The Spectre of Multi-National Terrorism in the 21st Century

The war on terror, over the long-haul, needs to be re-framed as a war of ideas and ideology rather than muscle and might. Community engagement by reaching out to youth, and to the true grass-roots by reclaiming the soul of Islam, recognizing its more peaceful symbols, verses and metaphors is our collective challenge and responsibility.

by Özer Khalid*

Abstract
Global citizens and international organizations have been given a responsibility, an assignment, a life-time opportunity to achieve this so as to evade and avoid any alarmist speculation of World War III. – Author)

From Peshawar and Parachinar to Paris – The Specter of Multi-National Terrorism in the 21st century
It is exactly one year since the stomach-churning Army Public school attack1, and the memory of our APS children martyrs still stings and lingers fresh in our collective conscience. Some wounds will never heal. Some blood stains never wash off. The screams of our APS martyrs echo resoundingly in our hearts. So palpable is the public panic that a year on and most schools remained shut on Pakistan`s darkest most disturbing day of December 16, after intelligence agencies tipped off schools of having received terror threats. As Peshawar and now Parachinar bleed, so too do our hearts. Terror has no religion, no country, and no race.

Blood pungently pervaded the pure air of Parachinar and its resilient people, as a deadly bomb detonated across a busy weekly bazaar strewn with clothing, human esh, blood and debris, killing 24 people and injuring countless souls. Parachinar, nestled in Kurram Agency, bordering North Waziristan, Orakzai and Khyber, has historically been a magnet for Sunni Shia clashes, the internecine centuries-old sinister sectarian strife to bedevil the earth`s 1.6 billion Muslims and growing.

The outlawed sociopathic sectarian extremist Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)2 alleges to have planted the Eidgah Parachinar improvised electronic explosive in retaliation for Shia support of Iran and Bashar al Assad3, reminding us all that the ISIS-Syria débâcle is snaking its venomous way into vulnerable South Asian arteries4; a region already deeply clogged and congested with the tyranny of terror. South Asia is a nerve-center for trans-regional connectivity and hence a pivot in the war against terror.

One year after APS Peshawar, Parachinar`s blast5 and the Jacobabad killing eerily resurrect fears of renewed sectarian tensions and terrorism: locally, linked regionally, reverberating globally. The most disconcerting part of this is the haunting knowledge that it almost certainly will happen again, and not knowing how to stop it compounds the problem ever-more.

Death knells will neither upset nor deine our destiny. Pakistan`s battle-hardened and able military, under the decisive leadership of COAS Raheel Sharif on 13 June 2015 reported remarkable progress with the laudable Operation Zarb-e-Azb6 which has, to quite an extent, broken the terrorist backbone. ISPR`s Asim Saleem Bajwa7 reported that 2,763 terrorist militants have been killed in Pakistan so far, including 218 terrorist commanders in 9,000 intelligence based operations (IBOs) where 21,193 have been arrested. 837 terrorist hideouts have been destroyed and 253 tonnes of explosives and 18,087 weapons recovered.

Operation Zarb8-e-Azb has cleared countless terrorist strongholds and destroyed their communication infrastructure. Dubious pockets of the Haqqani network straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are being cleared, especially in North and South Waziristan and Wana. Next the operation will be intensified in the peaks of Shawal. Zarb-e- Azb is where 488 brave soldiers of the Pakistan Armed Forces, Frontier Corps and Rangers embraced martyrdom and 1,914 were injured. There are 11 military courts in operation, with 142 terrorist cases referred. The operation must be intensi ed, and similar operations must be replicated regionally and globally.

Whilst our thoughts are with the brave and resilient soldiers who sacri ced their lives along with the 144 martyr souls of Peshawar, Parachinar and recently Jacobabad, and though their combined resolve is unquestionable, the global community can ill-afford to view such incidents purely as a regional terror contagion with tacit complacency. ISIS, with the opening of an Afghan chapter, Khorasan – a word signaling the apocalyptic end of times9 – is taunting Pakistan and has attracted the attention of radicals in Afghanistan, unnerving authorities who fear a potential violent spill-over affect and contagion into Pakistan. The notion of Khorasan presages a head on collision and postulates that war would be inevitable with a destruction hitherto never been witnessed by human kind – a war to extinct humanity. They propagate that the destruction of Aqsa Mosque10, with Israel trying to assert sovereignty over Jerusalem, will drive 1.6 billion Muslims to a dead-end street where they will be forced to ght their way back – and the world would see the Black Flags of Khorasan the day it happens. ISIS romanticizes such apocalyptic alarmist messages to lure violence-prone combat-ready young radicals in their prime.

Salting the wounds further is the establishment of “Qaedat al- Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent” in South Asia11, a terrorist entity that vows to fight the governments of Pakistan, India (where Muslims are increasingly butchered on false accusations of eating beef in Bihar), Myanmar (where the horrid atrocities against the Rohingya keeps those minorities on a knife`s edge) and Bangladesh, where capital punishment highlights the heavy-handedness of Sheikh Hasina Wajid. AQIS claimed responsibility for hijacking a Pakistani naval ship PNS Zulfiqar on September 06, 2014, and trying to use it to re rockets against US vessels in the Arabian Sea. IS allegedly made its rst public appearance in Pakistan with the distribution of pamphlets in the outskirts of Peshawar and Balochistan. The booklet titled Fatah (victory) is published in Pushto and Dari languages. Such documents were also found with the Ismaeli community bus that was devastatedly attacked by terrorists in Karachi on May 12, 2015. Therefore, South Asia, as a region, is teetering on the razor`s edge of uncertainty due to mindless militarism.

ISIS has also reached India. On December 26, 2015, three radicalized students, Abdul Wasim, Umar Hassan Farooqui and Zamir Farooqui from Hyderabad, allegedly about to join ISIS, were detained by anti-terror officials with support from Telangana police of Maharashtra at the Nagpur airport while they were about to board a flight to Srinagar en route to Syria12.

The world`s 1.6 billion Muslims have an acute disdain for the self- appointed Islamic State. The latest polling by Pew of 11 countries with large Muslim populations affirms this viewpoint. Worrisome, however, is that in Pakistan only 28% bear an unfavourable view of ISIS and 62% are fence-sitting by offering no opinion whatsoever. Our counter-radicalisation messaging must intensify. Amidst excellent efforts by the Pakistan Army, more civil-society led grass-roots counter-terrorism campaigning and funding is needed in Pakistan for peaceful positive perception building, especially of the West.

According to Pew, support for the Islamic State was 8% in Turkey 8% and 6% in the Palestinian territories. Such numbers, however small, are still alarming and must be brought down.

These statistics are proof that there are significant enough population segments ripe for radicalization recruitment who can easily be lured into the terrorist snare.

ISIS – A Conventional State or a Non-State Actor in International Relations

Interestingly, the self-appointed `Islamic State` of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, IS, ISIL or its Arabic name Daesh hereafter) is often labelled as a non-state actor (NSA), even by the most seasoned of security analysts. What they often glaringly overlook, however, is that ISIS might actually be considered a state actor in international relations. In Weberian14 state terms, ISIS have ultimate monopoly over the use of force, as they have: i) their own army; ii) claimed tangible territory transcending traditional borders and boundaries, including 1916 Sykes-Picot; iii) assumed Westphalian15 sovereignty; iv) appointed a Caliph; v) declared a capital; and vi) they have their own budget but not yet their own currency.

The state, as laid out in the Montevideo convention per international law, is an international person that should possess a permanent population, a de ned territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Whilst ISIS does not meet the nal criteria it most certainly bears attributes of the rst three, namely land, population, control and a centralized Caliphate based government16.

Obviously, whereas ISIS does not enjoy legal de jure sovereignty it has most certainly clinched de facto sovereignty at gunpoint. Though ISIS state sovereignty is not legally enshrined, it is more a reality than couched in rhetoric, which makes it all the more menacing. On the other hand, there are states that have been recognized de jure but not de facto, such as Palestine. It is a de jure state, in that it is possesses a legitimate government in a territory over which it has no actual control. The PLO and Palestinian17 authority claim that the State of Palestine is a sovereign state, many other states such as the UK, Sweden18 and Spain also echo such sentiments, but Palestine remains under the de facto control of Israel.

There are also states that legally straddle between de facto and de jure status, and are considered de jure states only according to their own law, for instance, ISIS recognizes itself de jure but only according to its own twisted interpretation of the Shariah. Somaliland19, for example, is a self-declared but internationally unrecognized state, a non-recognized de facto regime. The government of Somaliland regards itself as the successor state to the former British Somaliland protectorate.
Most accurately, ISIS might be categorized as a break-away secessionist state, much like Biafra was in Nigeria. The historical, economic, legal and political parallels are uncanny. Just as ISIS, Biafra claimed lucrative territory atop resource rich oil reserves, in southeastern Nigeria from 30 May 1967 to 15 January 1970. The inhabitants were mostly the Igbo20 people who led the secession due to economic, ethnic and religious tensions among the peoples of Nigeria. Similar religious sectarian strife is evidenced between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq and Syria, and is considered as one of the very reasons behind the birth of the Islamic State.

The creation of the new break-away secessionist state that was pushing for recognition was among the causes of the Nigerian Civil War21, also known as the Nigerian-Biafran War much like the creation of the Islamic State has created the Syrian civil war.

One acute difference, however, between Biafra22 and the Islamic State, is that Biafra was also de jure formally recognised by Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia. Other states which did not give of cial recognition to Biafra but provided under- handed support to Biafra included Israel, France, Spain, Portugal, the then Rhodesia, South Africa and Vatican City. Just as it is often argued that the Islamic State also gets unofficial under-handed support from morally questionable sympathisers and donors. Biafra much like ISIS, also received aid from other non-state actors, including Joint Church Aid, Holy Ghost Fathers of Ireland, Caritas International, MarkPress and U.S. Catholic Relief Services. Admittedly, ISIS`s non-state sponsors and donors are much more sinister.

After two-and-a-half years of war, during which over three million civilians died in ghting and from starvation resulting from blockades, Biafran forces under the slogan ‘no-victor, no-vanquish’ surrendered to the Nigerian Federal Military Government (FMG), and Biafra was reintegrated into Nigeria. Now with intensified bombing by foreign powers over Syria, regional coalitions spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, a Russian military offensive, Turkish co-operation to reign in ISIS, renewed and re-awakened United Nations mandates promulgating UNSC Resolutions aiming to install a transitional government in Damascus within the next six months, paving the way for Syria`s elections within the next 18 months, along with stealth diplomacy by Lavrov and John Kerry, it is realistic to assume that Sykes-Picot might be restored, Syria and Iraq`s traditional borders re-established and ISIS defeated, ceasing to exist de jure. However, others may de facto inevitably take up ISIS` cause if their philosophy goes unchallenged.

ISIS may be recognized as having non-state actor attributes, such as its global recruitment base, its trans-national operations, logistics, funding and contract network and its worldwide appeal and viral spread via social media. As a result of ISIS many other terror groups, often with converging loyalties and interests, have also spawned and spread their venomous arteries far and wide, many of which are ISIS`s offshoot. They, as a result, can be labelled as Multi-National Terrorist Corporations (MTC`s)TM and non-state actors (NSA`s) in international relations.

ISIS – Strategy, Tactics & Modus Operandi and the Evolution of Warfare & Global Terror – 2016 and Beyond

As viewed above, there has been a proliferation in the spate of global terror. The common thread weaving together such human devastation in 2014 and 2015 is the theocratic fascism of “Islamic State”, which of late, has inter alia claimed combined responsibility for the gruesome Paris, Beirut24, San Bernardino, Suruç25, Ankara26, Northern Sinai, Sousse, Kuwait and Yemen attacks. IS maybe medieval in their beliefs, with their penchant for beheadings, stonings, crucifixions, sex slavery and dhimmitude – the practice of taxing those who refuse to convert – but are über-modern in their execution, for instance deploying slick videos and an online magazine, Dabaq.

A key motivation for the spate of increased IS attacks is the recently suffered setbacks on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, especially in light of the UN Resolution permitting Syria`s bombing, aerial strikes by Western powers and Russia`s heightened offensive. ISIS has especially suffered setbacks in central and northern Iraq, in cities like Tikrit and Tel Abyad, in Kobane and in Sinjar. On December 25, 2015, Iraqi forces consolidated their positions in Ramadi ahead of a final push against ISIS.

Nobody wants to join losers. So to preserve their recruitment and relevance, IS have to deviate attention from those territorial setbacks by inflicting gruesome attacks abroad, especially on soft civilian Western targets, which gives them cheap and immediate publicity. Such attacks keep them in the media spotlight, fuel their recruitment drive, propagate their divisive anti-Western propaganda, and maintain their image of shocking and reshaping the world – which is what they have done, with alarming alacrity.

Nothing succeeds like success, and IS’ recent military gains have brought it a “recruitment bonanza.” Far from abhorring the group’s brutality, young recruits are attracted by the adrenaline rush of its shock- and-awe tactics against the enemies of Islam.

