(This article is an adapted version of a chapter from the book, “Pakistan and a World in Disorder” by the writer, to be published soon.)
(There is definitely a strategic imperative of peace between Pakistan and India because of their status as de facto nuclear powers and the need for them to focus their energies and resources on the gigantic task of economic development necessitated by widespread poverty. Unfortunately, however, these factors alone will not be able to usher in an era of durable peace and friendship between the two countries. In all likelihood, Pakistan-India relations will continue to suffer from recurrent periods of tensions and strains because of India’s hegemonic designs in South Asia and outstanding disputes, especially the Kashmir dispute. Therefore, genuine friendship between the two countries would remain elusive in the foreseeable future. The best that can be hoped for is the maintenance of peace between them and normal good neighbourly relations marked by low level of tensions, CBM’s and cooperation in various fields on a mutually beneficial basis. – Author)
“India’s grand strategy divides the world into three concentric circles. In the first, which encompasses the immediate neighborhood, India has sought primacy and a veto over actions of outside powers.” (C. Raja Mohan, Foreign Affairs, July-August, 2006)
Narendra Modi’s election as the Prime Minister of India following BJP’s landslide victory in the recent Indian elections has ignited a heated debate in Pakistan about the prospects of Pakistan-India relations. This is not surprising considering Narendra Modi’s past record as the Chief Minister of Gujarat and his life-long association with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militant organization with total commitment to Hindutva or the Hindu way of life and antipathy towards Pakistan and the Muslims. Narendra Modi’s alleged role in the massacre of about two thousand Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 during his tenure as the Chief Minister of the state is too well known to require elaboration in this article. Equally well-known are his hardline views about Pakistan expressed during the election campaign. The BJP election manifesto promising to build Ram temple at the site of the Babri mosque, abrogate Article 370 of the Indian constitution which grants special autonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir, and review India’s nuclear doctrine carries seeds of internal strife in India and increased tensions with Pakistan. So a serious debate in Pakistan on the short and long-term implications of Narendra Modi’s rise and the definite shift to the right in Indian politics is called for.
In the short-term, Modi’s rise as the Prime Minister of India and BJP’s victory in the elections do not bode well for Pakistan-India relations. There is little possibility of a radical transformation of BJP or of Narendra Modi who is deeply steeped in the politics and philosophy of RSS. He is unlikely to adopt an inclusive and moderate style of politics. Modi is different from Atal Bihari Vajpayee who had a refined and cultured personality as compared with Modi’s ruthless character and communal bigotry. It is important to remember that Modi has refrained from expressing any remorse on the large scale massacres of the Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 for which many analysts hold him directly responsible. In short, whereas Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the right man in the wrong party, Narendra Modi, from Pakistan’s point of view, is the wrong man in the wrong party.
In view of the foregoing, Modi is likely to adopt a more hardline approach in dealing with Pakistan than that adopted by the preceding Manmohan Singh government. It would be instructive to recall that in its final months even the Manmohan Singh government declined to resume the composite dialogue with Pakistan before the alleged culprits responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attacks were punished. The Narendra Modi government’s position on this issue is likely to be even harder. One can draw the same conclusion in respect of other issues bedeviling Pakistan-India relations, particularly the Kashmir dispute.
Nawaz Sharif’s visit to New Delhi
The results of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s first encounter with Narendra Modi in New Delhi at the latter’s swearing in ceremony merely confirm these conclusions. The statements by the Indian foreign secretary and foreign minister after Nawaz Sharif’s visit showed that India remained focused on the issue of terrorism to the neglect of other important Pakistan-India issues. According to foreign secretary Sujatha Singh, Narendra Modi called for expediting trials of suspects of 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks to ensure that the guilty were punished. She also pointed out, “It was conveyed that Pakistan must abide by its commitment to prevent its territory and the territory under its control from being used for terrorism against India.” A day later on 28th May, the new Indian foreign minister Sushma Swaraj emphasized in a press conference, “We want to have good relations with Pakistan but this can be successful only if terrorism ends.” The only issue on which India was willing to move forward was the bilateral trade from which it hoped to gain more than Pakistan. The two leaders did ask their foreign secretaries to discuss the resumption of a restructured bilateral dialogue. However, no date for the meeting of the two foreign secretaries was fixed. So it would be quite some time before a comprehensive Pakistan-India dialogue is resumed.
