWFP under federal rule on or before 14th of August, 1947.[vii]
As a liberal democrat with close to four decades of parliamentary experience in the Indian legislature, Jinnah was repulsed by the idea of dismissing any Legislative Assembly. Therefore, in early August, he suggested instead that if given a chance the Muslim League could form a coalition government with non-Muslim representatives, which would give the Muslim League legislative majority and thereby bypass the Section 93 dismissal. As mentioned earlier, this Section 93 was in any event not available after August 14, 1947. Rob Lockhart was of the view that if a change was to be made, in the fitness of things, it had to be made quickly because he recalled that Dr Khan Sahib had warned of a mass movement, which he “would try and keep non-violent”. Lord Mountbatten failed to heed either advice and consequently it fell to the Governor-General of Pakistan to take a decision that he had hoped to avoid.
The Khan brothers were openly hostile to Pakistan.[viii] They had boycotted the referendum citing that it did not have the option of NWFP remaining independent or worse joining Afghanistan. Bacha Khan had on June 27, 1947 called for an independent and free Pathan state based on Islamic principles and social justice. Dr. Khan Sahib meanwhile continued to distribute arms licences to his party men. Similarly, consider the police intelligence report of August 5, 1947 that said: “It is rumoured in some circles that Congress and Red Shirt supporters might start civil disobedience after the 15th of August if the Congress Ministry is made to vacate the office. It is reported that the Faqir of Ipi will declare jihad against the British and the Hindus after the Id and that the ZalmaiPakhtoon Party would fight the Muslim League for the attainment of Pathanistan”.[ix]
In the circumstances, which government was going to allow an openly hostile government to continue in power, especially when that government had lost its majority in the Legislative Assembly? In the US for example, President Abraham Lincoln had dismissed not one but five state legislatures in the South in the immediate aftermath of the civil war. Jinnah, on the other hand, had not dismissed the legislature but had ensured an in-House change. Therefore, in the view of this writer at least the dismissal of the Khan Ministry was constitutional, democratic and morally responsible.
The accession of Kalat and the objections of the Baloch Nationalists have to be considered similarly. The Baloch claim that Kalat was somehow placed on a different plane than other princely states is not borne out by fact. Not only was Kalat a native state, governed under the suzerainty of the British Empire through a political agent but even the feudatory of Lasbela was recognized as a separate native state at par with Kalat. [x] Therefore the two claims by Baloch nationalists – a. that Kalat was not a princely state and b. that Lasbela’s accession was not valid fall flat on their face. Kalat was a princely state which signed a valid document of accession. Why is that important? It is important because law is common sense and experience. No princely state in India was allowed to claim a sovereign status after partition. Kalat was no exception. As for Lasbela it too acted in its best interest by acceding to Pakistan. Baloch nationalists have legitimate grievances against the state of Pakistan but “annexation” as they call it is not a valid grievance.
Finally we come to the accusation that Jinnah undemocratically chose Urdu as a national language over Bengali. This accusation is untrue because national language was never in issue. It is important to draw a distinction here between state language/lingua franca and national language. The two are entirely distinct — the former is appurtenant to statehood and the latter is a cultural construct. Nowhere in any of his speeches on that fateful trip to East Pakistan did Jinnah refer to Urdu as the national language. He used the words state language and lingua franca interchangeably. More importantly, he repeatedly emphasized in the same speeches that East Pakistanis had every right to safeguard and protect the Bengali language and culture as the official language and culture of East Pakistan. The impression therefore that Jinnah was out to destroy the Bengali language and culture is erroneous.
In so far as the decision to elevate Urdu as the lingua franca, the language of communication and the state language of Pakistan is concerned, it was obvious that the language of communication was one that was understood in all five provinces of the new state. This was Urdu and Urdu alone. How could Bengali be made the lingua franca of Pakistan? It was of course an important Pakistani language that could have been made the language of the East Pakistan province but no case could be made out for Bengali as state language of Pakistan. To draw an analogy, should Punjabi language be made the state language of Pakistan simply because the Punjabis enjoy the same demographic majority that the Bengalis did pre-1971?
Nor was this something unique to Pakistan. Here it is important to bust a myth about India. It is suggested that Hindi is not the state language of India. Hindi is the constitutionally declared official language in India. The Indian constitution in Part XVII states: “The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script.” Of course practical experience in both Pakistan and India forced these states to recognise other languages — Bengali was declared the national language alongside Urdu in Pakistan in 1954, which was duly recognised in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 — but the point is that both India and Pakistan chose a variant of Hindustani, in Devanagari script Hindi and in Arabic script Urdu, respectively.
In any event, Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis Urdu cannot be compared to Turkey’s elevation of Turkish as the national language and similarly, unlike Turkey that oppressed the Kurdish language and culture, Pakistan did recognise Bengali as a national language (not just state language) and documents and currency notes from the 1950s and the 1960s are all in both Urdu and Bengali. Even Jinnah’s mausoleum has both Urdu and Bengali inscriptions.
The two speeches that are at the center of Urdu Bengali controversy were made on 21st and 24th of March, 1948 at a public meeting and then at Dacca University convention. In both speeches Jinnah took a consistent stand:
1. The people of Bengal were free to choose Bengali as the official language of the Bengal province. This he said very clearly and unambiguously on both occasions and the premier of Bengal – KhawajaNazimuddin also reaffirmed this.
2. Urdu alone would be the state language and the lingua franca of the Pakistan state.
3. Bengali – like other provincial languages- could be the official language of the East Bengal province but not the Pakistan state and the Pakistan center (Jinnah’s words).[xi]
It may be remembered that in this – wrong or right- Jinnah’s policy was identical to India’s policy of constitutionally elevating Hindi and English. Jinnah did not go even that far and described in the proper constitutional manner Urdu as the state language not a national one. Urdu was to be – in the real sense of the word- a lingua franca for the diverse people of Pakistan.