In 2015, the “Islamic State” (IS) and their affiliates, mercilessly massacred humans even during the Holy month of Ramadan. What motivated IS and their splinter groups to carry out such callous carnage in this holy month of Ramadan, a month where Muslims are meant to stir self-reflection from within, is that Ramadan marked the one year anniversary of “Islamic State.” Al-Baghdadi`s faux caliphate. Symbolism and sadistic grandeur are their hallmarks. They, therefore, needed to mark their first year anniversary with blood-letting.

To better dissect and analyze the rising tide of global terror let us look back at the events of 2015, in analytical search of the fons et origo of terrorism and militancy, as well as examine how terror, warfare and retaliation are evolving and the counter-currents they are producing. Acknowledging the unwelcome role and rise of Multi-National Terrorist Corporations (MTC`s)TM and how they accentuate the urgency of action is needed rather than silently watching this pre-coded hell unfold on a global scale. According to many, amidst the throes of global terrorism27, developed countries still remain the victor ludorum and a majority of Muslim states the victus. In the uppermost levels of civilizational discourse, the aversion and unspoken hostility between historical perceptions of Islam and the Muslim psychological perceptions of the West still persist – sometimes overt but often covert – and still await a satisfactory resolution. Until we do not nourish long-lasting definitive change in such ill-fated perception, through intellectual inter-faith image-building exercises, we are headed toward a clash of civilizations rather than a culture of global concensus.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi gave birth to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004. Their brutal methods alienated many al-Qaeda leaders. They played an instrumental role in the Iraqi insurgency. Out of the ashes of AQI the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) was created – a precursor to what is today infamously labelled as IS. In 2010 the current IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi clawed his way to the helm, claiming purity over other aspirants due to his direct ancestry and lineage to the Quraysh tribe, a fundamental pre-requisite for any would-be Caliph. Many power-thirsty despots, Saddam Hussein included, also boasted Quraysh descent, and because no one knows much about Baghdadi—certainly not enough to trace his lineage back 1,433 years to a society a thousand miles away— it is dif cult (and in the Islamic State, probably fatal) to prove or suggest that he is lying.

Bernard Haykel28, an Islamic law expert at Princeton, says Caliphs are supposed to be chosen by consultation with all Muslim scholars. Baghdadi hasn’t shown he has the support of a majority, even of ultra- radical Muslims.

Whereas Bin Laden would sickeningly justify the 9/11 attacks via defensive Jihad, IS sees no reason whatsoever to justify any of its actions, taking the meaning of violent voyeuristic Schadenfreude to a whole new debased level. ISIS actually stresses violent action over theology and theory, and has produced no repertoire of ideas, other than the basest distortion of Islam, to sustain and nourish its social base. It is a killing machine powered by blood and iron. ISIS has created a blood- soaked paradise that al-Qaeda contemplated only as a distant daydream.

All the ISIS attacks hereunder exhibit evidence of sophisticated logistics, an effective global network, aligned co-ordination, social media savvy, along with advanced weaponry.

The aforementioned attacks in recent months illustrate and reinforce the unprecedented reach of terror.

IS has a world-wide support base. Alarmingly, the Clarion Project notes that ISIS has up to 42 million supporters in the Arab world30. US intelligence indicates that 20,000 foreign fighters have flocked over from abroad to the IS nest, including at least 6,000 Westerners, ready to behead humans or blast themselves up at a moment`s notice, anywhere on earth.

The CIA31 estimates that the Islamic State army has a strength of 32,000, whereas the Kurdish contingency claims it is closer to 50,000. The Soufan Group, a New York-based private intelligence rm, estimates the number of foreigners coursing into Syria and Iraq to join Islamic State and other Islamist groups has doubled over the past 18 months and is now as high as 31,000. 6,000 European citizens, many of whom were non-Muslim to begin with, European born and bred, gave up life and limb, kith and kin, even renouncing coveted citizenships to take up arms with MTC`s, especially with ISIS32 in Iraq and Syria. Years of priming and grooming, online and otherwise, brain-washed them to yearn for a faux theocratic Caliphate. It is sheer naïveté to assume that ISIS radicalized those 6,000 European Muslims who have travelled to the ends of the earth to join them. ISIS propaganda is effective, but not that effective. This did not happen overnight and did not take place from a vacuum33.

ISIS holds sway over large swathes of north-east Syria including its stronghold of Raqqa and a number of lucrative gas and oil fields in the east. It controls most of the territory along the banks of the Euphrates, including strategically important dams. It only controls one of Syria’s top 10 cities by population – Deir Ezzor, a stone`s throw away from the border with Iraq.

Operationally speaking, all the ISIS attacks accentuate the heterogeneity of radical terrorism today – in terms of tactics deployed and in their selection of targets. IS’s operatives in Isere, Paris, San Bernardino, Kuwait, Tunisia and Yemen struck at a company, a concert, a soccer match, a health centre, a mosque, a tourist location, and a funeral, respectively. Each of these locations are “soft” civilian targets with minimal security. And each of those attacks involved a small number of terrorists, with minimum ammunition causing maximum damage.

However, IS are also willing to attack “hard” targets. Egypt`s Sinai operation and the Chatanooga shooting were distinct from the other recent attacks, as they deliberately struck “hardened“ targets, such as military and police installations, using dozens of fighters and an eerie arsenal of weaponry. ISIS deploys both individual as well as collective attacks. The attack in Ankara reveals how terror is practised collectively.

ISIS` organizational chart below exhibits a well-thought-out operational strategy, a comprehensive reporting structure and functional division of labour, whereby they have a cabinet, a Sharia, Shura and military council(s), and importantly a robust media apparatus to spew out pernicious propaganda, a key characteristic of assymetric warfare. They clearly understand the importance of timely decision-making, key appointments, legacy and succession planning as well as operational agility.

Terrorism is not a monolithic phenomenon, it is a fragmented agile moving target, with competing perpetrators. The territorial turf wars and ideological wedges between the Abdullah Azzam brigades35 and ISIS in Beirut, or the al-Nusra Front and ISIS in Syria are illustrative of ideological and territorial turf wars for relevance, which makes global terror all the more challenging an affront.

There is “homegrown” radicalism, especially common in the West, such as the Belgian born and bred Paris attackers the main one being Abdelhamid Abaaoud. He was named ringleader of the Paris attacks and had boasted in ISIS propaganda of his ability to travel unnoticed into and through Europe. The Charleston shooting with Dylann Roof is another example.

Another “homegrown” terror incident was witnessed in East London, at the Leytonstone underground tube station, where a murderous man went on a maniacal killing spree with a machete, seriously injuring three people before being tased by police and arrested. He reportedly shouted “This is for Syria” as he was slitting one victim’s throat36.
His action produced an encouraging community resilient response on social media with an engaging hashtag, titled “YouaintnoMuslimbruv.” An effort of supportive Londoners, to empower Muslims with an exemplary sense of inclusion.

As depicted above, a lot of these terrorists are `homegrown`. The UN refugee agency stands justified in urging European countries not to demean or reject refugees because of the Paris bombers. Language that demonises refugees is deeply disturbing, especially in light of Poland, Slovakia and the German state of Bavaria`s citing of the Paris attacks as a reason to refuse deserving refugees.

Then there are “exported” hardened brain-washed IS/Al-Qaeda type operatives, with global know-how and capabilities, or what I refer to as Multi-National Terrorists, immersed in militant training overseas, like the Kuwaiti suicide bomber or the highly educated Mohammed Emwazi, also known as Jihadi John37 who travelled from London to in ict terror in the Middle East.

ISIS, though much more brutal than al-Qaeda in their attacks, are subtler and more sophisticated in their tactics. ISIS has learned from al- Qaida’s mistakes, and now avoids structured training camps, preferring to live and organise in residential buildings camouflaged among civilians to seamlessly blend in. The Paris conspirators, including the ringleader, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, were able to travel care-free between Belgium, France and Syria while the US-led airstrikes targeting ISIS command and control were in full swing. However, slavish loyalty to historic example makes the beliefs and plans of ISIS a little more predictable than those of a spry, global reach organisation like al-Qaeda38.

What renders IS and Multi-National Terrorist Corporations (MTC`s)TM tough to defeat39 is that coalition forces cannot simply deploy conventional third generation manoeuvrist warfare, utilising air force to capture delineated land and disrupt supply routes. Neither can it only use a frontal assault, due to the ever-adapting battle lines of the IS insurgency. The capability required for IS type insurgent guerrilla warfare is much more high-tech, agile and spread-out. Also in asymmetric warfare40, such as that waged against IS, traditional forces promptly withdraw as these wars are deemed resource draining, too costly and protracted. Such swift withdrawal creates multi-fold challenges, most notably democratic deficits and power vacuums, only to be filled by newer unsavoury terror entities.

Acknowledging MTC`sTM and ISIS as a fluid agile ever-moving guerilla insurgency affects how we retort to it. We can no longer simply bomb, kill, torture, shoot or legislate our way out of this difficult predicament. Certain analysts question the efficiency and outcome of the war on terror, by citing empirical evidence as hereunder:

Such evidence, by the U.S. State Department, shows that despite countless military campaigns, year on year, terror attacks keep surging. Recent Western wars against three Muslim-majority states, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, left all three more fractured than ever before, created a perilous power vacuum, and have become safe-havens for extremist entities who now almost have a carte blanche for recruiting distraught minds from war-torn dysfunctional families.

Given the corpus of international human rights advocacy and social media cognition, legitimizing forcible military incursions and foreign interventions will become ever-more arduous in the years ahead.

Missiles, military might and muscle of yore, alone, in and of themselves, can no longer control and conquer the malaise of the global insurgency terror contagion. Chop off the highest echelons of terror outfits, by taking out their leaders, and just as the Hydra`s head, hundreds more will spawn and re-incarnate. Taking out Osama Bin Laden in the Abbottabad operation did not spell the end of terror, au contraire, it yielded hundreds more would-be aspirants. Carpet bombing or droning entire regions will, not only result in tragic loss of innocent civilian life (what is often derogatorily referred to as collateral damage) but radical insurgents will always find hide-outs and re-emerge stronger.

In the aftermath of Operation “Desert Storm,” critics note, America has not been able to achieve a meaningful military triumph. Whether it was in Somalia with Black Hawk Down in Bakara Market or Bosnia- Herzegovina or the Bush-Blair botched up second invasion of Iraq in 2003 where former PM Tony Blair himself recently apologized for the intervention, or the Afghanistan occupation in 2001 or Libya in 2011. The U.S. did win tactical battles, however these did not empirically translate into strategic victory—durable and desirable peace.

The unequivocal certainty is that from Desert storm onwards, war no longer pursued its traditional trajectory and format. The rules of engagement have forever altered. Each embarrassment augmented frustration and addition of more power, in terms of quality and quantity— what security analysts term as the surge strategy. Lethality increased many folds and the list of achievable objectives shrank with each new experience. The very nature of war has forever altered its course.

Third generation warfare represented conventional inter-state warfare where armies are pitched one against the other. Warring states have control over their armies, characterized by the tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy’s combat forces. Strategies are: indirect approach, maneuver warfare, defence in depth, by-passing the enemy to attack his rear. Characteristics are: blitzkrieg which Hitler horrifically deployed, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next. Methods of fighting: tanks/bombers pitched against cities and armies. If the older generation wars were like fluids, fourth generation warfare is like a gas. It spreads everywhere yet regular armies have a hard time finding even the battle fields42.

The war against terror has certainly evolved into fourth and fifth generational warfare representing a clash between state and non- state entities lacking a rigid formal hierarchy or command and control structure. Many al-Qaeda, al-Nusra, AQIP, TTP operations typify this. In fourth generational warfare wars may commence and end as undeclared activities, discretely culminating without the adversary even realizing that there ever was a war. This reality makes us reminiscent of a line from the prodigious Sun Tzu, author of the Art of War43 who prophetically presaged that “all warfare is an act of deception”44.

In fourth generational warfare we see the ascent of complex, long- term wars deploying soft power – a term famously coined by Joseph Nye45 – which this researcher interprets as stealth diplomacy, lobbying, influence peddling, regularization of intrigue and acceptance of proxy war, especially in buffer go-between states (which to President Putin many Central Asian Republics (CAR`s) still remain), overtly encouraging dissidents, or any semi-legitimate means of furthering national strategic interests.

Fourth generational warfare (4GW) describes a decentralized non-national trans-national warfare which many terror organizations enjoy. Geographically diverse terror attacks from Paris to Ankara to Beirut bear witness to this. It is characterized by blurring the distinction between war and politics, soldier and civilian, state and society – having no delineated definable battle fields or fronts. Multi-National Terrorist Corporations (MTC`s), via suicide bombers, for instance, and a sickening slew of strategic stealth tactics certainly blur distinctions between war and politics, soldier and civilian, state and society.

