Kashmir Dispute: is There a Viable Solution

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Zamir Akram[1]


(For the past sixty years the Kashmir dispute has resulted in wars and incessant Pakistan-India tensions. As a consequence of the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by the two countries, this core issue has become a dangerous flashpoint. Courageous leadership and a paradigm shift in thinking are required for a lasting settlement of the dispute. Recent developments, especially the ideas advanced by President Musharraf offer a way out. Any just and durable solution must be acceptable to all three parties namely, Pakistan, India and above all the Kashmiri people. This paper examines various proposals for a solution and advocates “joint sovereignty” as the most viable option. Author).


A realistic paradigm is desperately needed for a solution of the Kashmir dispute which has been a festering wound for Pakistan, India and especially the Kashmiri people for six decades. This study attempts to step away from the groove of traditional thinking and, based on the prevailing realities coupled with a dispassionate analysis of the positions of the three parties involved, advocates a paradigm shift on their part. Only an innovative approach can facilitate the evolution of a conceptual framework to resolve this seemingly intractable dispute.

Kashmir has rightly been called “the most dangerous place on earth.”1 Pakistani and Indian troops face each other eyeball-to-eyeball in a confrontational mode along the Line of Control (LoC). Two wars have been fought between them over this territory, apart from several clashes as in Siachen and Kargil. It has also spawned a continuing environment of hostility which has retarded Pakistan-India relations for more than 60 years. After the nuclear tests by India and, in response, by Pakistan in May 1998, Kashmir has become a nuclear flash-point as well.

Accordingly, the Kashmir dispute remains a core issue on the foreign and security policy agendas of both Pakistan and India, exacting a heavy toll in terms of blood and treasure on them.

Even higher is the toll on the Kashmiri people who continue to be disenfranchised and brutalized under Indian occupation and repression. Though their spirit is undaunted, their sufferings, both human and material, are incalculable.

For the international community, Kashmir is the most likely arena for a nuclear war. Given the danger that even an unintended or accidental action by the troops of either belligerent could trigger a conflict, the fear is that this military exchange could quickly escalate and cross the threshold to nuclear war. Hence, resort to war to settle the Kashmir dispute is no longer an option for either Pakistan or India.

In view of these interrelated factors, there is an urgent need to resolve the Kashmir dispute on a durable and viable basis. However this is easier said than done because it entails reconciling the diametrically opposite positions of Pakistan and India. These time-entrenched positions have acquired an added significance that equates Kashmir to the very raison d’etre of both countries. Hence the indispensable precondition for evolving a practicable settlement is the development of an innovative mindset and shedding the baggage of the past by the two sides. The trail has to be blazed by a courageous and visionary leadership.

No objective study can afford to ignore the realities of power politics. The fact is that it has been the asymmetry in the power capabilities of Pakistan and India which has enabled the latter to repeatedly flout its international and bilateral commitments regarding Kashmir. It is due to this continuing inequitable co-relation of forces that India today occupies Kashmir without any political, legal or moral justification. Why then, it can be asked, should India change its policy and seek a compromise solution with Pakistan and the Kashmiris. It is the answer to this central question which will ultimately determine whether a viable solution to this dispute can emerge.


Genesis of the Kashmir dispute – 1947-48

Perhaps the best description of the Kashmir dispute was given by the late President   Ghulam Ishaque Khan of Pakistan who termed it as “the unfinished business of Partition.”2 The guiding principle by which the British-Indian empire was partitioned was self-determination through elections or referendum/ plebiscite. The Muslim majority states of British-India thus became Pakistan. The decision about accession by the Princely states such as Jammu and Kashmir to either Pakistan or India was left by the British to the rulers of these states with the understanding that their choice ought to take into account factors such as geographic contiguity and demographic composition of the state.

The Indian Congress Party, however, argued that the people, and not the rulers of the Princely states, were empowered to make the decision about accession to either dominion and, on the basis of this argument, forcibly absorbed those states whose Muslim rulers either wanted independence such as Hyderabad or to join Pakistan as in the case of Junagarh. The situation in Jummu and Kashmir was the reverse of the Junagarh case where the Muslim majority population was ruled by a Hindu Dogra ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. Hence, by their own yardstick, the Congress leaders should have accepted the right of the Kashmiris to decide the matter of accession and not manipulated a fraudulent accession by the Maharaja.

The duplicity of the Congress leadership is further exposed by a development in Kashmir at the time which has hitherto received scant attention. The fact is that the Muslim Conference Party in Kashmir, which gained a majority in the state elections of January 1947, passed a resolution on 19 July 1947 calling for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan “in view of the geographic, economic, linguistic, cultural and religious … relations” with Pakistan. 3

Despite this clear exercise of self-determination by the majority party, the British Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, as well as the Congress government of Jawaharlal Nehru manipulated the situation to ensure Kashmir’s occupation by India. As disclosed by British historian Alistair Lamb4 and others such as Campbell-Johnson,5 Mountbatten altered the Radcliffe Award, giving the Muslim majority Gurdaspur district to India, thereby ensuring the latter a land access to Kashmir. Mountbatten also connived with Nehru to ensure that Maharaja Hari Singh signed an instrument of accession to India in return for military support to quell the popular uprising against him in various parts of Kashmir, especially in Poonch, Gilgit, Hunza, Skardu and Kargil. This public outcry broke out as soon as the Kashmiris realized that the Maharaja would not honour the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. Based on documentary evidence, Alistair Lamb has conclusively proved that the Maharaja could not possibly have signed the accession document on 26 October 1947 as claimed because on that day he was fleeing from Srinagar to the safety of Jammu by car.6 By then Indian troops were already in Srinagar and Hari Singh was actually confronted by a fait accompli. In effect, therefore, the Maharaja signed the instrument of accession under duress of Indian occupation of Kashmir which made this document null and void.7

This Indian charade was so blatantly obvious, that both Mountbatten and Nehru hastened to camouflage their machinations by promising the Kashmiris the exercise of their right to decide their future and termed the Maharaja’s instrument of accession a “provisional” document. This was clearly stated in Mountbatten’s reply of 27 October 1947 to Hari Singh’s “instrument of accession” that this was conditional and Kashmir would only be incorporated permanently into India after a reference had been made to the Kashmiri people for their approval.8 Nehru, for his part, stated that “it has been our policy all along that where there is a dispute about the accession of a state to either dominion, the accession must be made by the people of that state.”9 Later, Nehru also claimed “we have always right from the beginning accepted the idea of the Kashmiri people deciding their fate by referendum or plebiscite.10

Still, the Kashmiri freedom fighters, aided by Pakistani volunteers and tribesmen from the NWFP, held out against the Indian troops to liberate a substantial part of Kashmir.11 Sporadic fighting continued for 14 months and ended only after intervention by the UN and acceptance by Pakistan and India of a ceasefire in Kashmir on 1 January 1949.12 The ceasefire line agreed to by the two sides continues to divide Kashmir to this day.