The Pakistani side tried to put up a brave face despite the hardline adopted by the Indian side during Nawaz Sharif’s visit. Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s adviser on foreign affairs and national security, stressed in a press conference on the same day when the new Indian foreign minister was expressing India’s unifocal position on the issue of terrorism that the outcome of Nawaz Sharif’s visit to New Delhi was “beyond Islamabad’s expectations.” Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself in a letter to Prime Minister Narendra Modi in early June expressed his satisfaction over the exchange of views between the two leaders on bilateral relations and regional issues. He rightly stressed that millions of the people living in poverty in the two countries deserved their foremost attention. In his reply of 13th June, Narendra Modi did concede the convergence of views between the two leaders on a Pakistan-India relationship defined by “peace, friendship and cooperation.” But in an oblique reference to India’s position on the issue of terrorism, he called for “an atmosphere free from confrontation and violence to chart a new course” in bilateral relations.
It is true that the commitment of both Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi to the development of Pakistan and India respectively provides a common ground on which the two sides can try to build up bridges of understanding. Both Pakistan and India need peace in their neighbourhood to allow them to focus their energies on economic progress. However, this would require a degree of flexibility in the policies of the two countries. While Nawaz Sharif’s visit to New Delhi and his subsequent statements and letter to Narendra Modi showed that he might be prepared to show such flexibility, Narendra Modi and the Indian establishment failed to make any move in that direction. Therefore, any dramatic breakthrough in bilateral relations can be ruled out in the immediate future unless Pakistan decides to fall in line with the one-sided Indian demands.
We must, therefore, maintain our guard while avoiding any adventurous (e.g. Kargil) or provocative activity from our side. In particular, we must establish a firm grip on the various Jihadi organizations to prevent them from undertaking activities which may aggravate tensions between Pakistan and India. At the same time, we must avoid a posture of appeasement in the face of India’s expansionist or domineering policies. The lesson of history is that a policy of appeasement towards an expansionist power merely whets its appetite for more thereby precipitating precisely the crisis that it is supposed to prevent. Above all, we must strengthen internal unity and stability, accelerate economic growth, and maintain a credible security deterrent at the lowest level of armed forces and armaments. In other words, while exploring all avenues for defusing tensions and improving relations with India, we must remain prepared for the worst.
Long-term prospects of Pakistan-India relations
Pakistan’s short-term policies relating to India must be cast within the framework of a long-term strategy to safeguard our national interests. Such an approach in dealing with India would impart a modicum of stability and strength to our India policy while avoiding frustrations and disappointments which are the product of unrealistic policies driven by short-term and short-sighted considerations. A realistic comprehension of the long-term prospects of Pakistan-India relations must form the basis on which to raise the edifice of our India policy. A long-term approach is even more desirable in dealing with mature democracies like India where foreign and security policy decisions are taken on the basis of internal consensus among the various concerned state organs arrived at after due debate and discussion. In such cases, the emergence of new leaders mostly changes the style rather than the substance of policy.
Nawaz Sharif’s first encounter with Narendra Modi, which reaffirmed the main elements of the policy pursued by the preceding Manmohan Singh government in dealing with Pakistan, should have brought home this essential truth to our policy makers. Therefore, we must avoid euphoria or undue pessimism in dealing with successive Indian governments while anchoring our India policy to a well-considered long-term strategy. Realism based on long-term considerations must always guide our policy makers.
The long-term prospects of Pakistan-India relations will be determined to a large extent by India’s strategic goals and objectives in the context of the evolving regional and global security environment. The other part of the equation would be Pakistan’s policy goals and its handling of this critical relationship. The geopolitical scene on the Asian continent is being radically transformed by China’s phenomenal economic growth and India’s rise as a major power of the 21st century. Other noteworthy developments are the rebalancing of the US power to the Asia-Pacific region, the strengthening of the US alliances in the Far East to contain China, some indications of the emergence of a more assertive Japan, growing strategic partnership between China and Russia, and the US strategic commitment to help build up India as a major power of the 21st century.