4 GW is widely dispersed and largely undefined. Actions occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society. The six staged attacks in Paris and the concurrent attacks in Sousse, Kuwait and Northern Sinai on the very same day, over the span of three continents within three hours bear testimony to how ISIS achieves assymetric advantage through concurrent attacks46. Fourth generational warfare is cultural manipulation, not just a physical phenomenon. Brain-washing minds with tyrannical theological indoctrination is certainly more a cultural Machiavellian manipulation47 of the mind rather than a physical transformation of body and attire (at least to commence with).

4 GW most detrimentally involves a direct attack on the enemy’s culture, civilization, way of life and ideology. Terrorist entities such as IS seeking to wholesale demonise the Occidental template in favour of a distorted over-literalist reading of the Shariah, to vilify anything and everything Western exemplifies this. Such warfare incorporates highly sophisticated psychological warfare, nuances of the mind, especially through media manipulation or what Noam Chomsky aptly describes as manufacturing consent48 through media propaganda49, where all available pressures are employed, i.e. religious, political, economic, social and military. Antonio Gramsci`s cultural hegemony50 assertion via religion to assert the dominant ideology surfaces to mind.

4 GW is a low intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks. This is a major dilemma the Syria coalition faces against IS: non- combatants are a tactical challenge. How do you deal with a suicide bomber who loves death as much as other humans/soldiers cherish life? The elements involved are small in size but widely spread out in terms of networks of communication and financial support. TTP, LeJ, ASJW leveraging the black market`s under-handed, hard to trace havala system to line their pockets for financial support springs to mind here.

ISIS deploys all such tactics to paralyze the enemy with doubt, destroying an enemy’s civil society and turning their population into mindless cowards. Characteristic dispiriting of the enemy. Method of fighting: propagandists-to-populations.

If traditional war centered on the enemy’s physical strength, and 4 GW on moral strength, fifth generation warfare (5GW) focuses on intellectual strength. War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. 4GW is executed over a very long time frame, sometimes decades51. 5GW is conceived in terms of strategic vision over an even longer time frame, sometimes before an opponent realizes that they will be opponents but the execution time may be very short in comparison to 4GW52. ISIS, in a matter of just split seconds wreaked havoc in Beirut, Bataclan and San Bernardino.

5GW co-opts the enemy by manipulating their decision making so that they are “entangled” without being aware of what entangled them; a scenario in which multiple, seemingly unrelated events hurt one nation or a group of nations repeatedly, as if ‘the hand of God’ were behind those events”. 5th Generation War allows very weak fighters to attack, because the world does not know about them. Warriors may implement changes “from above” but not as a result of revolution; rather, “by moving up through legitimate channels to implement an invisible evolution from above.”

In 4GW the enemy attempts to use the target country’s media as a vehicle to sap the people’s and political leaders’ will to fight. In 5GW the enemy actually becomes the media and the political leadership. ISIS hitting the airwaves and launching radio broadcasts in Nangarhar Afghanistan53 to drum up support, recruit fighters and spread anti- government propaganda is an instructive case in point.

Fifth generational warfare allows individuals with small sums of money, such as the US $ 32,000 to stage the deadly Paris attacks, to accomplish their objectives. We now have super-empowered individuals and groups with access to modern knowledge, technology, and means to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual and group interests. Arguably, its first identifiable manifestations occurred in the United States during the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the ricin attacks of 2004. Both sets of attacks necessitated specialized know-how, included attacks on federal government facilities, succeeded in disrupting governmental processes, and yielded widespread mayhem and hysteria in the public. The attacks were quite successful in exacerbating public fear.

ISIS and MTC`s deploy 5GW tactics by proposing a strategy for a truly global con ict on as many fronts as possible and in the form of resistance by super-empowered small cells or individuals. Modern weapons and technologies have conferred tremendous power on small actors. One person with a kilo of plastic explosive and a simple detonator can do millions of dollars in damage to key infrastructure. 5 GW is a “holistic” warfare, total war through total engagement.

To avoid penetration and defeat by security services, organizational links are kept covert and to an absolute minimum. Small empowered groups wage a distorted global Jihad. Manifestation of these theories were witnessed in Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and during the London 7/7 attacks in 2005. In each case, the perpetrators organized themselves into local, self-sustaining cells that acted on their own, but simultaneously, sought guidance from visiting emissaries of the global movement.

In a protracted and unceasing war of nite conventional resources arrayed against in nite asymmetrical threats, the victim states must strive to carefully and comprehensively understand and calculate the character of the emerging threat and adapt commensurately.

From Bardo to Bataclan to Beirut – Rise of the Multi-National Terrorist Corporation (MTC)

The view that terror incidents are isolated, that the dots do not connect, that a silo-based country-by-country counter-terrorism approach can work constitutes collective delusion. Tashfeen Malik, San Bernardino shooter`s link to the radicalized Abdul Aziz54 and the Red Mosque network is the example of a global cross-border attack in an ever-connected global village. The Paris attack was planned in Belgium.

Cross-border counter-radicalization intelligence gathering, sharing, brie ng and training initiatives must intensify, in the wake of what this author terms as Multi-National Terrorist Corporations (MTC`s) TM – a new and unwelcome organization under the aegis of globalisation. Labelling, branding and recognizing new lexicon like MTC`sTM empowers us to better conceptualize and intellectually and empirically counter the menace of global terrorism, which is increasingly both global in nature, yet local in execution.

From Bardo museum to the Bataclan stadium to Benghazi , from Suruç to the spineless shootings in San Bernardino to Sinai to the blood-soaked battle elds of Syria, from Paris to the Army Public School in Peshawar to Parachinar, the menace of multi-national terrorist corporations (MTC`s hereafter) TM sow a segregating sinister clash of civilizations, holding humanity at ransom. ISIS spare no one. Along with Muslims, Christians, Kurds and Yazidis have fallen by the tip of their beheading swords, therby, casting stain and stigma to global security and peace of mind with a purposely perverted misinterpretation of Islam and causing unprecedented and alarming levels of backlash, bigotry, barrier-erecting, border-sealing and blame-apportioning exercises, from both Muslim-majority countries and the Western world. Such vitriol triggers what Samuel Huntington quasi-prophetically presaged as fault lines on civilizational planes thereby inflaming a clash of civilizations55. In the current dialectic between civlisations, conflict dangerously dampens dialogue56.

The malevolent malaise of militancy is spread via multinational terrorist corporations (MTC`s) TM. Many terrorist groups are re-incarnated heathens from previous life-forms, for instance the Mujahideen became al-Qaeda many of whom evolved into the Taliban, all competing for relevance against ISIS in an ever-crowded violent world. These splintered offshoots include, inter alia, but are certainly not limited to, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Houthis in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)57, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Nusra58 Front in Syria, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Tehreek-E-Taliban in Afghanistan59, the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan, Tehreek -E-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jamat-ud-Dawa in Pakistan, AQIS, ASJW, LeJ, LeT, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group60, the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria61, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) the Black Widows in Russia. These are just some major MTCsTM; the tip of an inter-twined iceberg. They receive funding from many donors across the globe. ISIS and like-minded MTC`sTM operations, logistics, infrastructure, contacts, recruitment base are a full-blown global insurgency and a part of a worldwide propaganda to impose a fake, highly politicized version of religion by gunpoint.

Such terror out ts are abound in an over-saturated terror market. The term `terror market` has purposely been deployed to denote that these MTC`sTM, like any other multi-national corporation (MNC) vie to capture both mind and marketshare, compete over scarce resources and hunger for rapid market entry. Islamic State and Taliban fighters are clashing over lucrative drugs in Nangarhār and other smuggling routes in Afghanistan, vital to their abilities to acquire more weapons and recruits.

In a global knowledge economy MTC`sTM just like Multi-National Corporations (MNC`s) battle over a lucrative market share of funding, seek to get their murky hands on products, in their case earth-shattering life-destroying weapons of mass destruction (WMD`s), secure highly coveted trade and oil routes62, especially in the resource rich Middle East, South Asia and Western African hemispheres, and all are equally hell-bent on dismantling the current world order, and the edifice of peace, law and post-modernity which are its constructs.

MTCTM operatives are globally networked and connected, seamlessly in-touch via instant messaging and social media. Tashfeen Malik’s online activities and global links to terror networks surrounding Lal Masjid (the Red Mosque)63 in Islamabad reinforce this. The Paris bombers executed their terror via encrypted social media messaging.

MTC`s TM are indisputable enemies of civilisation64 for they seek to unravel the Washington consensus, destroy the OIC, annihilate the G-8, dislodge NATO, undermine Bretton Woods structures including the UN, and all other global institutions, which have painstakingly been architectured post-World War 2. However, these out ts are not only out to demonise the Western template of modernity but also seek to demolish the Muslim world from within, through militancy, insurgency and civil war, positioning themselves to appear as if they are engaging in Islamic Jihad.

Some conspiracy theorists state that MTC`s TM are financed and operated by countries whose agenda it is to brew religious radicalization, both formally and informally, overtly and covertly, regionally and globally. MTC`s TM seek to spread sectarian strife: taunting terror, malevolent militancy, and civil insurgencies in unstable less developed countries (LDC`s). Certain critics argue that this not only perpetuates class inequalities and neo-imperialism, but war allows corporatized contractors with vested commercial interests to boost their bottom lines and balance sheets.

Analysts estimate that the terrorism industry is (at a bare minimum) worth $ 1 billion now, one that has irreversibly been internationalized with the dawn of the 21st century. Terrorism has taken root partly due to ill-fated pregnant power vacuums created, either by coincidence or design, as a result of botched knee-jerk interventions such as that of Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011.

MTC`s TM and their militancy malevolently not only threatens the West, but patently plagues Muslim majority countries, denying and delaying their richly deserved drive toward progress and modernity whilst unhealthily tying them to dependency relations with developed countries and the prohibitive interest payment accompanying debt repayment. MTC`s TM reinforce the status quo of poverty, inequity, illiteracy, political instability and underdevelopment.

MTCsTM are not fulfilling any heroic “holy task” nor are they fighting any “divine war.” Such populist propaganda pretensions are meant for the consumption of the gullible masses, the lower ranking rookie terror recruits, passive media consumers, or an increasingly politically polarized identity-confused citizenry.

The Mujahideen was the Frankenstein editio princeps of MTCTM founded and funded to defeat the Soviet Union, which it did comparatively well. Its re-incarnation became al-Qaeda. This law of unintended consequences spiraled out of control, spawning a myriad of MTC`s TM seeking to enrich themselves and their higher echelons, with or without imperial consent, but reliant on corporatist donors and seekers of Sunni-Shia sectarian strife, who have dominated world politics since time immemorial.

Currency, lucrative oil deals or arms-for-sale contracts easily hires the loyalty of anyone, anywhere and anytime, in this wonderfully twisted world. Ideologies to one side, MTC`s TM , to a large extent are ruthless mercenaries for hire to the highest bidder, who tailor their terror ideology to suit whatever cause célèbre du jour.

Saudi Arabia recently formed a coalition of 3465 mainly Muslim countries – including powers such as Egypt and Turkey with the partially-recognized state of Palestine, Pakistan, UAE, Qatar, Malaysia and Nigeria et al- to coordinate a ght against “terrorist organisations”. The joint operations center will be based in Riyadh and the announcement came from Mohammad bin Salman, KSA`s defence minister and Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi’s foreign minister. When asked if the alliance would deploy troops on the ground, Jubeir said “nothing is off the table”.

Predictably the Saudi coalition of 34 lacks regional rival Iran and its allies, Syria and Iraq. Such Shia contingent exclusion, despite all states sharing a common enemy against ISIS, is deeply regrettable and intensi es the chasm against the IS chimera.

For now the anti-terrorism alliance must intensify its efforts not just in Syria but also Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan, current hot-beds of raw radicalisation. Of strategic importance in the coalition is Turkey`s remarkable show of solidarity. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu told reporters in Ankara that: “Turkey is ready to contribute by all its means to all gatherings that aim to ght terrorism, no matter where or by whom they are organised,”. The Kurdish border region, dubbed Rojava, or Syrian Kurdistan, could importantly serve as Turkey’s cordon sanitaire against ISIS66.

Many geo-strategists warn that tempers between Riyadh and Tehran are seething and that the U.S. is precariously close to a war with Russia in Syria in what is brewing to be a neo-Cold War given President Putin`s regional muscle-flexing. Amidst global cataclysm and blood-letting, concerns have been raised by pundits that Moscow and Tehran are hatching part of a cynical plan to cement a one-man omniscient despotic Assad régime, casting a hovering cloud of doubt over long-term regional political quiescence which may spark a negotiation stalemate.

Russia is engaged in “classic asymmetric warfare” in Syria by using its military clout to prop up President Bashar al-Assad while saying it is attacking ISIS militants. Moscow`s propaganda machine is as effective as ever. Putin wants to retain Assad in a bid to keep the Soviet- style police state, by which the Alawite minority has dominated and oppressed the huge Sunni majority. Damascus would be playing to the tune of Iran’s elite Quds force under Qassem Suleimani; the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Shia militias of Iraq.