International Mediation-1948 – 1965.

Nehru decided to refer the Kashmir issue unilaterally to the UN on 15 January 1948 under chapter VI of the Charter, in which India accused Pakistan of committing “aggression” and demanded that Pakistan stop assisting and deny access to “invaders” into Kashmir.13 Pakistan counter-charged India of illegally annexing Kashmir and proposed that the UN arrange for a ceasefire and withdrawal of all outside forces from Kashmir, ensure the rehabilitation of refugees who had fled the state, establish an impartial administration and hold a plebiscite to determine whether the Kashmiri people wanted to join Pakistan or India.

In the UN Security Council debates, Pakistan’s arguments carried greater weight and the Indians soon discovered that, despite having brought the issue to the UN, they were being put in the dock. The Council adopted its first resolution on Kashmir on 17 January 1948, calling for the end of hostilities14 and, in a subsequent resolution, decided to set up a UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)15 to investigate the facts and to play a mediatory rule, leading to a plebiscite.

On 14 August 1948, UNCIP presented its proposals, the essence of which was: (a) agreement on a ceasefire; (b) Pakistan to endeavour to secure the withdrawal of its nationals from Kashmir; (c) the administration of the evacuated area by local authorities under   UNCIP’s  supervision;  (d) the phased withdrawal of Indian troops from Jammu and Kashmir;  (e) the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under UN supervision.

After due deliberations, both Pakistan and India accepted the UNCIP resolution, including the principle of plebiscite, which was also endorsed by the Security Council.

Although the UN continued to be seized of the Kashmir issue for many years to come, adopting several resolutions, and enlisting the services of several prominent international personalities, the UNCIP’s plebiscite plan could not be put into effect due to Indian obduracy. Similar efforts by some of the major powers, especially the US and UK, which continued until 1962, also come to naught as did the efforts by Pakistan to engage in bilateral negotiations. The crux of all these efforts was to secure India’s agreement to the demilitarization of the area and hold a UN supervised plebiscite.

But India continued to vacillate and obfuscate. At first it raised technical and procedural objections to the enforcement of the UN resolutions and then, finally, in 1956 resorted to outright rejection. Nehru formally stated that there was no need for a plebiscite in Kashmir as it was legally a part of India.16 As justification, he claimed that since the Kashmiri people had by then voted for a Constituent Assembly, which brought the (Indian puppet) Sheikh Abdullah to power as “Prime Minister,” they had thereby already exercised their right of self-determination. The UN, however, rejected this claim and stated that any action by the state assembly could not be a substitute for a plebiscite.17

The UN’s failure to implement its decisions was largely due to the indifference of the major powers. None of the Security Council’s permanent members had a direct interest in the Kashmir issue. Their main concern was for peace between the two combatants and to a much lesser degree to upholding international law. None of these powers was, therefore, willing to expend its resources and incur the enmity of India for the sake of the Kashmiris. Hence, without any political, legal or moral justification, India has been able to claim ownership over stolen property. As such, the principle of self-determination has been sacrificed by the world community at the altar of political expediency. The same sordid replay of realpolitik on the issue of Kashmir is in evidence even today.

Developments Within Indian Occupied Kashmir – 1948-1965

In the build up to independence and partition, Nehru assiduously cultivated Sheikh Abdullah who had set up the “secular” National Conference which he saw as being more in tune with Congress policies, especially regarding the creation of Pakistan.

Nehru was hopeful that Sheikh Abdullah would obtain the popular mandate of his people to join India.  It was with this calculation that the Indian leader took the Kashmir issue to the UN. However, he soon discovered that the popular freedom movement in Kashmir belied Abdullah’s claims of enjoying the support of his people.  Therefore, the real reason for Nehru’s prevarication on the plebiscite issue after having initially accepted it was the growing realization that India would lose the referendum.  Later his defence minister, Krishna Menon, was more forthright when he conceded in 1965, that in a plebiscite “Kashmiris would vote to join Pakistan and we would lose it.”18

Not surprisingly then, the Indians immediately installed Sheikh Abdullah as head of an emergency administration. A “special status” was given to the state in the Indian Union and Hari Singh’s son, Karan Singh, was made the “Sadar-i-Riasat” and not the Maharaja while Abdullah became “Prime Minister.”

This special status embodied in the Indian Constitution as Article 370, recognized the autonomy of Kashmir, with the state having jurisdiction over all matters except Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications.

By 1953, India no longer needed this façade and, furthermore, Abdullah had outlived his utility. Consequently, on 8 August of that year, he was dismissed and placed under arrest while Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was appointed Chief Minister with the instructions to “finalize” Kashmir’s accession to India. New Delhi also withdrew Article 370 and with it ended whatever little autonomy in real terms that the state had enjoyed.

Through the help of repeatedly rigged elections and repression of any political opposition, the Indians ensured Ghulam Mohammad’s continuation in power for the next ten years. But as others before him he too was expendable once his usefulness ended. Charged with corruption and abuse of power he was replaced by another puppet, Khwaja Shamsuddin, in 1964.

War and Diplomacy 1965-1990.

The failure of political and diplomatic initiatives to make any headway towards a resolution of the Kashmir dispute prompted Pakistan to attempt changing the status quo by other means. In August-September 1965, it launched “Operation Gibraltar” which led to a full-fledged conflict on 6 September. Fighting continued for seventeen days and ended with a ceasefire on 21 September. The war was a stalemate and did not alter the ground realities.

It was left to India’s staunch ally, the Soviet Union, to broker a peace agreement, the Tashkent Declaration, which was signed on 10 January 1966.  This agreement contained little of value for Pakistan as it did not commit India to any negotiations, let alone resolution, of the Kashmir dispute.