India with a population of 1.24 billion and GDP of $ 2.19 trillion in nominal terms in 2013, already looms large on the South Asian sub-continent. None of the other South Asian countries comes even close to the size of India’s population and economy. In fact, India’s population and GDP are more than the combined population and GDP of all the other South Asian countries. By way of comparison, the population and GDP of Pakistan, the second biggest country in South Asia, were estimated to be 183 million and $ 258 billion respectively in 2013. Thus Pakistan’s population is about one-seventh of that of India and its GDP is about one-ninth of India’s GDP.[ii]
Even in global terms, India’s economy will rise up rapidly in world rankings. According to a study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers, India’s GDP in nominal terms will increase to $ 7,918 billion by 2030 making India the third biggest economy in the world after China ($24,356 billion) and the US ($23,376 billion). In PPP terms, India is already the third biggest economy in the world.[iii] According to another forecast, India, as the third biggest economy in the world in PPP terms, will have a GDP of $9.29 trillion in 2020.[iv]
In the Asian continent, India is currently the second biggest economy after China with the GDP of $ 5295 billion in PPP terms in 2013. It is followed by Japan ($4,716 billion), South Korea ($1665 billion), Indonesia ($1315 billion) and Australia ($1020 billion). However, in nominal terms India occupies the third position, lagging behind Japan.[v]
India has also increased rapidly its defence expenditure and acquisition of advanced weapon systems to translate its growing economic strength into military power. India’s military expenditure would be around $36.3 billion during the year 2014-15. This represents an increase of 10% over the defence budget for the preceding year.[vi] India received nine per cent of global arms transfers from 2006 to 2010 making it the world’s leading importer of weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was also the leading importer of weapons during the period from 2008 to 2012.[vii] It has been acquiring advanced defence weapon systems from major world suppliers to increase its military capabilities. Its plans to acquire aircraft carriers reflect its intentions to project its power in far flung areas of the India Ocean region.
India is generally recognized by the world community as an emerging major power because of its growing economic and military strength. It is now a member of many of the forums like G-20 where important decisions about global politics and economy are taken. It is also a candidate for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The United States has accorded an important role to India in its strategy to contain China. In a statement of far reaching strategic importance issued in March 2005, Washington announced its intention to help build up India as a major global power of the 21st century. Soon thereafter the US entered into major agreements with India for commencing cooperation with it in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the military field. The fact that the US modified its domestic laws and persuaded other members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to allow civilian nuclear cooperation with India despite its nuclear explosions of 1998 showed the importance that it attached to its future strategic cooperation with New Delhi.
India’s hegemonic designs
In view of the anarchic nature of the international system, it is in the nature of an emerging great power like India to seek hegemony as pointed out by John J. Mearsheimer in his widely acclaimed book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. After analyzing the characteristics of international politics, Mearsheimer concludes, “Thus the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions. Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved.”[viii]
It should not cause any surprise, therefore, if India as an emerging great power seeks hegemony in South Asia. India’s conduct and statements by its spokesmen bring home the fact that it has every intention to assert its power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean regions. It is in the process of developing its military capabilities and evolving a structure of alliances for playing that role.
India’s determination to achieve hegemony in South Asia was unequivocally elaborated by noted Indian security analyst, C. Raja Mohan, as follows: “India’s grand strategy divides the world into three concentric circles. In the first, which encompasses the immediate neighborhood, India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers. In the second, which encompasses the so-called extended neighborhood stretching across Asia and the India Ocean littoral, India has sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests. In the third, which includes the entire global stage, India has tried to take its place as one of the great powers, a key player in international peace and security.”[ix]
Interestingly, the first of the three factors which in C. Raja Mohan’s opinion have prevented India from realizing its grand strategic goals was the partition of South Asia and the creation of Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) along religious lines. This factor, according to him, left India with a persistent conflict with Pakistan and an internal Hindu-Muslim divide, separated India from Afghanistan, Iran and, one may add, Central Asia, and created profound problems for India’s engagement with the Muslim Middle East because of Pakistan’s character as an Islamic state. The other two obstacles identified by Raja Mohan in the way of the realization of its grand strategic goals were its socialist system and the Cold War which put India on the losing side of the great political contest of the second half of the twentieth century. He further points out that while the second and the third obstacles identified by him have disappeared, India needs to deal with the first obstacle, that is to say Pakistan, in the realization of its grand strategic goals.