Russian involvement in Syria has cost it dearly. The result was a tragic downing of a Russian charter airliner over Sinai on Oct. 31, that killed 353 people. In September 2015, Russia also launched airstrikes “against terrorist groups” in Syria. Fewer than 10% of its initial strikes were against ISIS targets, the majority have been against anti-Assad groups, which reinforces the stance that the Kremlin favours Assad, come what may.

What augurs well for the international community and most of all for the people of Syria is that after ve long years of a life-destroying soul-sapping Syrian civil war, the United Nations and world powers have finally unanimously agreed67 on a 15 to 0 basis on 18 December at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to embrace a plan for a cease-fire.

Ballots, over the long-haul, always resonate louder than bombs and bullets. The 18 December UNSC Resolution renders the Security Council an imprimatur to a possible political solution laying the groundwork for a government in Syria and a peace process that holds the distant prospect of ending the conflict in a country where 250,000 civilians have indiscriminately been killed and 12 million displaced – half of them in exile. If the United Nations authoritatively plays its key role in this protracted struggle, 1916 Sykes-Picot borders might well be restored.

A lot now resides on the shoulders of Ban Ki-Moon, who should take a more interventionist stance. The UN is not a mere echo chamber for superpowers. Mr Ki-Moon, whilst providing profound returns and concessions, where and when required, on a cautious, case-to-case, country by country basis, can ensure that the Middle East stops being in the throes of tyrannical régimes68 of yesteryears. This requires an astute geo-strategic re-calculation and optimization of foreign policies away from pure national self-interest toward long-term regional stability.

The UNSC Resolution abides by an accord known as the Geneva Communiqué – reached three years ago and considered critical by the Western powers – that proposes a transitional government with full executive powers. The world needs to be more receptive to the Geneva 1 and 2 negotiation process vis-à-vis Syria, and might consider exerting the soft power of diplomacy just as it intelligently, less aggressively, brokered an on-going pro-West Iran nuclear program containment.

Against all odds, Mr. Kerry managed to bring the Saudis, Russians and Iranians in a series of meetings in Vienna and elsewhere over the past three months and force-fed a diplomatic process that many in Washington had believed would never see take off.

Such a UNSC Resolution should have come much earlier. Despite the UNSC Resolution, the road ahead is not a gilded path. Tricky diplomacy will be required to translate the delicate consensus achieved on paper in New York into real change on the ground. Acute lingering disagreements are to be reconciled between Riyadh and Tehran as well as the American and Russian positions, for instance Mr. Kerry alleges that 80 percent of Russian airstrikes were hitting opposition groups fighting Mr. Assad, not the forces of the Islamic State extremist group. To this Mr. Lavrov retorted that Moscow had since long sought joint military exercises with the U.S. but to no avail in Syria.

A dizzying array of armed forces have left Syria in tatters, killing 240,000 and driving millions of refugees out of the country, creating the worst diaspora and mass exodus since World War II and threatening to destabilize the entire region. Syria is a fragile, fractured and fragmented state. Syria is a country divided.

One shortcoming of the UN resolution is that it makes no mention of whether Syria’s Assad would be able to run in the new elections, which it says must be held within 18 months of the beginning of political talks. That process will begin sometime in January 2016 at the earliest.

On paper, the resolution is striking for its ambition. It places the political process to decide Mr. Assad’s future under United Nations auspices, thereby, making it far harder for Mr. Assad to control the vote. It also specifically requires that all Syrians, importantly “including members of the diaspora,” be allowed to participate in the vote. This was conjured up in Vienna in November by Mr. Kerry, who is betting that if Syrians around the world can participate in the vote, Mr. Assad will not be able to win.

Moscow and Tehran have blocked any explicit discussion of whether Mr. Assad, who has depended on Russia and Iran for critical military and financial support, can try to stay in of ce. Mr. Lavrov argued after the vote that there should be no move for regime change. He cited Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Muammar el-Qadda ’s Libya as examples where American intervention left much to be desired.

Diplomatic concessions are always required at crucial historical junctures as these, but allowing Assad to retain the seat constitutes a grave diplomatic faux-pas. Assad is damaged goods, the quicker Moscow realizes this the better. His barrel bombs70, chemical weapons (sarin and VX)71 and vicious tactics have so embittered a huge segment of his own population that even his once friends have now turned to foes, insisting that he can no longer rule Syria with his murky iron st.
One obstacle to putting a deal in place may be determining which of the disparate rebel groups would participate in the talks scheduled to begin next month, and whether they would agree to come to the table at all without a guarantee of Mr. Assad’s exit. Nor has Mr. Assad said he would participate — though he will be under pressure from Russia and Iran to do so.

A cease- re in Syria poses multi-fold challenges. Problematically, it is not expected to apply to all parts of the country — certainly not to the vast swathes of land captured by the deadly ISIS — and the idea of sending United Nations-sanctioned observers to monitor those areas is unthinkable. The resolution gives Secretary General Ban Ki-moon one month to tell the Council how a cease- re could be monitored. Mr Ki-moon`s role has to be swift, realistic and decisive. The world can ill- afford a vacuum in Damascus that the Islamic State or other extremist groups might ll.

The resolution detrimentally leaves open the question of whether other rebel groups can be designated as terrorist organizations and excluded from the cease- re agreement. It embraces an effort led by Jordan to figure out which groups should receive the terror designation. It is, however, inadmissible to divide terrorists between good and bad ones.

The battle against terrorism is a long-drawn one. The articulate and analytic, President Obama72 reminded Americans of the need for “strategic patience” in battling ISIS. A greater emphasis was on the required regulation of the visa program, tighter probes by the Departments of Homeland Security and State on visa exceptions which allowed, for instance, the San Bernardino mass murderers to enter the USA, community outreach and gun control at home; intensified support for the multilateral forces and the use of intelligence abroad. President Obama, in a rare speech from the Oval Of ce, sent a subtle but unmistakable message: his policy is on course.

There have been almost 3,000 airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria since a US-led campaign began in September 2014. According to the US monitoring group Airwars73, more than 95% of these have been conducted by the United States. In September 2015, France joined the campaign, and has since stepped up its airstrikes in Syria in the wake of the Paris attacks with a “massive” attack on the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa in the north-east of the country.

U.S. and allied coalition forces, post November 20, 2015, have especially been attacking and aerial bombing al-Bukamal, al-Hawl, al- Hassakah which is closer to Turkey`s border and Ain Issa, as well as the vital oil elds of al-Omar and al-Tanak, whereas the Russian offensive has focused on areas close to Hama, Idlib in an attempt to prop up Assad`s iron grip.

This is a historic opportunity to exert UN leadership which must delicately manage to tactically embrace consensus-building and compromise-seeking, especially given the conflicting interests of Lavrov, Kerry, Rouhani and the Saudis. The UN must now tailor their policies to suit the circumstances du jour, even if it implies tough policy reversals. Syria`s future aspirations rely on it.

Western foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis the Middle East needs to be less bi-polar and schizophrenic. More strategic depth needs to be added to present foreign policy calculations other than self-interest and petrol-politics, especially in light of the Paris Climate summit which accentuates a keener global appetite toward renewable energy sources.

What unfolds in Syria next is of immense consequence for the Middle East. Syria, much like Tunisia and Turkey, can be a harbinger for moderate Muslim democracy or outright secularism. Syria can be a beacon for stability or become an interminable labyrinth of incongruous and swift sectarian rifts like Libya and Iraq. The international community must ensure the former and banish prospects of the latter.

A de ant Assad in Syria, a nuclear assertive Iran and region-wide tumult with a Yemen war, and an ongoing stand off between Turkey and Russia underscore the importance of Middle Eastern stability. Turkey, as a NATO member, is balancing Russian hegemony in an emerging Neo-Cold War climate. The world, now more than ever before, can ill- afford cumbersome political uncertainty. Syria and the wider region’s future hinges on prompt new transitional government formation, an amended Syrian constitution, free and fair elections and decisive action.

Following the Money Trail – Starving ISIS of it’s Financing

Launching terrorist attacks requires money. A major way to slay the terrorist dragon is to starve it off its financing.

ISIS` ill-gotten gains largely come from shady oil deals. ISIS often sells oil in the free black market at $ 40/barrel, this fetches them a handsome $1.2 million a day in Iraq and $2 million a day in Syria with a cumulative $97 million a month.

Stopping the ow of donor money to ISIS and curtailing the illegal oil trade by ISIS oil and petroleum products is quintessential. Currently it is as easy as ISIS digging holes and letting the oil outpour and then siphoning it off into tankers for transportation. Striking ISIS`s two top producing oil fields, al-Omar and al-Tanak where production fell by 30% was a positive first step.

Though consistent intensified attacks are needed throughout the oil route, starving ISIS of their oil finances necessitates attacking, curbing, diverting and shutting the Conoco and al-Taim oil fields near Deir Ezzor, where the production was between 34,000 to 40,000 barrels a day, the al-Najma and al-Qayara oil fields near Mosul in Northern Iraq that produces about 8,000 barrels a day77, and undermining the stranglehold of the Zakho ma a and other illicit cartels which purchase oil from ISIS.

Since the U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve, the American alliance targeted ISIS’s mobile oil refineries and pertinent infrastructure but that approach is overly cautious and narrow in terms of rules of engagement as ISIS simply xed the damage and continued business as usual, showing its resilience through spare parts and repairs. Tankers continued to move towards Turkey, as they were part of convoys of other goods, from car parts to food products and household goods, that transit the Levant. The fact that ISIS mixed the oil tanker caravans with normal Levantine ground traffic helped to give it an advantage by using “economic” shields.

The pressure has mounted since the Russians are on a rampage against Raqqa`s Rockerellers. Moscow has gone on the offensive against ISIS’s oil economy, by destroying the mobile infrastructure that allows ISIS to transport and sell oil. The Russian air force destroyed about 500 fuel tankers. This “greatly reduced illegal oil export capabilities of the militants and, accordingly, their income from oil smuggling”79.

ISIS’s oil economy still thrives, however, by selling Iraqi and Syrian oil for cut-throat prices to Kurdish smuggling networks and ma as, who label it and sell it on as barrels from the Kurdistan Regional Government.

What is needed now, besides kinetic action against ISIS , is a multi- pronged effort in economic forensics. Economic forensic analytics is the procurement and analysis of electronic, human intelligence, or other relevant data to reconstruct, detect, or otherwise support a claim of financial fraud to support criminal or terrorist activity. There is a lot of work to be done with coordination, information sharing, and, most importantly, notable and robust action. Economic forensic requirements will reveal some very unpleasant truths that may affect geopolitics for at least a decade.

In a gut-wrenching attempt to shore up financing ISIS might also be in the body parts trafficking business, after it sanctioned, by means of a fatwa, organ harvesting from captives80 with 18,000 cases already reported. To prop up their finances ISIS also seized more than a dozen wheat and grain silos in northern Iraq, essentially replicating Baghdad`s subsidized food distribution system, in a bid to leverage the commodity to create a self-sufficient Caliphate81.

According to Finance Minister Michel Sapin, the terrorists who organized the Nov. 13 attacks on Paris that left 130 dead and several hundred more wounded spent only 30,000 euros, or approximately $32,000, to fund the massacre. A lot of this money came from stolen art works82. People often unwittingly buy stolen art and antiquities, a market which might now merit tighter regulation, including Certificates of Origin, as is now commonplace in the diamond industry.

ISIS has raided several ancient historical sites in Iraq and Syria, notably several temples in the ancient city of Palmyra. Some works of art and historical artifacts have already been sold in the U.S. and Europe and art experts predicted that stolen art objects could soon appear in Paris, Berlin, New York and other art metropolises around the world. The illegal traffic in looted antiquities buys the bombs and bullets that kill so many. This is how some G20 members among 40 states are unwittingly funding ISIL terror said Putin83.

Such theft better explains why the psychotic IS vows to demolish Egypt`s most cherished historic monuments out of “religious duty”. These include statues that, according to them, encourage “idolatry”, such as Egypt`s Great Pyramids, Pharaoh monuments and the Sphinx. IS is literally wielding a sledgehammer to some of humanity`s most admired ancient treasures. IS` pitiless decimation of Hatra, Nimrud and the statues in Mosul, as well as the pillage of Dur Sharrukin and Palmyra, bear testimony of how IS constitutes an affront to our collective civilization, cultural heritage and humanity.

ISIS, MTC`sTM and off-shoots all have a central authority who use steady streams of income generated from front charity donations and Zakat (tithes) from mosques. This money is raised for training, propaganda and operational expenses. Cells, however, raise funds for living and their operational expenses. After initial “seed” funding they become self-sufficient and fund their own operations. Cells garner this money through the usual ways which include credit card fraud, car fraud, and forgery.

MTC`s illegal or unregulated activities like drugs trade, the informal economy, hawala transactions, and kidnappings for ransom, money laundering, dubious banking transactions and bhattas must be cracked down upon. By most accounts, the 9/11 attack did not cost more than half a million dollars. What is worse from the viewpoint of law enforcement, is that some of the perpetrators legally declared their dollar possessions at entry points.