Taking advantage of Pakistan’s internal political crisis, to which it had no doubt contributed, India invaded East Pakistan in December 1971. This resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

The most obvious lesson of the1971 war was that when Pakistan could be divided in half, what hope could there be for a just solution of the Kashmir dispute through bilateral or international efforts.  Indeed, several Indian officials, such as the then Foreign Secretary, T.N. Kaul, had pressed their government to use their military advantage to secure a ‘final’ settlement of Kashmir by occupying Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas or at least forcing Pakistan to accept the status quo.19

Acceptance by Pakistan of the status quo, therefore, became the primary objective of Indian diplomacy during the negotiations which led to the Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972. Since then New Delhi’s  efforts have been to stress articles of the Simla agreement regarding ‘inviolability’ of the ceasefire line, henceforth called the Line of Control, as well as to renounce the international status of the Kashmir dispute and oppose Pakistan’s efforts to take this ‘bilateral’ issue to any international forum.  More importantly, India repeatedly alleged that in addition to the written text of the Simla agreement there was an ‘understanding’ between the leaders of the two countries, Z.A.Bhutto and Indira Gandhi,  that Pakistan would eventually accept the LoC as an international border.20 This ‘sell out’ was vehemently denied by Z.A.Bhutto in subsequent parliamentary debates and press comments and continues to be rejected by Pakistan.  Irrespective of the spin given by the Indians, the fact remains that the Simla agreement calls for a “final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir” apart from acknowledging the supremacy of the ‘principles and purposes of the UN Charter’ and calls for respecting the LoC by both sides, ‘without prejudice to the recognized position of either side’– which clearly maintains, as far as Pakistan is concerned, that the LoC is not an international border and, therefore, the status quo is unacceptable.21

The people of Indian occupied Kashmir were demoralized by the outcome of the 1971 war as they felt that a weakened Pakistan would not be able to champion their right of self- determination. The Simla Agreement was perceived as a further blow, especially by those Kashmiris who were opposed to their destiny being decided by Pakistan and India and not by themselves, as envisaged in the UN resolutions. Most vocal among these Kashmiris were the ones favouring independence for their land which became the rallying cry of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a new political force that emerged on both sides of the LoC.

During the 1980s, Pakistan’s strategic environment deteriorated dramatically when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, thereby destabilizing Pakistan’s western border at a time when tensions were continuing with India on the eastern side, especially due to growing Indian problems with Sikh separatists for which India blamed Pakistan. Taking advantage of Pakistan’s preoccupation with the Afghan situation, India also began encroachments into the undefined no-man’s land in the Siachen glacier, leading to yet another area of confrontation between Pakistani and Indian troops. During a temporary thaw in relations, the two sides did come to an agreement to “redeploy” their troops from Siachen in July 1989 but the Indians soon reneged on this understanding. Consequently, the Siachen issue continuous to plague Pakistan – India relations to the present day, having become one of the spin-offs of the Kashmir dispute.

The other related issue that emerged during this period was due to Indian preparations to build a barrage on the Jehlum river in occupied Kashmir at Wullar Lake, in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty concluded in the 1960s. The Wullar barrage dispute also continues to be on the bilateral agenda.

The Kashmiri Uprising– 1990-2007.

During the decades of the 70s’ and 80s,’ the Kashmiri sense of betrayal and alienation from India continued to fester.  Sheikh Abdullah and his son and successor, Farooq Abdullah, were viewed as traitors and were blamed for corruption and abuse of power. Political opposition was not tolerated by them and several state elections were blatantly rigged.  Even worse, Delhi’s governor, Jagmohan, a Hindu fanatic, promoted communal tensions and increased economic deprivation of the Muslims.

The rigging of the 1987 elections and heavy handed efforts to stifle political dissent led to violent public demonstrations and total boycott of the 1990 elections. In response, the Indians dismissed the Farooq Abdullah government and imposed Governor’s rule along with deployment of the Indian Army and paramilitary forces who resorted to indiscriminate repression.22 The Kashmiri youth reacted by meeting force with force in self-defence. Thus began the “intifada’ which still continues in occupied Kashmir.

This indigenous uprising has qualitatively changed the Kashmir situation. For the first time in five decades, the Kashmiri people have taken the lead to demand the right of self-determination. They have thus demonstrated in the most forceful manner that they are the central party to the Kashmir dispute which cannot be resolved only by India and Pakistan. This change also underscores the fact that the status quo is not a viable basis for a settlement even in the unlikely event that Pakistan accepts such a solution. Consequently, the Kashmiris have made it clear by shedding their blood and undergoing tremendous sacrifices that any solution to the dispute must be acceptable to them.

The Kashmiri struggle has also undergone a metamorphosis over the past fourteen years.  Initially it was mainly led by the JKLF which continues to advocate an independent Kashmir and the Hisb-ul-Mujahideen, the military wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami which favours accession to Pakistan. Despite their differences, these groups cooperated to set up the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) which also included other pro-Azadi (independence) groups such as the Peoples Conference and the Awami Action Committee besides other smaller outfits. While the APHC perused the political campaign for Azadi, the JKLF, the Hisb-ul-Mujahideen and other smaller groups such as Al Umar Mujahiddin engaged in the military struggle.

By the mid 1990s, as the war in neighbouring Afghanistan against Soviet occupation began to wind down, “jehadi” elements began to gravitate towards the new “jehad” in Kashmir against Indian repression. Widespread Indian abuse of human rights and violence against the Kashmiris created frustration and helplessness forcing the people to resort to other means for survival. This phenomenon led to greater emphasis on the jehadi aspect of the struggle rather than on the political goal of self-determination. It also brought to the forefront these Islamic militant forces in place of Kashmiri nationalists as groups such as Harkat-ul-Ansar, the Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammad  and others began to dominate the military struggle. Unfortunately, these groups began resorting to hitting soft targets such as non-combatants and civilians instead of exclusively targeting the Indian security forces. Attacks on Hindu pilgrims, kidnapping of civilians, including foreign tourists and indiscriminate bomb blasts in crowded areas became common place. The Indian themselves encouraged this trend by using “Sarkari” (official) militants and conducted fake encounters to project the Kashmiri struggle as “terrorism.” The cumulative impact of these developments was to erode popular support for the Mujahideen within Kashmir and provide an opportunity for the Indians to project the Kashmiri struggle as “cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan.” This also had repercussions at the international level.