Therefore, I submit that this accusation against Jinnah — though very popular — fails the test of facts. This misrepresentation overshadowed other more monumental decisions taken by Jinnah. For example, on the same trip Jinnah overturned the martial race theory, declaring that the martial qualities of the Bengalis had been suppressed by the colonial rulers and that the Bengalis were second to none. He thus became the first ruler in 200 years to undo the officially sanctioned racism against the Bengalis.
The common Bengali continued to revere the Quaid-e-Azam despite the deliberate misrepresentation by certain quarters on the language issue. An example of this is how Jinnah’s memory helped galvanise the Bengali masses in support of Fatima Jinnah. Leading this campaign was none other than MujiburRehman. Fatima Jinnah swept East Pakistan. The reasons for the separation of Bangladesh should be located in the political and economic disenfranchisement of the Bengalis. Had Pakistan managed a workable constitution, the two wings might well have been together. Had the transfer of power been allowed and Mujib’s reasonable six points (none of which had to do with language or culture, which were secure) accepted in 1970, Pakistan would have stayed together. To turn around and locate the root of the crisis in Jinnah’s perfectly sound pronouncement of 1947 is disingenuous. It may well be remembered that Jinnah had favoured an independent and united Bengal in 1947 and that it was Congress that had vetoed the idea of a Bangladesh in 1947. [xii]Therefore, at least in the view of this writer, there was nothing in Jinnah’s conduct vis-à-vis Bengal that may be deemed undemocratic. Jinnah did enjoy immense influence and power but it is important to note that this power was not derived from his position as the Governor General. His moral authority came from the elevated status that he enjoyed as the Quaid.
 The author is a practicing Lawyer based in Lahore. He is also the author of the upcoming book “Jinnah; Myth and reality.” He can be contacted at 0300 555 2232 or at email@example.com.
[i] (Pages 229-230 Sayeed)
[ii] Pakistan’s Governor General had lost those powers that he exercised in his discretion or individual judgment in contrast to the Indian Governor General. See Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 which stated that all expressions, “in his discretion”, “acting in his discretion”, and exercising his individual judgment”, should be omitted wherever they occurred. Lord Mountbatten issued this order on the advice of Mr. Jinnah. Constitutional lawyers will probably appreciate this argument better that aforesaid Order was not drafted in terms of the Ninth Schedule of the Independence of India Act 1947. The said Ninth Schedule had actually been omitted altogether. Jinnah’s ideas of what kind of democracy Pakistan would be are very much apparent in this move. Here one must also state that Alan Campbell Johnson in his book “Mission with Mountbatten” is clearly guilty of distorting the facts when he claims that Jinnah applied for powers under the Ninth Schedule of the IOIA 1947.
[iii] Prime Minister Atlee admitted in the second reading of the Indian Independence Bill in the British Parliament on 10 July 1947 that powers given Governors-General of both dominions were extremely wide. When read with the PPCO 1947, it becomes clear that the powers conferred on Governor General of India were much wider.
[iv] (Page 246, Sayeed)
[v] Lord Birdwood in his book “A Continent Decides; London – Robert Hale, 1953, on page 35 writes: “For a while Dr. Khan Sahib clung to his responsibilities. But on the establishment of Pakistan and his refusal to take the new oath of loyalty to Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah removed him.”
[vi]US National Archives 845.00/8-747
[vii]No. 301 Transfer of Power Papers, Volume XII, Pages 441-445
[viii] Khalid Bin Sayeed reports on page 244 of his book that “one finds Sir George engrossed in problems like propaganda of Abdul Ghaffar Khan in favour of Pathanistan, the dangers posed by the hostility of the Faqir of Ipi to Pakistan, and the support that his Government was likely to get in the Assembly during the Budget session. The Governor reported to the Quaid-e-Azam that Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other ‘Red Shirt’ leaders were busy making speeches and hoisting the Pathanistan flag in public meetings.” Jinnah advised restraint on which the Governor asked Abdul Qayyum to go slow on Red Shirts. Khalid Bin Sayeed further writes: “Abdul Ghaffar Khan, however, persevered in his propaganda and also attacked the Government of Pakistan for not being based on real Islam and not free of foreign interference and control. One of the letters dated 31 December, 1947 expressed some concern over the frequent demands that were being made at public meetings and tribal jirgas for the substitution of Shariat for the ordinary law.”
[ix] See No 220, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad, 1996, 263-264, The Referendum in NWFP
[x]See Page 57 of Volume IV of the Imperial Gazetteer of India http://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/gazetteer/pager.html?objectid=DS405.1.I34_V04_086.gif
[xi] (See Pages 150 and 158 of “Jinnah Speeches And Statements 1947-1948” Millennium edition Oxford University Press- he said “Realizing, however, that the statement that your Prime Minister made on the language controversy, left no room for agitation, in so far as it conceded the right of the people of this province to choose Bengali as their official language if they so wished, they changed their tactics. They started demanding that Bengali should be the state language of the Pakistan centre, and since they could not overlook the obvious claims of Urdu as the official language of a Muslim state, they proceeded to demand that both Bengali and Urdu should be the state languages of Pakistan. Make no mistake about it. There can only be one state language if the component parts of this state are to march forward in unison, and in my opinion, that can only be Urdu”)
[xii] So much for Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s claim that two nation theory had been drowned in the bay of Bengal. Jinnah had agreed to Suhrawardy-Bose Plan for an independent and united Bengal state or Bangladesh in May 1947. Jinnah’s view was that without Calcutta, East Bengal would be unviable and that it was better to keep Bengal united than a divided Bengal in Pakistan.