More insidiously though, terrorism is also financed by perfectly legitimate sources. Well-meaning individuals may be parting with their hard-earned, tax-paid earnings for charities that have covert objectives other than the stated objectives on their pamphlets and websites. A number of analysts include even Zakat85 and Islamic banking among the sources of financing terror. Again, looking for causes of terrorism in abject poverty is not a lot of help. According to the eminent economist Allan Kruger86, many wealthy individuals, legally earning and working away from home, fund causes back home which they keep closest to their hearts. The trickling money tap must be turned off for such illicit activities.

Recently in Pakistan, it is heartening to see swift and decisive action being taken to investigate terror cases of suspected terror financing, including money embezzlement pertaining to terror affectees. Pakistan has promulgated potent legislation to curb terror financing suspicions, bringing its legislative framework against money laundering and terror financing into conformity with international norms and best practices.

Section 11EEEE of the Anti-Terrorism Act (1997) allows law enforcement agencies to detain individuals under suspicion of suspected involvement in terror financing and embezzlement of funds. Disheartening, however, is that some high-profile terror funding cases in Pakistan might be against people better known for their links to politics rather than to terrorist entities87.

The constitutionally mandated amendments to the Pakistan Army Act of 1952 include, among others, sub-clause (e) which states that providing or receiving funding from any foreign or local source for illegal activities de ned as acts of terror is itself an act of terror. The pre-existing regime of anti-money laundering and control of financing terrorism consists of: i) the requirements by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance binding financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to NAB; and ii) a similar requirement of Control of Narcotics Substance Act of 1997 for transactions suspected to be related to drug business; and, most important, iii) the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Act of 2010. The legal onus of detecting suspicious transactions is on the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). A Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) has existed within the SBP to implement the provisions of this Act88. The SBP’s Annual Performance Review 2013- 201489 talks about strengthening of regulations to “ensure the integrity of the banking system against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”.

These include preventive measures like customer due diligence, correspondent banking, wire transfer requirements for sending and receiving funds, reporting of suspicious transactions, risk-based approach as per internal risk assessments and other requirements on internal controls, policies, compliance, audit and training. However, the report says nothing about the number of cases detected, investigated and successfully prosecuted.

Whether military courts will be able to deny terrorist groups what General Colin Powell had described as their oxygen (i.e., money), only the future will tell.
It is naïveté éclairée to assume all terrorists are bearded-brigade rag-tag gangs ransoming90, laundering money purely from any black market sympathetic to their dubious cause – of course there have been charities, mosques, cartels and rich relatives convicted of funding them. However, the multi-layered sinister reality of terror groups is much more nuanced with today`s more sophisticated capital money markets. Al Qaeda has been fueled through a diversified portfolio of investments, investors, money transferred through banks, and employment – of the legal kind.

Al Qaeda dollars have been funnelling through the same monetary system David Cameron uses to buy his Saville Row suits. In this regard, terrorist organizations have been analogized by Western media to “multinational corporations”91, whereas this author deploys the term Multinational Terrorist Corporation to highlight the sui generis nature of such outfits in a globalized information economy.

In an interview from September 28, 2001, Osama bin Laden (OBL hereafter) himself stated that “Al Qaeda is comprised of such modern educated youths who are aware of the cracks inside the Western financial system”92. OBL`s financiers were known as the `Golden Chain`. Deeply disturbing was when British HSBC bankers found out terrorists were conducting transactions from their accounts. In 2012, HSBC was charged with links to Al Rajhi Bank, of which the owner has been confirmed to be an Al Qaeda benefactor. Such financing aided al-Qaeda`s abrupt departure from Sudan in 1996, enabling them to set up camp in Afghanistan. Al Rahji is also known for financial services to the 9/11 hijacker Abdulaziz al Omari, who was on American Airlines flight 11. The international nature of terrorism`s sophisticated financial engineering can be witnessed hereunder:

Starving off ISIS requires multi-sectoral investigators who can probe the dark underbelly of ISIS economy enablers. Oil is merely a lucrative tip of the iceberg. Economic forensics must delve deeper into commodities such as wheat and grain, art and antiquities, illicit charitable donations and banking transactions. Once definitive conclusions are reached some unpleasant truths will be unearthed that may affect geopolitics for decades. The option of economic sanctions could be explored, no matter how unpleasant the political resistance or blowback. That’s not good news in this tough and volatile neighborhood surrounding the so-called Caliphate.

Definitively Defeating ISIS Once and For All

Characterizing Islamic State as part of an insurgency is vital because, as with Vietnam and Afghanistan, crushing an insurgency is different from winning a conventional war. Counter-insurgency resides on the assumption that the enemy has significant support in the communities from which it recruits. The aim of counter-insurgency strategy is to deny the enemy any propaganda triumphs that further fuel its recruitment. Insurgents have to be isolated from their targeted host communities. This requires a mélange of psychological, physical and economic warfare, all with the aim of undermining the insurgents’ ideological, operational and financial assets.

Therefore the ideology of fundamentalism needs to be isolated, intellectually defeated, rendered socially obsolete and made as unappealing as totalitarianism through scholastic religious re- interpretation, massive education campaigns and targeting the youth and regional/global capacity building measures.

President George W. Bush might have hurried headlong into the Jihadist trap by invading Iraq, and though it is true that an intervention in Syria will be used by Islamic State to mobilise more recruits, a failure to intervene with inaction has also been used by them as evidence that the world has deserted Syrians, leaving them to face Syrian al-Assad’s barrel bombs all alone.

True, it becomes ever-harder to find genuine ISIS targets. As the terrorist group gets better at melting in with the surrounding population, the civilian toll is likely to rise. Blanket airstrikes alone are not the solution. Aerial bombs destroy buildings and equipment and kill people. They cannot take or hold territory. They cannot secure victory, let alone peace and prosperity. Air power can be effective in battle eld support for determined ground troops. In general airstrikes are pointless if not followed up on the ground.

Blanket airstrikes by themselves will create an unacceptable loss of civilian life. Airstrikes in Kunduz, Afghanistan on a hospital run by Médecins Sans Frontières led to a tragic loss of life. Airstrikes over Raqqa are reported to have killed at least 12 people, including ve children, when bombs fell near a school. The number of civilian casualties from Russian bombardment is far higher than the number caused by American and French airstrikes said Wael Aleji94. “This can be attributed to technology, the Russians use more ‘dumb’ bombs and have less advanced guidance systems such as Brimstone.”

Therefore the military assault against Islamic State must also be supported by an international ground force, a few thousand in number, and fronted by Sunni Arabs, whose entire region is at stake. These should be backed by an international squad of special forces and support staff, all of whom are focused on dislodging Islamic State from its strongholds of Mosul and Raqqa95. ISIS will de defeated through attrition on the ground, from local forces fighting it to a standstill.

Arming ISIS rebels to the teeth has to be exercised with great caution, because as we have often witnessed, arms in the Middle East change hands with the blink of an eye, as loyalties are often bought by the highest bidder. There are plenty of ISIS opponents who are unsavoury, cannot be trusted and bear radical stripes and impulses themselves. The world can ill afford more Frankenstein`s being churned out in the experimentation lab that has for too long been the fragile Middle East, and is now exporting fear and terror worldwide.

There are circa 70,000 non-extremist Syrian opposition fighters who could help fight ISIS. What makes this an uphill struggle is that these fighters are split into at least 100 to 120 different groups, with various aims, and differing in size from thousands to just 100 to 200 members. So far they have not shown much interest in focusing on ISIS, so they need to be incentivized to do so. They are currently too preoccupied fighting Assad’s Syrian army.

Another challenge is that the most effective groups militarily in the opposition are among the most hardline. Two groups currently dominant are Jaish al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham, which have a combined strength of 27,500 fighters. They are not at all secular yet vehemently oppose ISIS being in Syria and have fought it successfully in the past.

One of the other most powerful forces is the al-Qaida af liated Jabhat al-Nusra, which has also been banned by the US. Both Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham have been heavily involved in ousting ISIS fighters from Syria’s Idlib province and the Aleppo countryside in the north.

Alas, the alliances of “moderate” opposition fighters in Syria is constantly shifting, but many still ght under the broad banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). They control much of the territory in and around the western Syrian cities of Hama and Homs. They include groups such as Tajamu Ala’Azza and Liwa Suqor al-Jebel. Groups allied with the FSA also control areas around Syria’s southern border with Jordan. But after years of disunity and faltering advances the influence of the FSA is on the wane.

A key cornerstone to defeat ISIS is to carry on supporting the Kurds in the heat of the battle. Their unique voice, interests and identity must already echo from Westminster to the White House. This could be a true harbinger of hope. The Kurds96 valiantly defended the Kurdish city of Kobanî97 against the clutches of ISIS. Kobanî is a city of epic resistance against the genocidal assault of the Islamic State (IS). More funds may be funelled to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which has been foghting ISIS in Syria98 and the Peshmerga who dealt ISIS a historic defeat in Iraq`s Sinjar.

However, it is high-time that the armed wing of the Kurdish contingent (PKK) lay down their arms against Ankara and chose ballots over bullets, as did the IRA in Northern Ireland now present in Westminster Abbey or ETA in Spain. Once the war is fought the time will be ripe for the Kurdish99 movement to evolve from the blood-stained battle elds of the Middle East to the corridors of political influence with the HDP in Ankara and PYD in Damascus.

Let me re-iterate, however, that all such ground-based alliances against ISIS may weaken Islamic State’s operational capacity but will not defeat its ideological appeal. Bombing alone is never a solution. In Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Mosul, ISIS is living almost totally among civilians, so you can’t hit them. ISIS will one day disintegrate, as will al-Qaeda, but their philosophy will find new vessels and voices; re- incarnate themselves continuing to brain-wash fresh malleable minds down deadly paths. What needs to be decimated are their philosophies, which cannot be accomplished physically.

The Islamic State was not alone in radicalizing the estimated 6,000 Europeans who have traveled to join them. That many recruits couldn’t have emerged from a vacuum. Islamic State propaganda is good, but not that good.

Islamic State has simply plucked the low-hanging fruit seeded long ago by other Islamist groups operating across Europe. Decades of extremist propaganda had already primed, positioned and poisoned the minds of these young Muslims to yearn for a theocracy. It should come as no surprise that, from this milieu, up to 1,000 British Muslims have joined the Islamic State, which is more than have joined the British Army reserves.

Radicalism is always given oxygen in new tyrannical outfits and reprehensible cliques, who will try to force-feed the world with the resurrection of a world-wide Caliphate by sword rather than the pen, which is why this author argues that their very ideological appeal must be made intellectually obsolete through alternative narratives, popular messaging, peaceful picketing such as the Muslim Peace rally on December 12th 2015 in New York and the vigils in memoriam of the APS Peshawar martyrs, enlightened education and a host of other noteworthy measures.

Reversing radicalism will require decades of work by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, but the endgame must be to render the ideology of fundamentalism ideologically, intellectually and socially antediluvian and obsolescent.

As for Islamic reform, the time is ripe to evolve away from excessive literalism and theological autarky. Muslim-majority countries must inculcate their own intellectual ijtehad in harmony with Islamic tenets, harbouring political renewal from the bottom-up as we progress into the 21st century.

Espousing the Turkish and Tunisian model of secular democratic government might be an idea whose time has come of age. Turkey and Tunisia have often acted as beacons for the region. Our diplomacy and political algorythms have regrettably neglected the possibilities this present. To this end, the OIC should play a more decisive role.
Jinnah, much like Ataturk, a leader amongst men, pre-emptively foresaw the malaise that a forced theocracy could impose upon minorities and was intellectually intuitive and equivocal on the matter: “You are free; you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state.”

Global terror entities have pre-emptively leveraged the digital information superhighway at break-neck speed. Today’s computer hackers can literally, with the click of a mouse button bring down governments and corporations on a global scale by attacking the Internet with malicious computer programs100. Israel attacking Iran`s online Stuxnet uranium enhancing nuclear capabilities without deploying a single soldier yet causing billions of dollars of losses to Iran`s nuclear aspirations is a prime example of cyber warfare.
More recently, the Chinese and anon accounts hacking sensitive U.S. servers including that of Apple have already demonstrated that hackers, many of whom are already on terror entities` payrolls, can easily and single-handedly wage technological terror campaigns. Hence more sophisticated next-generation algorhythms and encryption protocols are key. Giving law enforcement access to such encryption requires alliance building with the private sector and might have pre-empted the San Bernardino attacks. The fact that intelligence agencies could not decrypt the San Bernardino couple or the smart apps used by the Paris bombers raises cause for concern.