Another negative development was the marginalization of the Kashmiri political movement led by the APHC with the result that over the years APHC unity frayed and ultimately broke down. The Indians, of course, encouraged this trend through their propaganda. Despite these developments, however, the momentum of the Kashmiri movement against Indian occupation has survived and an overwhelming number of Kashmiris, irrespective of their political affinities, remain committed to their opposition to Indian rule. New Delhi’s response has been to try and bludgeon the Kashmiris into submission. Draconian laws and repressive measures such as TADA, POTA and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act have been used to unleash state-sponsored terrorism through the security forces and the so-called official or “sarkari” militants comprising Kashmiri traitors and criminals. The number of troops deployed including the army and the paramilitary forces have steadily increased over the years to levels over 700, 000. This is the highest concentration of military forces in such a small area in any part of the world today. These troops have resorted to a reign of terror including murder, torture, rape, arson and looting as instruments of policy, leading to consistent and massive violations of human rights which have been highlighted by independent human rights organizations such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International as well as the US State Department.23

The cost of these repressive policies for the Indians has also been high. Kashmir has become a bleeding wound for India. It is for these reasons that successive Indian governments have tried to launch peace efforts in Kashmir offering financial inducements and political concessions as well as dialogue. However, all these initiatives have so far failed as Delhi is unwilling to accept the central Kashmiri demand for a transparent and impartial exercise of self-determination.

Pakistan-India Tensions and Dialogue–1990-2007

India has predictably blamed Pakistan for its endemic problems in occupied Kashmir, accusing Islamabad for aiding and abetting the Kashmiri “militants” and “terrorists,” despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the freedom fighters were and still remain indigenous Kashmiris who are defending themselves against continuing Indian repression and waging a just struggle for self-determination.

The high degree of tensions in bilateral relations that began with the Kashmiri uprising in January 1990 have continued in a cyclical trend, with periods of volatile confrontation eased through de-escalation and dialogue and back again to confrontation. Over the last 14 years, therefore, tension levels have fluctuated, with signs of hope and fears of war. The period of tensions in the early 1990s gave way to dialogue in the mid-1990s leading to agreement on several “Confidence Building Measures” (CBMs) such as renouncing use of chemical weapons; identifying a no fly zone for military aircraft near each other’s borders; prior intimation about military exercises near the borders among others.24

Tensions, however, flared up again when the Indians tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 forcing Pakistan to respond in order to maintain strategic deterrence. Confronted with the spectre of nuclear war triggered by the Kashmir dispute, the international community compelled India to re-open the dialogue process with Pakistan. As a result a “Composite Dialogue” started in October 1998 in which, for the first time, India agreed to include the Kashmir issue as a separate item on the 8 point agenda.  This was followed up by the Lahore Summit in February 1999 which adopted, apart from the Lahore Declaration, an MOU on nuclear/security CBMs. Notably in the Lahore Declaration, both sides agreed to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues including the issue of Jammu and Kahsmir.”25

Relations again plunged with the Kargil episode in May-June 1999 and remained acrimonious till the Agra Summit on 15-16 July 2001 between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee. While the Indians twice reneged on agreed texts of joint statements, the talks marked a lowering of the confrontation.

However, the implicit understanding at Agra to resume talks did not materialize since the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 provided the opportunity that India needed to jump on the “terrorism” band-wagon in the post-9/11 global scenario dominated by the American “war on terrorism.”

By December 2001 relations had deteriorated to the brink of war, with India deploying its troops on the Pakistan border and threatening punitive action in its exercise of “coercive diplomacy.” This phase of tensions lasted till January 2004 when, after growing international opprobrium over its belligerent policies, India relented and agreed to attend the SAARC Summit in Islamabad where Vajpayee met President Musharraf for the second time on 6 January 2004.  In their Joint Press Statement the two sides agreed on the resumption of the composite dialogue to settle all issues “including Jammu and Kashmir” to the satisfaction of both sides.25

However, the dialogue process could not commence until holding of the Indian elections in May 2004. These elections produced a surprise result with the defeat of Vajpayee’s BJP-led coalition and the victory of the Congress Party and its allies.

In her very first public appearance after the election victory, Congress President, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, affirmed her party’s commitment to continue the dialogue with Pakistan which was followed soon after by another reiteration by the newly elected Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh.

The scheduled Foreign Secretary level talks including on Kashmir were held in New Delhi on 27-28 June 2004. According to the Joint Statement issued after the talks, the two sides “held detailed exchange of views on Kashmir and agreed to continue the sustained and serious dialogue to find a peaceful negotiated settlement” and “reiterated the hope that the dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.”26 Pakistan also drew some satisfaction from the fact that while the Communiqué referred to the “determination to implement the Simla agreement in letter and spirit,” it also, in the same paragraph “reiterated the commitment to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter,”27 which is by implication Pakistan’s reference to the UN resolutions on Kashmir.

While the composite dialogue process has continued between the two sides on predictable lines that reflect stated positions, the most significant development has been the courageous and visionary policy advocated by President Musharraf. He has promoted “out of the box” thinking to evolve a solution acceptable to all parties. The central theme in the President’s proposal is for both sides to demonstrate flexibility in order to evolve a “win-win solution”. His 4 step approach envisages (i) identification of regions in Kashmir taking into account nuances and strategic implications; (ii) demilitarization of the area with security to be provided by the people themselves; (iii) maximum autonomy to the Kashmiris; and (iv) joint management/institutional arrangement by creating a super structure which gives comfort to both Pakistan and India. 28

This proposal demonstrates remarkable flexibility on the form of the solution but retains the principle of self-determination in that it requires that the solution must be acceptable to the Kashmiris. It also requires reciprocal flexibility from the Indians and challenges them to respond to an eminently reasonable proposal if they are indeed committed to a settlement as they claim. Taking his initiative forward, the President has succeeded in ensuring a durable ceasefire on the LoC, instituted a back-channel dialogue process and ensured that direct contact between Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC are restored through reopening long dormant road links for bus services.

At the same time the President’s initiative does not especially spell out a formula for a solution and seeks to evolve one through negotiations. This is also a positive factor as any “pre-cooked” solution would have invited immediate Indian rejection.  Now they have to engage in a dialogue process to work towards a mutually acceptable settlement. President Pervez Musharraf has also claimed that the time has come to move from conflict management to conflict resolution and, more importantly, that it should be resolved within a “reasonable time frame.”

Whether the Indians are willing to respond with equal flexibility and demonstrate similarly courageous leadership is yet to be seen. They are now, no doubt, under pressure to demonstrate by actions their stated commitment to resolve the Kashmir issue and to show flexibility towards this end. So far, however, statements from New Delhi remain ambiguous – Prime Minister Singh has stated that “short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything” regarding Kashmir.29 This is just another way of advocating the status quo. Accordingly, no real change in the Indian position has taken place.