Indian hegemonic designs in South Asia and its ambitions to rival China are recognized by noted scholars of international politics. For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski in his latest book “Strategic Vision”, after taking note of the Indian ambitions and the emerging China-India rivalry, points out: “Indian strategists speak openly of a greater India exercising a dominant position in an area ranging from Iran to Thailand. India is also positioning itself to control the Indian Ocean militarily; its naval and air power programs point clearly in that direction — as do politically guided efforts to establish for India strong positions, with geostrategic implications, in adjoining Bangladesh and Burma.”[x]
The foregoing establishes conclusively India’s hegemonic ambitions in South Asia. The historical record reinforces this conclusion. The way India tried to destabilize Pakistan soon after the partition through the delay in sharing cash balances with Pakistan, cutting off the supply of river water from two head-works under her control in 1948, and the stoppage of trade with Pakistan in 1949 because of the latter’s refusal to devalue its currency were early examples of India’s hegemonic ambitions. India’s blatant military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 was an obvious attempt to cut Pakistan down to size. India’s handling of its disputes with Pakistan, particularly Kashmir, Sir Creek and Siachin, also reflects its hegemonic mindset. The same is true of India’s frequent resort to coercive diplomacy when things don’t go according to its liking in relations with Pakistan. India’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is again in pursuit of a great power status to which India thinks it is entitled.
Pakistan’s domestic political instability, the debilitating war on terror in which it is engaged, its deplorable economic performance over the past decade and a half, and the constant American pressure on it because of the crisis in Afghanistan have worked to weaken its position vis-à-vis India. On the other hand, India has been emboldened in the pursuit of its hegemonic ambitions by its much faster economic growth, its rapidly growing military strength, its status as a stable democracy, and the US strategic shift in its favour to contain a rising China.
Logic of power and the Indian strategy
The issues of peace and security are ultimately decided in this anarchic international system through the logic of power. Unfortunately Pakistan’s power relative to that of India has weakened over the past decade and a half. If the trend of the relative decline of Pakistan’s power vis-à-vis India continues, the latter’s ability to dictate to Pakistan would grow in strength. Under the present circumstances, the chances of the resolution of major Pakistan-India disputes like Kashmir on satisfactory terms from our point of view appear to be quite remote, at least in the near future. India’s decision to resile from the Pakistan-India agreement on Siachin is a case in point.
It is unlikely that India would be dissuaded from pursuing its hegemonic policies in South Asia just by expressions of friendliness on our part and our desire for peaceful coexistence and cooperation as some of our politicians, including Nawaz Sharif and others, seem to think. What India wants instead is submissiveness on the part of Pakistan. It will use the full weight of its growing power and every trick of trade to achieve this goal. By now the main contours of the Indian strategy to tame Pakistan are more or less clear. Our leaders and policy makers must carefully analyze the Indian strategy so as to draw appropriate conclusions for our own policy in dealing with India.
The Indian strategy for dealing with Pakistan has political, military, economic and cultural dimensions. Since Pakistan has acquired a nuclear deterrent, India is not in a position to inflict a conclusive military defeat on Pakistan for bringing it down on its knees. Indian strategy in essence, therefore, would focus on political, economic, and cultural means to overcome Pakistan’s opposition to its hegemonic designs in South Asia. India’s rapid economic growth over the past decade and a half, despite the recent slowing down, has enabled it to undertake a massive armament programme not only for positioning itself as a great power and competing with China but also for putting pressure on Pakistan to increase its military expenditure correspondingly. If the Indian plan succeeds, Pakistan would be forced to allocate an increasing amount of its resources to the military sector, thus, denying the economic sector the resources needed for Pakistan’s rapid growth and prosperity.