Tashfeen Malik had pledged allegiance to ISIS online, she and her husband Syed Rizwan Farook had attempted to destroy their digital footprint prior to these attacks. Such digital record destruction highlights the need to remain at the forefront of online suspicious activity reporting (SAR) and monitoring. The FBI therefore, was justified in declaring the San Bernardino Tashfeen Malik case as a terrorism investigation. Such mounting evidence underscores the fact that smarter cross-continent cyber digital monitoring and tracking (M & T) activity is needed. It is time for deeper strategic alignment between the FBI and Pakistan FIA`s National Response Center for Cyber Crime and their counter-terrorism wing.

Countless measures must be taken to “protect life and maximise public safety”101, “maintain public order and peace”, and “maintain community cohesion”. Extra reassurance is needed for the affected or vulnerable communities, especially Yazidis, Jewish, Islamic and all minority communities. Grief counselling to terror affectees, and all forms of psychological therapy including cognitive behavioural are required. Measures must mitigate fears through providing messages to communities at neighbourhood and grass-root levels.

More intelligence based operations (IOB`s), training on emergency preparedness, evacuation, safety and security, essential life saving skills, regional intelligence capacity building and other drills must proliferate. Law enforcement agents need to be placed on standby for emergency national mobilisation and develop early warning triggers and systems. Here is where I re-emphasize, that the best early warning system can and will come from within Muslim communities who are our greatest allies in the war against terror; the mainstream peace-loving moderate Muslims, who are busy with their lives and cherish humanity and their loved ones. Alienating them is not only wrong but a tactical error and a deep strategic mistake.

Countering Radicalisation – From a Clash of Civilisations to a Culture of Consensus

The battle against terrorism and radicalization has to be strong and smart, resilient and relentless. As the internet and social media erase distance between societies it is also used by terrorists to prey on the vulnerable, grooming and manipulating them and poisoning their minds such as those of the Boston marathon runners, the Ankara bombers and the Beirut mass murderers.

The combat against terrorism is a generational one that will take decades, an irreversible international and imperative process, until the ideological appeal of terrorism is rooted out and made redundant. Community engagement, cultural sensitization training, civil-society driven grass-roots led inter-faith harmony, encouraging everyday Muslims to partake in positive neighbourhood activities and pro bono initiatives and speaking up in defense of democracy rst and foremost is required.

Terrorism is a cancer with many perpetrators and no quick-fixes, nor any immediate cure. Admittedly, this cancer is a multi-layered generational war of ideas and action, some of which we can aspire to plant during our lifespan, the rest of which must be carried on by generations to come.

Lured into the lair of a faux Caliphate, ISIS simply plucked the brain-washed low-hanging fruit, which had been seeded long ago by various fundamentalist groups, and it will now require decades of community resilience to push back. The latest dénouements in Paris and San Bernardino are part of a wave in an unprecedented global tide of terror.

Global leaders and communities must aptly identify the insurgent ideology that we all need to understand, emasculate, undercut, repudiate from proper Islam, and offer alternatives to. Just as in dynamic Hegelian102 dialectic, the thesis of terror needs to be countered, this is the counter- narrative. The role of community cohesion and peace-building equally resides on the shoulders of concerned non-Muslim citizens and civil society members, who cannot remain mute, immobilized and incapable, just because they deem themselves outsiders. Their authentic voices must neither be silenced nor delegitimized as is often the case.

Terror affects us all and sundry. Here humanity must unite. Similarly one need not be Muslim to speak up against anti-Muslim hate and bigotry that isolates communities, alienates youth, vili es hard- working Muslims, drives wedges between people and fosters a climate of otherizing.

Stigmatizing and stereotyping Muslims of all hues and stripes, as was the case with the ingenious 14 year old clock-making school-boy Ahmed Mohammed, causes divisive social cleavage. Such racial and religious pro ling must cease.

Reforming voices, both Muslims and non-Muslims, must engage in debates, promoting pluralism, defending democracy, harnessing human rights and enhancing acceptance; whilst being empowered with a language to deploy against those who are attempting to silence their progressive efforts within their own societies. Ensuring that the debate is not surrendered to the loudest extremists who, meanwhile, discuss Islam with impunity.

What has haunted humanity since time immemorial is that history is always made by a determined voiceferous minority. Regrettably with Islam, it is clear that that minority is comprised of the radicals. Moderate Muslim-majority voices need to reclaim their religion, delegitimize the radical voice of a vocal minority, and desensitize a bulging youth demographic from their deadly dogma. We cannot let a minority of radicals dictate our destiny. A majority of Muslims who just want to get on with life must step up. Time is running out. A major terrorist incident, e.g. one involving a weapon of mass destruction, and the response will likely be apocalyptic. That is what happened in Germany with the Nazis (a minority)–they were recognized as somewhat radical but there was sympathy for them.

Sidling sectarianism has cursed the Middle East and South Asia and must halt. Shia Sunni rivalry, orchestrated by sinister powers seeking regional instability, should realize that sectarian strife has now hit their shores and must steer away from such divisive sectarian divide, or its citizens too can become further embroiled in such savagery. Syria, Parachinar and Jacobabad are just the latest casualties.

The Middle East is large enough for both Iran and Saudi to assert broader hegemony without making surrounding states blood-stained proxies. Middle Eastern affairs have drawn Muslim-majority countries into an intractable 1433 year old sectarian strife between Sunni and Shi’a powers, as well as into an abyss of internecine struggles of the Sunni world between traditionalist monarchies and radical fundamentalsm. This vicious cycle must end for there to be any semblance of a move away from a clash of civilisations.

Islamic State is only the latest incarnation of a global guerilla terror insurgency, but it has been brewing for decades, spurred on by Islamist social movements that have filled the void left by democratic de cits in Muslim-majority countries and botched up foreign interventions without long-term succession planning. To address the democratic de cit, the Arab Spring was a momentous Intifada, the entire region now needs the logical corollary, a follow-up democratic Intifada, which springs human and minority rights as a legal and political forerunner. This must be an organic grass-roots civil-society cultivated Intifada rather than a pre- coded pre-arranged political coup d`etat implanted by super powers and given the semblance of a genuine social renewal.

Specifically in terms of Syria, what was planted by the UNSC Resolution must be further seeded via a transitional government in six months, a new constitution, and free and fair elections within 18 months. I would argue that the key elements of a deal are emerging: cease res, opposition groups coming together, the regime looking at negotiation.
Better and fairer global resource management is key to a less radical terror fuelled world. Amartya Sen so eloquently reminds us that “what good is an island of prosperity surrounded by huge oceans of horrific poverty”103. Mounting austerity, giant pockets of poverty, the volatile vicissitudes of economic markets and the uncertainty of labour markets do not augur well for global economic security. All this ignites the wrath of a giant pool of alienated, angry and jobless young humans, a few of whom are prone to violence and are especially ripe for ISIS recruitment.

Over-crowded prisons and inhumane treatment there and in torture chambers must cease. It was recently telling that Shaker Aamer, when released from Guantanamo Bay, compared it to the horrific Azkaban from the Harry Potter novel. A fear is that heavy-handed arrests and torture, especially of innocent victims, without sufficient cause or legal reasonable doubt, and brutalising them may further lead them into the willing arms of a despotic yet well-funded and organised IS.

Counter-radicalisation is a battle for the soul of Islam, a battle for the “hearts and minds” of Muslims. Broadly speaking, there is less room for unilateralism and a greater role for the United Nations and coalitions to play. The UNSCR`s recently adopted cease re in Syria is a move in the right direction, but should not have taken five gruesome years. More rapid response Security Council Resolutions must be churned out with binding affect. The global community must forge a global `security strategy` that is not purely militaristic but also educational, economic, environmental, health and development oriented. Security needs to be addressed in the broadest terms and with the widest references for a safer, sustainable more socially inclusive world. Legitimate governance and internal security, education and infrastructure and high investments in global peaceful preventive measures are the way forward. Narrowly focused military intervention is a last resort and no longer a first option.

Political leaders of yore unhelpfully circumscribed the definition of terrorism to whichever fundamentalist group was wreaking most havoc at any given moment, while paying scant attention to the broader trend of MTC`s and the social exclusion dilemma. More Muslims and minorities need to be embraced into the mainstream, through inclusion, fairer global employment opportunities and recruitment. It is of primal importance to note that terrorism is also often economic, social and cultural in nature.

Fairer foreign policy execution and mediation is needed to short- circuit the appeal of fundamentalism, which often arises due to a sense of foreign policy grievances. A majority concensus, including the governments of UK, Spain and Sweden, to name but a few, now officially and legally recognize the state of Palestine and call for a fair internationally mediated two-state solution which the far-right Likud party and Netanyahu are regrettably averse to.

Kerry and Lavrov, Hammond and Rouhani need to be capable of a policy re-orientation from ideological to one that is more accommodating and conciliatory. Ankara and Moscow must stop muscle-flexing for they both have a common enemy, namely ISIS. The time is ripe to unleash political centrism and conciliation, including a strategic alliance-building with other centrists. This will add vigour to a UN process that has and can act as a strong agent of conciliation – in a coalition. The time has come for super-powers to evolve from hegemony104 to coexistence105. Politics is the unique art of creating solutions. This is the historical need of the hour. To achieve this, political movements of all stripes have to compromise and come together.

Over the long-haul, remaining mute to the causes of Palestine and Kashmir provides a pivotal rallying point which IS and MTC`s feel they can exploit due to arbitrary foreign policies which galvanise popularity out of Palestinian and Kashmiri misery106.

Some strategists contend that the viability of unilaterally maintaining foreign army and air bases may be questioned. Especially during times of peace. Besides, geo-strategists question the need for highly visible air and army bases in an age of agile remote-controlled electronic intelligent warfare. IS and MTC`s and Muslim populations remain allergic to any foreign, especially coalition-led, military presence or airbases in the Islamic world.

Considering their founding history, the USA – a nation that prides itself on immigration and is a melting pot of a rich mélange of cultures, races, religions and ethnicities – is especially well placed to offer templates of inclusion as well as speak about why theocracies are never good for humanity. They also can help Europeans deal with the challenges of creating new, post-refugee national identities.

The most promising counter-radicalisation lies with the international community`s capacity to build prosperous long-term win-win partnerships with civil society, the private sector, local law enforcement and governments; but most importantly the public – Western and Eastern, Muslim and non-Muslim – to support homegrown outreach, diversity and acceptance. This is a new whole-of-culture and whole-of- civilisation approach to international security, which recognizes that our collective human safety is enhanced by the involvement and mobilization of individuals, families, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, at all levels of society.

Wars are shifting from swords to bullets to hashtags. The war against terror needs to simultaneously also be fought with socially inclusive online hashtag movements and activism such as I will ride with you after the Sydney attack and You ain`t no Muslim bruv after the Leytonstone London tube stabbings. This can sway millions toward social inclusion. Peaceful messaging via podcasts, online streams and inter-faith documentaries all have an increasing role to play and should be funded under the aegis of corporate social responsibility and other donor-led initiatives. Such social media movements are and have been real positive eye-openers in deterring thousands from radicalizing.

To bring civilization ever-closer, the Gulf States, USA and Europe all need to build a more extensive infrastructure to better welcome more Syrian and Afghan refugees who keep hazardously trickling across the perilous high seas in rickety boats, risking life and limb, kith and kin. Those pro ting from the plight of refugee human trafficking must be sanctioned. Syrian refugees now constitute a sizeable new minority, especially in Europe, forever reconfiguring the ethnicity and demography of Europe, which is all the more reason why a clash of civilization must irreversibly be halted.

Europe, especially France and Hungary, unfortunately, do not have a stellar track record with its minorities. Therefore before absorbing new immigrants and refugees, as noteworthy a humanitarian cause as it is, Europe needs to get her own house in order in order to truly allow IDP`s and refugees to rightfully integrate into European life. To this end, trail- blazers such as Justin Trudeau are paving the way, which others should emulate. Pakistan, which generously accommodates 3 million Afghan refugees is an exemplary case in point.

The international community must step up its efforts, and guarantee more refugee camps and refugee safe zones in the Arab world and GCC countries. Speaking of IDP`s and refugees, the future prospect of welcoming more Syrian and Afghan refugees, very harshly persecuted under defiantly dictatorial regimes, raises the urgency for social and structural reforms as well as international humanitarian aid.

The most pressing challenge for the international community is to end the schism of political and religious polarization and form societies of co-existence in good faith, which has often been lacking. Social inclusion is not only a common language, common targets and a common mind but also unity in diversity. For a coalition of cultural consensus to transpire, doors, hearts and minds need to emphatically remain open, for the hopes and aspirations of billions of humans hinges on this reality.

These are the ways to truly counter radicalization over the long- haul, and move away from a clash of civilisations to a coalition of consensus and acceptance. The war on terror, over the long-haul, needs to be re-framed as a war of ideas and ideology rather than muscle and might. Community engagement by reaching out to youth, and to the true grass-roots by reclaiming the soul of Islam, recognizing its more peaceful symbols, verses and metaphors is our collective challenge and responsibility. Global citizens and international organizations have been given a responsibility, an assignment, a life-time opportunity to achieve this so as to evade and avoid any alarmist speculation of World War III.