There is no doubt that the confrontation over Kashmir has exacted a heavy price on all three parties to the dispute. There have been both direct costs and opportunity costs. No reliable computation of the costs is available in the public domain of either country. These expenditures are hidden in their respective budgets. While quantification in such situations is difficult, a measure of the magnitude involved is provided by the fact that in 1992, one “roti” for the Indian troops in Siachen cost Rs. 500.30 If we use this figure as a base, the expenditures on both sides of the military confrontation along the LoC alone is astronomical, not to mention on the international border as well.

The opportunity costs of the Kashmir conflict are also obvious. Were it not for this dispute, issues such as Siachen, Kargil and Wullar Barrage may not have arisen, or could have been resolved amicably. Moreover, Pakistan and India would have been able to engage in mutually beneficial economic and commercial cooperation apart from diverting their scarce resources towards desperately needed social sector projects.

In such a situation, it is particularly essential for the Indians to evaluate the costs of their intransigent Kashmir policy. Since 1990, more than 700,000 Indian forces have been bogged down in the Kashmir quagmire. According to reliable estimates, Indian casualties (dead and wounded) over the last 17 years have been about 800,000. According to the general rule of thumb, the actual number is usually 3 times higher. Morale is also low. There have been growing desertions from the troops deployed in the combat zones as well as several cases of attacks on superior officers and refusal to obey orders. The expenditure of the occupation for India is estimated to be around US dollars 4 billion annually.31 Kashmir has, therefore, become a quagmire for the Indians – but so far they seem to remain prepared to pay this cost for their occupation.

The highest price, however, is being paid by the Kashmiri people. Their struggle since 1990 has taken a toll of over 91,000 Kashmiris killed, including 6627 custodial killings by the Indians; 1000 have been tortured;7554 are presently under detention; 9722 women have been molested by the Indian forces as an instrument of policy; 105,440 houses and buildings have been deliberately burnt down32 in an organized policy of “ethnic cleansing .”

The alternative to this tale of horror is a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute which can open up vast areas of mutually beneficial cooperation, not only between Pakistan and India but for the entire South Asian region. The benefits of a compromise are, therefore, obvious. Billions of rupees being spent on defence by both sides could be devoted towards desperately needed social sector projects to eradiate poverty, hunger and disease as well as to provide housing, education and employment. Trade and economic cooperation could also flourish including such projects as oil and gas pipelines from Iran and Central Asia as well as sharing of the existing electrical power generation potential. Consumers on both sides would also benefit from greater regional economic integration under SAARC. Tourism travel would increase and above all mutual tensions will dissipate, leading to peace and stability in the region as a whole.33


The nuclear tests by India and, in response, by Pakistan in May 1998 converted the already volatile Kashmir issue into a nuclear flash-point. This had a profound impact on the subsequent nature of relations between the two countries, especially in the context of their policies towards Kashmir. Reverberations of the tests were also felt across the world, in particular the West, which feared that a flare up of Pakistan – India tensions, even by accident, could lead to nuclear war. The American CIA in its assessment of global flashpoints for the year 1999 described South Asia as the most likely arena for a nuclear war.34

In the India-Pakistan strategic context a “balance of terror” through “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) came into operation. This transformation in effect negated the advantage of conventional weapons numerical superiority acquired by India over Pakistan. Consequently, an effective and credible situation of nuclear deterrence was established. The implication of this reality was that resort to war or use of force no longer remained an option for either side.

It is important to note here that the major powers, while calling for settlement of Kashmir through dialogue, place greater emphasis on maintaining peace and avoiding tensions. By implication, therefore, the primary interest of these countries is that in an environment of deterrence, the spectre of nuclear war has frozen the Kashmir situation for all times.

Such arguments have been made by Western and Indian nuclear strategists, academics, journalists and privately even by government officials. These views are based essentially on the doctrine that nuclear deterrence eventually leads to “stability” such as during the Cold War between the US and the USSR. However, some experts recognize that deterrence can also create the “stability–instability paradox” which means that while deterrence would prevent full scale conventional war, it can actually facilitate sub-nuclear threshold hostilities such as through guerrilla tactics and/or limited clashes.35 It is in this context, that India continues to accuse Pakistan of waging a “proxy war” in Kashmir and itself threatens a “limited war” against Pakistan.


As in the case of the nuclear tests, there has been a tremendous impact on the Kashmir issue by another extraneous development—the terrorist attacks on the US on 9/11, 2001. The consequent US-led war on terror has come as a vital opportunity for India to cover up its repression in occupied Kashmir and, at the same time, demonize Pakistan.

From the beginning of the Kashmiri uprising in 1990, India had tried to project the Kashmiri freedom fighters as terrorists and accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism across the LoC. However, till the mid-1990s the West had tended to remain neutral about the armed clashes between the Kashmiris and Indian security forces, maintaining that neither side should target civilians or non-combatants, which it would consider as terrorism. However, this approach changed in July 1995 when several western tourists including two Americans were taken hostage and some subsequently executed by the so called “Al-Faran” group which was accused by India of connections with Pakistan.

Consequently, a greater receptivity grew in the West for the Indian allegations against Pakistan. The Americans put several of the “jehadi” groups on the list of terrorist groups and called upon Pakistan to terminate “infiltration” across the LoC and “dismantle” the so called training camps in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Secretary of State Colin Powell said in Delhi on 16 March 2004 that “cross border terrorism” against India from Pakistan should end.36 This was repeated by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage on 16 July 2004.37

The terrorism issue has thus been exploited by India to shift the focus from the real issues in Kashmir which are Indian denial of Kashmiri self-determination and massive violations of human rights, to the charge of act of terrorism by Pakistan and the Kashmiris.


Three basic options for a solution of the Kashmir dispute exist in keeping with the positions of the three parties to the dispute. Several other options have also been suggested by various experts over the years. It would be instructive at this stage of the discourse to examine the major proposals and the reactions of the parties concerned.

1.         Plebiscite/Self determination

Pakistan advocates a plebiscite under UN resolutions which would enable the Kashmiri people to choose between accession to either Pakistan or India. Pakistan remains confident that the majority of the Kashmiris would choose to join Pakistan. It rejects the contention that the UN resolutions have become obsolete and argues that only another UN resolution can amend or annul these resolutions.

The plebiscite option has remained completely unacceptable to India since it realizes that it would lose such a referendum.

The Kashmiri people support a UN-sponsored plebiscite but some groups such as the JKLF want the inclusion of the option of independence.

A proposal for “joint control” has also been put forward for consideration by all these parties by President Musharraf.