In the Indian calculations, this trend, if continued over a sufficiently long period of time, would place Pakistan in an untenable position of poverty and backwardness in the face of economic progress in India and force it to accept Indian hegemony. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has been happening in the Pakistan-India equation. While India on the whole has been growing economically at a high rate since mid-1990’s, Pakistan’s dismal performance has left it far behind. Our military expenditure is at an unsustainably high level (46% of the net federal revenues in the budget for 2014-15) while the allocation of resources to economic development as a percentage of GDP is at an extremely low level.
According to the Pakistan Economic Survey for 2013-14, Pakistan invested only 14.0% of its GDP for economic development achieving a low GDP growth rate of 4.1% during that period.[xi] As against that, India for several years has been investing over 30% of its GDP for economic development achieving much higher growth rates of its economy.[xii] This remains more or less true despite the recent slowing down of the Indian economy due to structural problems and the inability of the Indian government to carry out necessary reforms to overcome the obstacles to rapid economic growth. It should also be a matter of serious concern to Pakistan’s fiscal planners that for several years the total of the military expenditure and debt servicing alone has been far in excess of the net revenues of the Federal Government.
For instance, according to the budget documents for 2014-15, the total allocation for the military sector (Rs.1028 billion covering defence services, military pensions, and contingent liabilities) and debt servicing (Rs.1458 billion covering interest payment and repayment of foreign loans) would far exceed the net revenues of the federal government amounting to Rs.2225 billion. The federal government would rely on loans and bank borrowings amounting to Rs.1238 billion to meet its total current expenditure estimated to be Rs.3463 billion during that year. The financial burden of development expenditure would be over and above the resource gap of Rs.1238 billion.[xiii] This state of affairs is a recipe for an economic disaster if urgent measures are not taken to rectify the situation.
As the noted scholar of military strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart, has expounded in his classic book on the strategy of indirect approach, the essence of strategy is “concentration of strength against weakness.” He elaborates that the concentration of strength against weakness requires the dispersion of the opponent’s strength, which in turn is “produced by a distribution of your own that gives the appearance, and partial effect of dispersion. Your dispersion, his dispersion, your concentration—such is the sequence, and each is a sequel. True concentration is the fruit of calculated dispersion.”[xiv] While applying these principles to the situation in South Asia, India would like Pakistan to fritter away its resources on the building up of its military machine while leaving the economic sector, and thereby the country as a whole, in a weak and vulnerable condition.
If such an economically weak Pakistan is also pushed into a South Asian Economic Union as some of our political leaders have been naively advocating, Pakistan’s capitulation would be complete without the firing of a single Indian bullet. Pakistan would then become merely an appendage of the Indian economy and the decisions about our economy would be taken in New Delhi rather than in Islamabad. Once that happens, it would not be too late before decisions about Pakistan’s politics and security are also taken under the influence of New Delhi because of the close link of economic issues with political and security affairs. Pakistan would thus be reduced to the status of India’s satellite thereby fulfilling India’s real strategic aim in South Asia.
The Indian economic offensive against Pakistan is spearheaded by a cultural invasion through the use or misuse of Pakistan’s electronic and print media, some misguided NGO’s, and the soft power of the Indian film industry. This cultural invasion is targeted at the people and the intelligentsia of Pakistan. Its real aim is to convince our people that Pakistan and India are culturally the same. The propagation of this line of thought strikes at the very roots of Pakistan’s ideology and the rationale for its establishment. The purpose of this propaganda campaign is to break the will of the people of Pakistan to resist India’s hegemonic designs.