These are historic civilizational ideas whose time have come. The UN can bridge modernity with the Middle East, just as Islam and democracy can be reconciled. Bridges rather barriers need to be built between Islam and other world faiths and between human societies.

The aforementioned initiatives, partnerships and objectives will help to counter violent extremism, far-right fascism and terrorism, prevent trans-national insurgent gang recruitment, combat human trafficking, and empower human communities toward a more peaceful purposeful co-existence in 2016 and beyond.

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References

1 Popham, Peter “Peshawar school attack: ‘I will never forget the black boots…It was like death approaching me’”. The Independent. 16 December, 2014. Also Yusufzai, Ashfaq “Mastermind of Peshawar school attack killed”. Telegraph, Pakistan Bureau, 26 December, 2014.
2 LeJ`s founder, Malik Ishaq, is said to have been killed in a `police encounter` in a Muzaffargarh gunfight. Unfortunately heads of other terror out ts like Ha z Saeed of LeT roam scot free.
3 The notorious Ali Bin Su yan, believed to be LeJ`s spokesperson, sent the following message to the media: “We warn the Shia parents that if they don’t stop their children from participating in the war of Bashar al Assad [in Syria], they would face more attacks like this”. It is proven that LeJ bears ties to international terrorism. Roul, Animesh “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Terrorism”. Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) 3 (11). 2 June, 2005.
4 Encouragingly South Asia has regionally co-operated on many occasions to combat terrorism, for instance the 3rd South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Kathmandu (1987) adopted a resolution to suppress terrorism, which was further reinforced in the Summit of 2001. SAARC has adopted several conventions, these are: SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (signed by all member states and came into force in 1988); Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (2002); and Bilateral Counter Terrorism Agreements.
5 Tariq, Saeed “Parachinar attack” Pakistan Observer, 14 December, 2015.
6 In February 2014, the Pakistani Finance Minister Ishaq Dar told a visiting US Senator Jack Reed that the cost of the Operation Zarbe-Azb reached Pak Rs 40 billion (US$390 million) and could go as high as Pak Rs 130
billion (US$1.3 billion).
7 All the gures cited have been taken from of cial ISPR press releases dated July
2014.
8 Saleem, Farukh “India disappointed by Zarb-e-Azb’s success”. The News
International, editorial, 14 October, 2014. Khan, Tahir “Anti-terrorism cooperation: Islamabad asks Kabul to extradite Fazlullah”. The Express Tribune. 30 June, 2014.
9 Khorasan refers to a historical region that encompassed northeastern Iran, southern Turkmenistan and northern Afghanistan. It was established by the Sasanian dynasty, the last Iranian empire before the rise of Islam, in the 3rd century. Its name literally means “The Land of the Sun,” a reference to its eastern location. After the region was taken over in an Arab conquest in the 7th century, Khorasan became a part of the Umayyad Caliphate, part of early Islamic culture. Notably, a widely discussed (though disputed Hadith) speaks of how «black banners will come out of Khorasan” in the end times. Read more: Halsell, Grace (2002) Forcing God’s Hand, Amana Publications and Landau-Tasseron, Ella. “The Waning of the Umayyads: Notes on Tabari’s History (1992) Translated, vol. XXVI.” Islam 69: pp. 81–109. And Hawting, G. R. “Umayyads.” (2002) In “The Encyclopaedia of Islam“. CD-ROM edition. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
10 IDF forces, of late, have chosen to stage an unprecedented escalation in Jerusalem at al-Aqsa Mosque, also known as Bayt al-Muqaddas, the third holiest site in Islam and is located in the Old City of Jerusalem. The storming of the Mosque, has sustained signi cant damage, with dozens of Palestinian worshippers and activists injured, has brought back to the people of Jerusalem memories of the huge re that destroyed large parts of the mosque in August 1969. Historical accounts of the Mosque can be viewed: Al-Ratrout, H. A., The Architectural Development of Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Early Islamic Period (2004) ALMI Press, London. Schieck, Robert (2008) in Geographical Dimension of Islamic Jerusalem, Cambridge Scholars Publishing; see also Omar, Abdallah (2009) al-Madkhal li-dirasat al-Masjid al-Aqsa al-Mubarak, Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al- Ilmiyaah; also by the same author the Atlas of Al-Aqsa Mosque (2010).
هبش يف داهجلا ةدعاق ةعامج Also known as al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent or 11 ‎, Jamā‘at Qā‘idat al-Jihād fī Shibh al-Qārrah al-Hindīyah, usuallyةيدنهلا ةراقلا abbreviated as AQIS. The militant group has also stated its intentions to attack American targets in the Indian Subcontinent.
12 Three students allegedly planning to join Islamic State detained at Nagpur airport (2015), The Indian Express, 26 December, 2015
13 Poushter, Jacob In Nations with signi cant Muslim populations much disdain for ISIS, Spring 2015, Global Attitudes Survey, Q 12n, Pew Research Center, November 17, 2015.
14 Weber, Max. Political Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). Ed. Peter
Lassman. Trans. Ronald Speirs. Cambridge UP, 1994. Xvi and also Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An
Outline of Interpretive Sociology. University of California Press, 1978.
15 Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of nation-state sovereignty based on territoriality and the absence of a role for external agents in domestic structures. It is an international system of states, multinational corporations, and organizations premised on the principle of non-interference and that all states, no matter how large or small, are equal. It began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Osiander, Andreas (2001), “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, International Organization 55 (2): consult especially pages 251–287. Gross, Leo (1948), “The Peace of Westphalia”, The American Journal of International Law 42 (1): pp. 20–41. Cutler, A. Claire (2001), “Critical Re ections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy”, Review of International Studies 27 (2):
pp. 133–150.
16 Shaw, Malcolm Nathan (2003) International law. Cambridge University Press.
View especially p. 178 which elucidates upon Article 1 of the Montevideo
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17 United Nations General Assembly Session 67 Agenda item 37. Question
of Palestine A/67/L.28 26 November 2012 and Resolution 67/19. Status of Palestine in the United Nations A/RES/67/19 dated 29 November 2012. View also Gharib, Ali “U.N. Adds New Name: “State of Palestine””. The Daily Beast. 20 December, 2012.
18 Wallström, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot (30 October 2014). “Sweden today decides to recognise the State of Palestine”. Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm). 30 October, 2014.
19 “Somaliland: The Myth of Clan-Based Statehood”. Somalia Watch. 7 December 2002. Also Houreld, Katharine (Apr 4, 2011). “Somaliland coast guard tries to prevent piracy”. Navy Times. Gannett Government Media Corporation. 4 April, 2011. As well as Hussein, Abdi “Somaliland’s Military is a Shadow of the Past”. Somalia Report, 13 August, 2011.
20 Other than the Igbo, other ethnic tribes that enrich Nigeria further include the Hausa, Yoruba and Fulani. For an insightful take on the Igbo people read Ogbaa, Kalu (1995). Igbo. The Rosen Publishing Group. Consult especially page 49.
21 Nowa Omoigui. “Federal Nigerian Army Blunders of the Nigerian Civil War – Part 2”, 19 July, 2008. For more recent repercussions of the Biafran war cast an eye on Senan Murray “Reopening Nigeria’s civil war wounds”. BBC. 3 May, 2007 and Brooke, James “Few Traces of the Civil War Linger in Biafra”. New York Times. 14 July, 1987.
22 Barnaby Philips (13 January 2000). “Biafra: Thirty years on”. BBC News. 13 January, 2011.
23 A month of terror worldwide, selected terrorist attacks by Islamist groups, The Economist, February 2015.
24 On the floor there were bodies, esh fragments, heads and feet in the ghastly Beirut bombing where 43 people had died and 239 had been wounded in the twin blasts in the Shia-majority Hezbollah partial district of Burj al-Barajneh, in the south of the city. The double suicide bombing in South Beirut upends a fragile peace. In mid-2013 the southern suburbs of Beirut, known as Dahiyeh, suffered from a series of suicide bombings after Hezbollah announced that it was intervening in the war in Syria. Shaheen, Kareem “Beirut attacks and ISIS” The Guardian, November 12, 2015. And Akbar, Jay “Beirut attacks and ISIS” dailymail.co.uk November 12, 2015.
25 Suruç, once a centre of silk-making, is now home to one of the biggest refugee camps in Turkey housing Syrians who have ed the bloody four-year con ict at home, currently sheltering about 35,000 refugees who crossed the border after Islamic State jihadists seized Kobane last year. Hall, John “Suruc Ankara atacks and ISIS”, Daily Mail, July 21, 2015.
26 Over 100 people were killed when two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside Ankara`s central train station on October 10, 2015. The government con rmed that one of the Ankara suicide bombers was Yunus Emre Alagoz. The younger Alagoz brother, of Kurdish origin born in Adiyaman, is believed to have acted on behalf of ISIS. The 20-year-old is believed to have gone to Syria last year with his brother, Yeginsu where they were radicalized. Ceylan; Arango, Tim “Explosions During Peace Rally in Ankara, Turkey’s Capital, Kill Scores”. The New York Times. 10 October, 2015.
27 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2012-): Syria in Crisis. Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) (n.d.-): ISIL, Syria & Iraq Resources Higgins, Eliot et al. (2014, July-): Bellingcat. IntelCenter (2014, August-): Islamic State’s Global Affiliates Interactive World.
28 Watch Bernard Haykel (2015) in A lot of Muslims are embarrassed by ISIS hosted by Anderson Cooper on 360°. CNN. February 23, 2015. And Reinhart, A. Kevin (2005), “Reviewed Work: Revival and Reform in Islam: the Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkānī by Bernard Haykel” in Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 39 (2): pp. 226–228
29 Institute for the Study of War Islamic State`s expanding reach, Reuters, 7 July, 2015.
30 The figure of 42 million comes from a cumulative analysis of four polls surveying Arab public opinion towards the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), which reveals that the group has a bare minimum of 8.5 million strong supporters and that’s a very conservative estimate. If you include those who feel somewhat positively towards the Islamic State, the number rises to at least 42 million. The estimates are based on a March 2015 poll by the Iraq-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies; a November 2014 poll by Zogby Research Services; another November 2014 poll by the Doha-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and an October 2014 poll by the Fikra Forum commissioned by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. To obtain a more in-depth statistical breakdown gaze Mauro, Ryan ISIS has upto 42 million supporters in the Arab world, The Clarion Project, dedicated to challenging extremism and promoting dialogue. June 28, 2015.
31 CIA assesses the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS) can muster between 20,000 and 31,500 ghters across Iraq and Syria, based on a new review of all- source intelligence reports from May to August, CIA intelligence spokesman Ryan Trapani said in a media statement dated September 11, 2014.
32 Over 12,000 foreign ghters have gone to Syria since the 3-year con ict began, more than traveled to Afghanistan during its ten-year war and violent aftermath. And they continue to arrive. Zelin, A. Y. et al. (2013) “ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among 2 Western Europeans” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 17 December, 2013
33 Eurostat, IMF “Foreign fighters in Syria” The Internatiional Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, the Soufan Group.
34 Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, Islamic State`s Leadership Structure, Reuters, 5 December, 2014.
35 A local al-Qaeda af liate.
36 Dodd, Vikram“Paris attacker travelled to UK to meet terror suspects”, The
Guardian, December 4, 2015
37 “Jihadi John’ born into stateless family in poor corner of wealthy Kuwait”. CTV
News. 2 March 2015.
38 Wood, Graeme (2014) What ISIS`s leader really wants, the New Republic, 2 September, 2014
39 Alali, Andy Odasuo; Byrd, Gary W. (1994): Terrorism and the News Media: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography. Jefferson: McFarland. Andrusyszyn. View Greta H. (2009): Cyber and High Tech. In: Terrorism: A Selected Bibliography. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Library, pp. 15-17.
40 For new techniques deployed in counter-insurgency Tomes, Robert “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare” Parameters (US Army War College). 7 June, 2010. For tactics utilized in assymetrical con icts Stepanova, E. (2008) Terrorism in asymmetrical con ict: SIPRI Report 23, Oxford University Press and Zhao; et al. “Anomalously Slow Attrition Times for Asymmetric Populations with Internal Group Dynamics”. Physical Review Letters 103, 148701, 2 October, 2009. Arreguín-Toft, Ivan. “How the weak win wars – A theory of asymmetric con ict” 2 October, 2009.
41 U.S. State Department (2014) Terror attacks around the world.
42 Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal (TI) Jihad and Modern Warfare, Criterion
Quarterly, Islamabad, 25 August, 2014.
43 The Art of War has masterfully been translated numerous times. The most recent