2.         Status Quo

While India maintains the maxamilist position that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is its integral part, including Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, it has indicated its willingness to accept the status quo or the LoC as a “compromise” solution. This was India’s objective at the Simla conference and continues to be its implied bottom line, as we have established in the foregoing analysis.

Obviously, this option is unacceptable to Pakistan and the majority of Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC.

The latest Indian position, as articulated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is for “any solution short of changing borders” – implies little more than the status quo.

  1. The Third Option

Independence for Kashmir, usually called the “third option” is advocated by a section of the Kashmiri people, mainly the urban population who support the JKLF. Whether this group is in the majority or not can only be determined if and when the Kashmiris are able to exercise their choice.

So far both Pakistan and India, for their own reasons, reject this option.

4.         Chenab Formula

According to this formula, the Muslim majority areas comprising the Kashmir Valley and three Muslim dominated districts of Jammu (Poonch, Rajouri and Doda) falling on the right bank of the Chenab river would join Pakistan and the rest of occupied Kashmir would go to India. This solution was superficially discussed during the 1962-63 Bhutto-Sawaran Singh talks but was not followed through by the Indians. Later, in 1999, it was also discussed between former Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik and his Indian interlocutor R.K. Mishra, both of whom had been authorized by their respective governments to unofficially explore solutions for Kashmir.38 However, nothing came of their talks and this could have been only an exploratory ploy by the Indians.

Pakistan and the Kashmiris could live with such a settlement but it is highly unlikely that the Indians would accept it in the present circumstances.

5.         Owen Dixon Plan

Owen Dixon was an Australian jurist who had been entrusted by the UN in 1950 to explore ways to resolve the dispute. After extensively visiting the region, Dixon proposed a regional approach for the areas where the people’s preference for India or Pakistan was not clear i.e., the Kashmir valley; and present day Azad Kashmir, whose status would be negotiated and resolved through reference to the people. As for the other areas, Jammu and Ladakh would go to India while the Northern Areas would become part of Pakistan.39

Pakistan could have gone along with such a regional approach but India did not take a clear position initially and later rejected this proposal.

6.         Kashmir Study Group Proposal

In 1998 a US-based Kashmiri tycoon, Farooq Kathwari, funded a think tank called the Kashmir Study Group composed of South Asian experts from the region and the US. The group put forward several variations based on the idea of a “United Sovereign Entity” which envisages the Kashmir valley to be reconstituted through an internationally supervised ballot as a sovereign entity but without an international status, having free access to and from both India and Pakistan. Later, this proposal was enlarged to include Azad Kashmir in such an entity.40

So far neither Pakistan nor India have endorsed this proposal.

7.         UN Trusteeship Proposal

Under this proposal, made by Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a Pakistani academic, the areas of Jammu and Ladakh would join India while the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir would become a part of Pakistan, leaving the Kashmir valley to be put under UN Trusteeship for 10 years following which a referendum would be held to determine whether the people want to join Pakistan or India or become independent.41

So far neither country has endorsed this approach and it is unlikely that they will in the present conditions.

8.         Yousaf Buch Formula

A former Pakistani and UN official of Kashmiri descent, Yousaf Buch, put forth a 2 phased approach in which the first phase would be devoted to ending the violence in Kashmir by declaring a ceasefire within Kashmir and on the LoC; and in the second phase, the UN would demarcate five cantons or divisions along the lines of the undivided state of Jammu and Kashmir where elections would be held to Provisional Assemblies in the 5 cantons. Each Assembly would vote on whether it wished to continue with the existing relationship with either Pakistan or India or to negotiate a new relationship with either or both which would then be put to a referendum in that canton.42

This idea has not found favour with either Pakistan or India. In any case, it is too complicated an approach.

9.         The Trieste and Tyrol Models

These ideas have been put forward by an American academic, Selig Harrison, who uses the model of the autonomous region of Trieste between Italy and former Yugoslavia where the people of Slav origin live under Italian sovereignty but enjoy freedom to protect their culture and ethnicity as well as travel between the two sides. Harrison proposed that India should give special status to the Kashmir valley as an autonomous region while Pakistan would do the same in Azad Kashmir so that both sides of Kashmir would get equal autonomy. The LoC would become a “soft” border allowing people on both sides to move freely across.43

A similar arrangement existing between Italy and Austria in the German speaking area of Tyrol in Italy with maximum autonomy and free movement across the border with Austria has also been suggested by some experts.

Neither Pakistan nor India or the Kashmiris have expressed any interest in these ideas.

10.       The Andorra Solution

Andorra, like Kashmir, is a small princely state situated on the border of Spain and France which had been claimed by both sides since 803. In 1993, the two countries agreed to give Andorra an independent constitution with jointly guaranteed autonomy. According to this idea, Kashmir should be similarly given a special autonomous status by Pakistan and India.44


In the forgoing analysis an effort has been made to bring together all the relevant factors that have a bearing on any possible solution to the Kashmir dispute.

In this study we have established that while Kashmir has come to be viewed as underscoring the very identities of Pakistan and India, it has also placed a very heavy burden on them and especially on the Kashmiris themselves. Moreover, as we have seen, there is no military option open to either party due to nuclear deterrence and they are, therefore, limited to seeking a political or negotiated settlement. This entails a compromise which in turn requires a change in the mindset or the evolution of a new paradigm for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

An attempt is made here to synthesize   ideas from various sources, the most prominent among which are those of Mushtaq-ur-Rehman45 and the Kashmir Study Group46 who have put forward suggestions on “shared sovereignty,” as well the idea put forward by President Musharraf for “joint management.” It is hopefully possible that such a synthesized approach may provide a viable solution to the hitherto intractable Kashmir dispute.

This proposal envisages absorption of Azad Kashmir and the Northern areas into Pakistan; and Hindu majority Jammu, (excluding the Muslim majority districts of Poonch, Rajouri and Doda), and Buddhist majority Ladakh into India. The remaining area of Kashmir proper and the Muslim majority Jammu districts, would be unified and become autonomous with all powers with the exception of defence and foreign affairs under joint Pakistan-India “sovereignty” or “control.” Both countries would be jointly responsible for defence and foreign affairs of Kashmir within pre-agreed limits. This arrangement would have to be part of an overall “package” deal or treaty among the three parties, in which their respective powers, rights and responsibilities would be clearly defined.

Outlined below are suggestions relating to the specifics of such an arrangement.