Even factually this propaganda lacks validity. A comparison of the essential characteristics of the Hindu and Islamic civilizations would show that they are far apart from each other. While Islam teaches human equality and brotherhood, Hinduism is based on an impregnable division of the society into castes barring vertical mobility. Those born in the lower strata of the society are condemned to accept their exploitation at the hands of the people in the higher castes without any possibility of improving their lot. The untouchables, as the name suggests, are at the lowest rung of the society, destined to lead a life of abject misery and deprivation. Quaid-i-Azam highlighted the cultural differences between the Muslims and the Hindus in the following manner in his correspondence with Gandhi in 1944:
“We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions. In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.”[xv]
It would also be reasonable to assume that India would use all the means at its disposal to weaken Pakistan’s polity by destabilizing it internally whenever and wherever it gets the chance. There is enough historical evidence to substantiate this assumption. Its blatant act of aggression against Pakistan in 1971 resulting in the country’s dismemberment is well known and needs no elaboration. More recently, according to the claims made by the government of Pakistan, it has been fomenting an insurgency in Balochistan. There have also been accusations of its involvement in some of the terrorist incidents in Pakistan.
There is definitely a strategic imperative of peace between Pakistan and India because of their status as de facto nuclear powers and the need for them to focus their energies and resources on the gigantic task of economic development necessitated by widespread poverty. Unfortunately, however, these factors alone will not be able to usher in an era of durable peace and friendship between the two countries. In all likelihood, Pakistan-India relations will continue to suffer from recurrent periods of tensions and strains because of India’s hegemonic designs in South Asia and outstanding disputes, especially the Kashmir dispute. Therefore, genuine friendship between the two countries would remain elusive in the foreseeable future. The best that can be hoped for is the maintenance of peace between them and normal good neighbourly relations marked by low level of tensions, CBM’s and cooperation in various fields on a mutually beneficial basis.
To safeguard our vital national interests, Pakistan has no choice but to resist India’s hegemonic designs in the region while recognizing the strategic necessity of peace between the two countries. This would be possible, however, only if we are able to achieve internal political stability, maintain our cultural identity, and increase our economic strength relative to that of India while maintaining a credible deterrent at the lowest level of armaments and armed forces. Our diplomacy should focus on defusing tensions with India to reduce the risk of an armed conflict and to enable us to divert our scarce resources from the military to the urgent task of economic development. We should definitely avoid adventurism and provocation in the management of our relations with India.
We should maintain a firm position on major Pakistan-India disputes in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and international agreements without being provocative. However, we must also recognize that because of the historical and emotional baggage on both sides and the complexity of some of the disputes, particularly the Kashmir dispute, their satisfactory solution in the foreseeable future may not be attainable. In such cases, we should adopt a long-term approach instead of rushing into arrangements that we might regret later. For instance, on the Kashmir dispute our immediate concern should be the amelioration of the human rights conditions of the people of Kashmir in the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), the strengthening of the autonomous character of IOK, the demilitarization of IOK as the militant activity in the area winds down, and the facilitation of cross-LOC travel and trade. A permanent and comprehensive settlement of the Kashmir dispute would have to await some opportune time in the future. Trade with India should be conducted on a level playing field and a mutually beneficial basis with due regard to the health of Pakistan’s economy.
Finally, we must strengthen our strategic partnership with China and friendly relations with Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan to balance India’s power advantage over us. We should also build up bridges of understanding with Russia while developing cooperation with Central Asian Republics. For regional cooperation, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) rather than the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) should be the regional organization of our choice as explained by me in an earlier article in Criterion.[xvi]
 The author is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.
[ii] The World in 2013, the Economist, pp. 111-12
[iii] World in 2050—The BRICs and beyond: prospects, challenges and opportunities, January, 2013, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).
[iv] International Forecasts, May 16, 2013, Euromonitor.
[v] The World in 2013, the Economist, pp. 111-12
[vi] Defense News (www.defensenews.com)
[vii] SIPRI, Trends in arms transfers, (www.sipri.org)
[viii] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.34
[ix] C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power”, Foreign Affairs, July-August 2006
[x] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision—America and the Crisis of Global Power, p.85
[xi] Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2013-14
[xii] The Financial Express, 18 February, 2014 (www.financialexpress.com)
[xiii] Budget in Brief, 2014-15
[xiv] B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, p.334
[xv] Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, p.216
[xvi] Javid Husain, “Pakistan’s Option: SAARC or ECO?”, The Criterion, October—December, 2012