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Art of War: a New Translation. Chartwell Books.
44 Sun Bin`s The Art of War is another masterpiece worthy of a read
It can be found in Cheng-Yu Lee Just another Masterpiece: the Differences between Sun Tzu’s the Art of War and Sun Bin’s the Art of War at http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh?docid =P20121108003-201301-201302010022-201302010022-59-73 On Sun Tzu see Combs, Steven C. (August 2000). “Sun-zi and the Art of War: The Rhetoric of Parsimony”. Quarterly Journal of Speech 3: pp. 276–294.
45 Most recently Nye authored a book titled Is the American Century Over? (2015) On his riveting theories pertaining to soft power go through Nye, Joseph Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), PublicAffairs.
46 To gauge other means of achieving advantages in assymetric warfare Steele, Robert D. (2002) The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
47 A masterful take on the art of manipulation where the means justify the ends can be found in Machiavelli, N., (1532) The Prince and the Discourses, New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1950.
48 Herman, Edward S., and Chomsky, Noam. Manufacturing Consent. New York: Pantheon Books. p. 306.
49 Chomsky, Noam (2004) Letters from Lexington: Reflections on Propaganda, Paradigm Publishers. Other thought-provoking tomes by Noam Chomsky are: Chomsky, Noam (1996) Class Warfare, Pluto Press and Chomsky, Noam (1997) Media Control, the Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda.
50 Gramsci, Antonio (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International
Publishers and Joll, James (1977). Antonio Gramsci. New York: Viking Press.
51 Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal (TI) Jihad and Modern Warfare, Criterion
Quarterly, Islamabad, 25 August, 2014.
52 Lind, William S.; Nightengale, Keith; Schmitt, John F.; Sutton, Joseph W.;
Wilson, Gary I. (October 1989), “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth
Generation”, Marine Corps Gazette, pp. 22–26.
53 Qazi, Shereena (2015) “ISIL hits Afghan airwaves to drum up support”, Al-
Jazeera, 21 December 2015.
54 Khan, Azam “No regret over supporting IS, says Lal Masjid cleric”. The Express
Tribune, 14 December, 2014. Ahmed, Munir “Pakistani madrassa names library after bin Laden”. U.S. News & World Report, 18 April, 2014. Farooq, Umer “Religious Cleric Threatens Suicide Attacks”. OhmyNews International, 7 April, 2007.
55 Huntington`s Clash of Civilizations (COC) posits that people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. Though Francis Fukuyama intellectually challenged this stance, Huntington was proved right. Huntington, Samuel P.,The Clash of Civilizations?in “Foreign Affairs”, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer (1993) pp. 22–49. For a more detailed exploration of the theory see Huntington, Samuel P., (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster.
56 Köchler, Hans (1999) (ed.), Civilizations: Con ict or Dialogue?, Vienna, International Progress Organization, 1999.
57 On 7 January 2015, Saïd Kouachi and Chérif Kouachi attackedthe French satirical newspaperCharlie Hebdo, resulting in 11 French citizens killed and another 11 injured. The French-born brothers of Algerian descent stated they were members of Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP), and on 9 January, AQAP con rmed responsibility for theCharlie Hebdo shooting, in a speech from a cleric Harith bin Ghazi al-Nadhari. On 7 May 2015 a senior AQAP leader, Nasr Ibn Ali an-Ansi was killed. For more reporting on AQAP consult: Ford, Dana “Senior AQAP leader Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ansi killed” CNN, 7 May, 2015. Johnson, Gregory D. “A Pro le of AQAP’s Upper Echelon”. Combatting Terrorism Center, 24 July, 2012. Jamjoom, Mohammed; Smith, Matt “Yemen strikes may target top al Qaeda leaders”. CNN, 21 April, 2014. Spencer, Richard “The al-Qaeda commander at home in a governor’s palace”. The Telegraph, 4 April, 2015. Bacchi, Umberto “Yemen: Al-Qaeda operative Khalid Batar takes sel es inside Mukalla government”. International Business Times. 4 April, 2015
58 “Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria”. Institute for the Study of War. “Syria: A gathering force”. Financial Times. February 2014. “Jabhat al-Nusra”. Australian National Security. 28 June 2013.
59 Operation Zarb-e-Azb ef ciently disrupted the Haqqani network. Based in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network is closely affiliated with the Taliban, thereby confirming the cross-networking and overlap of terrorist outfits. The Haqqani network is a guerilla insurgency using asymmetric warfare to fight against US- led NATO forces. Jalaludin Haqqani and his son Sirajudin lead the group.
60 The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group participated in the 2011 Libyan civil war as the Libyan Islamic Movement (al-Harakat al-Islamiya al-Libiya), and were involved in the Libyan civil war of 2014 as members of the Libyan Shield Force, where al Qaeda`s Muhsin al-Libi now holds a key command position. Stephen, Chris and Penketh, Anne “Libyan capital under Islamist control after Tripoli airport seized”. The Guardian, 24 August, 2014.
61 Ajami, Fouad”The Furrows of Algeria”. New Republic. 27, January, 2010. Schindler, John R. “The Ugly Truth about Algeria”. The National Interest. July 10, 2012
62 Such as those in eastern Syria home to the Omar oil eld or sea routes with which to orchestrate piracy on the high-seas in the case of Somalia`s Al-Shabaab for instance.
63 This nexus also accentuates the reality that the entire entourage of Abdul Aziz must heavily be cracked down upon. The fact that many of the Red Mosque perpetrators roam scot free is repulsive.
64 Harris, Lee (2004) Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History, New York, The Free Press
65 Other countries involved in the coalition include Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Djibouti, Senegal, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Gabon, Guinea, the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros, Qatar, Cote d’Ivoire, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania and Niger.
66 Ibid.,
67 Somini Sengupta and David E. Sanger “After years of war in Syria, U.N passes
Resolution on talks”, New York Times, 18 December, 2015
68
69 This informative infographic exhibits how IS is in control of vast swathes of Syria. Institute for the Study of War “Syria: A Country Divided”, 1 September, 2015.
70 The campaigning group Human Rights Watch insists that these weapons constitutes a war crime and that those responsible should be held to account. Review: Marcus, Jonathan “Barrel bombs show brutality of war”. BBC. 20 December, 2013. For more on barrel bombs: Ishaan Tharoor “When the U.S. dropped barrel bombs in war”. Washington Post. 16 February, 2015.
71 Loveluck, Louisa “UN inspectors nd undeclared sarin-linked chemicals at Syrian military site”. The Telegraph. 9 May, 2015.
72 President Obama, The President addresses the people on keeping the American people safe, Oval Of ce, Washington, Published on Dec 6, 2015. President Obama delivered poignant remarks from the Oval Office on the U.S. counter- terrorism strategy both in the USA and abroad. Video streaming released by the White House.
73 From the start, America’s Gulf allies – Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar – have all taken part in some of the airstrikes.
74 Strikes on Syria from November 20, 2015, Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command, US Department of Defense, 20 November, 2015.
75 Iraq Energy Institute, “How ISIS uses oil to nance its terror operations”, December, 2015.
76 Erika Solomon, Robin Kwong and Steven Brnard Inside ISIS Inc: The Journey of a barrel of oil, Financial Times, 11 December, 2015.
77 This is heavier oil mostly used locally to manufacture asphalt.
78 Raqqa`s Rockerfellers: Hos ISIS smuggles its oil, al-Araby, September, 2015.
79 According to the Spokesman for the Russian General Staff, Colonel General
Andrey Kartapolov
80 In early 2014, reports surfaced that ISIS is organ harvesting. Hossain Noufel,
head of forensic pathology at the Damascus University told Syrian newspaper Al Watan that there had been more than 18,000 cases of organ traf cking in Northern Syria. Islamic State Sanctioned Organ Harvesting from Captives in Document Taken in US Raid, Vice News, December 25, 2015
81 Iraq wheat silos held by Islamic State. Iraq Grain Board, Iraq Ministry of Agriculture, U.S. State Department and UN World Food Programme, 11 December, 2014.
82 McHugh,Jess “ISIS Funding Sources 2015: How Islamic State Paid For Paris Terror Attack Guns, International Business Times, December 03 2015
83 Putin, V “Some G20 members among 40 states funding Daesh terror: Putin” The News, November 18, 2015
84 Image courtesy of https://www.google.com.pk/h?q=infographic+decemb er,+2015+isis+controlled+territory&biw=1024&bih=623&source=lnms &tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi41o3IguPJAhXFtRoKHUVUDs0Q_ AUIBigB#imgrc=f63p0y5VCFaxfM%3A
85 A word in Islam which denotes alms-giving as a means of fairer wealth re- distribution.
86 Krueger, Alan B. (2007), “What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism”, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
87 According to Khurram Husain this involved the case of Dr Asim Hussain, Mr Shoaib Warsi (deputy managing director of SSGC), Mr Zohair Siddiqui (former managing director SSGC), and Mr Kamran Ihsan Nagi (general manager Project and Construction, SSGC). Research Husain, Khurram Hot pursuit of terror funds, Dawn, September 17, 2015 or e-mail him at [email protected]
88 Dr Pervez, Tahir Money and terror, The Express Tribune, 9 January, 2015. Contact the author at [email protected]
89 State Bank of Pakistan, “Annual Performance Review”, 2013-2014 also available at: http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/arFY14/Vol1/anul-index-eng.html
90 Take for instance Al Qaeda’s consistent ransoming, such as the kidnapping of a
South African couple Yolande and husband Pierre Korkie, which was yet another
sleazy scheme.
91 Hagenah, Iliana What Happened to a Terrorist Corporation? International policy
digest, 26 January, 2014
92 Hamud, Randall B. (2005) Osama Bin Laden: America’s Enemy in His Own
Words. Nadeem Publishing, pp 1-428. Many U.S. publishers were reluctant to publicize books with content as controversial as this one. However, Nadeem Publishing believed that winning the war on terrorism meant learning all that we can about `declared enemies`. The book was marketed as a learning device that suggested prescriptions for defeating Mr. Bin Laden and his ignoble ilk.
93 Lopez, Linette “Report Shows How HSBC Maintained Its Ties With One Of Osama Bin Laden’s Key Benefactors“ Business Insider, July 17, 2012. The report was a Senate report.
94 Spokesman for the Syrian Network for Human Rights.
95 “2004 Census Data for ar-Raqqah nahiyah” (in Arabic). Syrian Central Bureau
of Statistics. Retrieved15 October 2015. Also available in English: “2004 Census Data”. UN OCHA. Retrieved 15 October 2015. Meinecke 1995, p. 410.b Mango 1991, p. 1094. Philip Schaff (editor), Ambrose: Select Works and Letters, Letter XL
96 Kurds represent about 10% of Syria’s population and live mostly along its border with Turkey and northern Iraq. They have established control of a large part of this area since the withdrawal of Syrian government forces in 2012. The US has used airstrikes to help Kurds hold on to their gains against the advance of Isis.
97 Pollard, Ruth “Islamic State gains ground in besieged Kurdish town despite US air strike”, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 October, 2014
98 Çagaptay, Soner “Turkey`s Political Scene Post Election”, Policy Watch 2444,
The Washington Institute, June 24, 2015
99
100 Often termed as malicious code or malware.
101 Dodd, Vikram“Paris attacker travelled to UK to meet terror suspects” The
Guardian December 4, 2015
102 On Hegel excellently consult Pinson, J.-C. (1988) ‘Hegel et l’empirisme dans
l’ecrit sur le droit naturel de 1802 1803’, Archives de Philosophie 51 Hegel. Dickey, L. (1987) Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of Spirit 1770- 1807. Souche-Dagues, D. (2000) ‘Thinking Logos in Hegelianism’, Philosophical Forum 31(3-4). Hegel, Wilhelm Friedrich Natural Law (1802), Jena, tr. T.M. Knox 1975. Hegel, Wilhelm Friedrich Science of Logic ‘Pure Quantity’, remark 2 (pp. 190-199), ‘Quantitative in nity’ remark 2 (pp. 234-238) Hegel, Wilhelm Friedrich Faith and Knowledge (Jena, 1802), tr. W. Cerf and H.S. Harris 1977. Hegel, Wilhelm Friedrich System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit (1803-4), tr. H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox 1979 and Reid, J.D. (2003) ‘On the unity of theoretical subjectivity in Kant and Fichte’, Review of Metaphysics 57.
103To gain humane and exalted insights on development economics consult
Sen, Amartya (1997) Resources, Values, and Development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press and Sen, Amartya (1985) Commodities and Capabilities (1st ed.). New York, NY: North-Holland Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Elsevier Science Publishing Co.
104 Keyman, Fuat E. and Sebnem Gumüsçu (2014) Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey, Hegemony Through Transformation, Palgrave and Macmillan. See especially Chapter 3 “Constructing Hegemony the AKP Rule” pp. 29-55
105 Karaveli, Halil “Turkish Democracy is not out of the Woods”, Turkey Analyst, vol. 8, no. 12, 17 June, 2015
106 Khalid, Ozer “A Global Tide of Terror: from Sousse to Sinai” Daily News Egypt, 5 July, 2015.

*Özer Khalid is a Senior Consultant, Geo-Strategist and Freelance Writer. He can be reached on [email protected] or Twitter followed on @ozerkhalid Disclaimer – The opinions expressed in this paper are analytical and expert views offered by specialists and do not necessarily always overlap with this author`s nor with Criterion Journal`s.