Kashmir would not be a sovereign entity but a highly autonomous region as in the present case of Hong Kong. Its degree of autonomous authority would have to be defined in an agreement between the Kashmiris and India and Pakistan. A good basis could be the defunct article 370 of the Indian constitution which allowed the Kashmir state all powers except defence, foreign affairs and communications. In this case, communications could be retained by the autonomous state subject to arrangements for communications with both Pakistan and India.

Kashmir would need to have the ability to act independently in its internal government functions including basic legislative, executive and judicial activities. As such it would have the right of “internal self-determination” but not the right of unilateral accession to either country or independence.


Kashmiris, as defined by permanent residency and /or ethnicity, and verified by the state authority through issuance of Identity Cards, would have the right to vote, own property and live in Kashmir. They would also need to pay taxes and other obligations placed on them by the state government. Kashmiris living abroad since 1947 who wish to return could do so provided they prove their ethnic origins and/or relationships to persons living in Kashmir. For travel into Pakistan or India, the Identity Card of the Kashmiri citizen would suffice as the borders of Pakistan and India would be open to them but not to the citizens of the other country who would require regular passports as at present. For travel outside Pakistan or India, citizens from Kashmir would have the choice of obtaining a Pakistani or Indian passport, as is the case of people of Northern Ireland who, in fact, have both British and Irish passports.

Legislative Powers

The powers delegated to autonomous Kashmir could be specifically listed in the Pakistan-India-Kashmir agreement on Kashmir’s status or Kashmir could assume all powers not specifically reserved for joint exercise by Pakistan and India. As stated earlier, a guide in this regard could be the Indian constitution’s provisions of Article 370. As such, defence and foreign affairs could be the joint responsibility of Pakistan and India while all other powers could be exercised by Kashmir.

The Kashmir legislature would have powers to enact laws governing the sectors of health, social services, taxation, education, language policy, transportation, adoption of penal and civil laws, police, planning, local administration, trade and economic policies among others.

The state would also engage with Pakistan and India to coordinate on issues such as communications, transport, transit trade, tourism, apprehension of criminals etc.

The Kashmir legislature would be elected for a stated duration by the Kashmiri people through adult franchise without any limitations or interference by Pakistan or India.

Executive Powers

As in the case of the provinces of Pakistan and India, autonomous Kashmir would have an elected Chief Minister or Prime Minister (the title is unimportant) along with a cabinet to administer the functions of the state powers. Instead of a governor, appointed by the federation or union as in the case of Pakistan and India, there would be a 3-member Governing Council including one appointee each of Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris, to represent the interests of Islamabad, New Delhi and Srinagar as well as to reconcile any differences that may arise in implementing the joint sovereignty agreement in Kashmir. In case of any dispute which remains unresolved by the Governing Council, it would be referred for resolution to the governments of Pakistan and India. In the event that the two governments are also unable to resolve the issue, it would be referred to the Kashmiris themselves, first at the level of their state Assembly and in case of a deadlock to the Kashmiri people to decide through referendum.

As per the joint agreement between Pakistan and India, the subjects of defence and foreign affairs would not be within the jurisdiction of the Kashmir state, which will be bound not to enter into any defence or foreign relations with any third country. Neither Pakistan nor India would maintain any troops within Kashmir or deploy any armed forces near the provincial borders of Kashmir. Law and order within the state will be maintained by the state government itself, through a police force composed of Kashmiri citizens only.

Judicial Powers

The Kashmir judiciary would be independent with the lower courts and the Kashmir High Court functioning as at present. However, the present system whereby the Kashmir High Court refers matters on appeal to the Supreme Court of India would need to be discontinued. A Supreme Court of Kashmir would need to be set up to replace the present judicial practice.

Economic, Trade and Financial Matters

The Kashmir autonomous state will have powers to raise funds through levying local taxes and would be exempt from taxation by the Pakistani and Indian governments. It will also retain full control over its monetary matters. The state could also receive equal financial awards from Pakistan and India. Customs duties would not be levied on goods from either Pakistan or India but could be applied to goods from third countries. Kashmiri trade would be given free access from and to Pakistan and India as long as the goods are of Kashmiri origin. Once the SAFTA agreement is effectively in place there would be no need for any controls on movement of Pakistani and Indian goods in either direction through Kashmir. Kashmir would also be granted access to foreign markets through both countries.

Kashmir could have its own currency if it wanted but it would be simpler to have a free exchange system between the Pakistani and Indian rupees, both of which could be used as is done in Nepal, where both Nepalese and Indian currencies are accepted. There are also precedents of federating units such as Scotland printing its own currency which is interchangeable with the British pound and this could also be possible in Kashmir.

Defence and Foreign Affairs

As noted above, these subjects would be retained by Pakistan and India. First of all it would be necessary for both powers to agree on mutual and balanced steps with regard to Kashmir as part of the overall package of agreements on promoting friendly relations between them. In the context of Kashmir, both would need to demilitarize and redeploy their forces from within Kashmir and from the LoC. The cantonments and air bases as well as other military and paramilitary installations would need to be pulled back to an agreed minimum distance from Kashmir. Perhaps it may be necessary to have international or mixed Pakistani-Indian-Kashmiri teams as observers to monitor these redeployments.

The Kashmir state itself would not enter into any defence or foreign relationships with a third power nor be represented abroad or have a representation of another country assigned to Kashmir. Kashmiri representatives, however, could be part of Pakistani and Indian delegations abroad, such as to the UN General Assembly sessions.

Implementing the Agreement on Kashmir

While Pakistan and India will be negotiating the agreement on Kashmir, the initial question will be as to who will represent the Kashmiris. This could be addressed by involving leaders of the APHC and some of the other parties such as the National Conference. Alternately, an impartial and transparent election in Kashmir could be held under international supervision and these elected representatives could send their delegates to the meetings with Pakistan and India. In either case, once the agreement has been finalized it will have to be put to a referendum by the Kashmiri people – which would be their exercise of self-determination.

As stated above, this formal agreement on an autonomous Kashmir state under joint sovereignty would be part of a broader treaty on peace and security between Pakistan and India. Its operationalization would also require appropriate amendments in the Pakistani and Indian constitutions. A related agreement would also need to be finalized between the three parties on sharing of the rivers waters which would, in a sense, be a successor to the Pakistan-India Indus Waters Treaty.  It would be up to the 3 sides whether they would want to involve the UN in this process, at least with regard to future functions of UNMOGIP. Even if it is to be wound up, this would require interaction with the UN.

Also, it would be advisable to setup a dispute resolution mechanism, at least in the initial stages, such as an international arbitration commission, to ensure binding interpretations of the agreements reached between the three parties.


`           In this imperfect world there are no perfect solutions. Of course the paradigm put forward here for a Kashmir settlement has many pitfalls and limitations. It is, for instance, rather complicated because it seeks to resolve a complex problem. But at least it is an effort to provide a framework for a possible settlement that has so far been intractable. It can and should be improved upon through collective efforts, preferably by experts on all three sides.

The proposed settlement would obviously not be fully in line with the demands of any one side but would entail a compromise by all the parties conceding on their maximalist positions. This paradigm, therefore, provides the most practical means for reconciling the divergent interests of the three parties. Above all, this agreement would mean an end to a long festering dispute and provide new opportunities for cooperation rather than confrontation. It should be seen as a win-win solution for all sides.

For Pakistan it would mean formal accession of Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas as well as partial fulfilment of its policy to enable the Kashmiris to exercise their right of self-determination. To that extent Pakistan would not be abandoning its principled position. Some in Pakistan would criticize the loss of the Kashmir valley and with it control over the rivers flowing through the area. However, the fact is that today Pakistan neither controls the valley nor the river waters which remain in Indian hands. As a result of the proposed agreement this control would pass on to the Kashmiris which would be more preferable for Pakistan.

For India, accepting Kashmiri autonomy under joint sovereignty would be in line with Article 370 of its constitution. It will also benefit by ensuring the de jure incorporation of Jammu and Ladakh into India. Above all, India would be able to end its expensive misadventure in Kashmir.

For the Kashmiris, the settlement will provide limited sovereignty instead of full independence or accession to Pakistan but at least will rid them of Indian occupation. Some Kashmiris would oppose ceding the areas of the state to Pakistan and India but as the existing realties are they do not have any control over these areas anyway.

This paradigm also makes certain basic assumptions which were alluded to in the introduction. The fundamental assumption is that the Indians will agree to a change in the status quo and that its leaders would have the foresight and courage to change their mindset and break the shackles of the past. This is a critical prerequisite for any solution to be possible in Kashmir.

Judging from current realities, however, it is unfortunate that no real change in the Indian approach is discernable, despite the rhetoric emanating from New Delhi. Their statements are positive but their actions are not. Therefore, there appears little hope for a breakthrough in the foreseeable future.

However, the improvement in atmospherics in the recent past has raised expectations among the peoples of Pakistan and India as well as the Kashmiris. The solution of this long standing dispute over Kashmir can no longer be brushed aside or postponed. The rising costs of confrontation and the growing benefits of cooperation have become undeniable forces that press for a durable settlement of Kashmir. India can ill afford to ignore this growing trend and must, therefore, recognize the need for a substantive change in its obdurate Kashmir policy. Pakistan, for its part, needs to continue with its peace offensive, and maintain the momentum for a lasting solution of Kashmir. The Kashmiris themselves must play the most proactive role – intensifying their political struggle while also defending themselves from Indian oppression. Ultimately, the truth that no one can be subjugated against their will, will triumph.

[1] Zamir Akram is Additional Secretary (Foreign Affairs) at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat.

1 Former US President Bill Clinton, Times of India, 11th March, 2000.

2 President Ghulam Ishaque Khan, Dawn, 10 May 1992.

3 Sardar  Abdul Qayyum Khan, The Kashmir Case, 1992, pp43-44.

4 Alistair Lamb, Kashmir- A Disputed Legacy, 1991, pp. 105

5 Campbell- Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 1951, pp. 145

6 Alistair Lamb, Myth of Indian accession  to Jummu and Kashmir, pp4-5.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Jawaharlal,Nehru, Broadcast to the Nation, All India Radio, 2 November 1947, Pakistan Foreign   Office     Documents

10 Nehru, The Statesman, 18 January, 1951, Pakistan Foreign Affairs Documents.

11 Rehman, Mushtaqur,  Divided Kashmir, 1996, pp.78.

12 This was formalized by the UN supervised Karachi agreement between Pakistan and India signed on 17 July 1949.

13 Rehman, op.cit, pp-87.

14 UN Security Council Resolution  No. 38 Document number S/651, dated 17 January 1941.

15 UN Security Council Resolution  No. 47 Document number S/726, dated 21 April 1948.

16 Rehman. Op cit. pp 98

17 UN Security Council Resolution No. S/2017/Rev. I, dated 30th March 1951.

18 Rehman, Op cit., pp. 103.

19 Claimed by T.N. Kaul in meeting with diplomats on 18 August 1990, New Delhi. (author’s notes)

20 Attributed to P.N. Dhar, former Secretary to Indian Prime Minister Indian Ghandi in his article in The Times of India in April 1995, mentioned by Victoria Schofield, op. cit. pp. 118. Also claimed by T.N. Kaul to author, op cit.

21 Text of Simla agreement.

22 Victoria Schofield, op. cit, pp. 144

23 Amnesty International Report, 2003, and US State Department Report on Human Rights, 2006.

24 CBM agreements signed between 1991 to 1992, Foreign Office Documents.

25 Joint Press Statement, 6th January, 2004.

26 Joint Press Statement, 28th June, 2004.

27 Ibid.

28 Interview by President Musharraf to Frontline Magazine, 25 August 2006

29 International Herald Tribune. 24th May 2004

30 Report in The Nation on Pakistan-India meeting on Siachen, 4 November, 1992.

31 Data estimated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad.

32 Data collected by APHC. SOS from occupied Kashmir, Vol. VII, No. 8, August, 2007

33 Shahid M. Amin, “Prospects of Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia: a Political Perspective” paper delivered at Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad on 8th June 2004.

34 CIA Report to the US Congress on Global Security Threats, 1999.

35 Feroz Hassan Khan, Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia, The Non proliferation Review, Spring 2003.

36 Time of Inida 16th March 2004.

37 The News 16th July 2004.

38 Author’s interview with Mr. Niaz Naik, 22 July 2004.

39 Mushtaq-ur-Rehman, op. cit. pp 91-92.

40 Kashmir Study Group – Kashmiri: A Way Forward, February 2000.

41 Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “A solution for Kashmir dispute” in Regional Studies, Islamabad. Autumn, 1986, P- 12.

42 Foreign Office Documents, 2004.

43 Selig Harrison, South Asia and the United States”, 1992  P-102.

44 Faisal Yousaf in “Resolving” the Kashmir dispute: an Array of Options, Kashmir Institute of International Relations. April 2004. P-35.

45 Mushtaq-ur-Rehman, op. cit

46 Kashmir Study Group, op. cit.