War and State Expansion: A Theoretical Framework

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By

Talat Farooq[1]

Abstract.

This article presents a theoretical framework pertaining to definitional issues and explanation of state expansion in both the Western and the non Western world. It further examines the relevance of the warfare theory to Global War on Terror that has resulted in expanded state capacity in the United States. Author

Definition of State Formation and State Expansion

State formation refers to the creation and establishment of such state institutions for societal regulation that do not already exist within a given territory.  State expansion, on the other hand, pertains to expanding the writ of the government within the state territory through existing institutions and machinery. The state may expand geographically, socially, politically or economically. Such expansion may occur with the help of direct or indirect methods such as state-sponsored violence, enactment of new legislation or implementation of existing laws or through direct or indirect coercion by employing state machinery. While state formation institutionalizes social activity, state expansion administers and supervises the process of societal regulation by enlarging governmental jurisdiction.  In political literature the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. In this study wherever the term “state building” is employed it combines and conveys both the concepts simultaneously while discussing relevant views on the subject.

The Emergence of State-Building in the Western and Post –Colonial Worlds

From the 13th to the 17th century the West saw the emergence of the dynastic or national state. It employed organized violence to harness and direct the energies of the aristocracy and the material resources of their respective territories to serve the national power in order to enter into international competition. Patterns of foreign wars, taxes and military conscription resulted in increased power for the central governments in Europe during the early modern period. [1]

The dynastic states required a dominant language for governmental use, a system of tax collection to maintain standing armies to subdue local aristocrats and other states. These armies were crucial for the maintenance and expansion of state power. They assisted the monarch in his struggle against localized systems of power in order to ensure a strong central government. As the early modern European monarchs succeeded in subduing the aristocratic and religious power systems, strong dynastic states were created. With time the bourgeoisie realized that their prosperity could be perpetuated by forging alliances with the court.[2]

The modern state in the West was ushered in by monarchy, commercial expansion, capitalism and science. It became the focal point of western political thought by the 18th century.[3] Warfare and taxation enhanced central authority and sovereignty became the core ingredient of the modern western concept of the state. As imperialism yielded more power to the European states, their survival became inextricably linked with the maintenance of the balance of power. Conflicts occurred whenever a state sought dominance. This was starkly, though tragically, demonstrated by the two world wars of the twentieth century which were triggered by Europe for the preservation of the balance of power. [4]

By the end of the nineteenth century, the West was transformed by rapid industrialization. Governmental institutions were accordingly designed for regulating and controlling the citizens. This centralization and empowering process varied in accordance with the peculiar circumstances in individual European states as they encountered enhanced urbanization. Nonetheless, they all modified their traditional institutions to cope with the emerging reality and state building became the primary focus. It empowered the central authority and absorbed previously marginalized segments of society in the surge of nationalism.[5]

From the historical perspective, the process of state building in the West substantiates that:

  • Warfare led to development of administrative state machinery.[6]
  • Competition for military superiority and economic benefits between early modern states resulted in the collapse of weak nations and expansion of the strong ones.[7]
  • A strong relationship between the state and capitalism was mutually reinforcing in perpetuating respective interests.[8]

For understanding post-colonial state building, a focus on the historical context of societal role in state building is essential.[9] In the non-western world, the society resists attempts of the state at reorganizing it. Elements inherent in traditional authority play a major role in this struggle and only where these are weak can the state penetrate and dominate. The strengths and weaknesses of the post-colonial states depend on whether the colonial authority fragmented or consolidated societal groups.[10] If the society chooses to engage with the state, the result is a strong government that comprises traditional structures and authority. If, on the other hand, the society opts to disengage, it leads to the independence of social and economic institutions and the traditional structures retain their significance.[11]

The non-western world differs from the early modern European state and state-society relationship. While many European nations defined their boundaries, the non-western states inherited predetermined state structures and boundaries from their colonial masters.[12] As compared to the mostly homogeneous societies of Europe, the post-colonial world consisted of heterogeneous societies, divided along tribal, ethnic or religious lines. The emerging class structure in the West was to the advantage of the elite, whereas in the non-western world, power struggle between the rulers and society made the smooth running of government more difficult. This led to despotism and hindered the development of institutional state structures.[13]

Causal Factors of State Building in the Western World

The frontiers of the pre-modern or pre-nation state systems comprised of zones of conflict rather than demarcated borders. By contrast a modern state has clearly delimited frontiers where its sovereignty is “territorially uniform” and “no-go” areas are an abomination.[14]States are, however, more than mere territories with well-defined boundaries because they are not just empty expanses but are populated. The relationship between people and borders, whether geographical, economic, political or social, is inextricably interdependent. Hence, “right-sizing and right-peopling may be the two most important imperatives of successful state-builders and state-managers.” [15]

According to Ian Lustick, when the state expands into a given territory, the territory itself is regarded as a colony, capable of being disengaged from, and is weakly institutionalized. This he calls the regime threshold. Once this threshold is crossed the territory becomes integral to the meaning of the state and constitutes its identity. When there is no doubt in the minds of the political elite as to the legitimacy of the state then state building may be considered successful. This occurs after the state has crossed the threshold of ideological hegemony which addresses the status of territory in the mind of a ruling political class or nation and involves, “a tacit shift from class to ethno-national relations.”[16]

An upward bias to the trend of state building in the West was provided by war and war mobilization, the working class power, bureaucratic aggrandizement, social reform and the state’s granting of democratic citizenship encompassing economic and political rights.[17]

Political thinkers and analysts specify three crucial contributory factors to the western state-building process.

  • Warfare
  • Societal Crises
  • Cultural Dynamics

Warfare

A symbiotic relationship between state and society developed as a result of the former’s dependence on the population for resources and the latter’s need for protection from internal and external dangers. Protection of the society necessitated the development of a war-marking capability as well as state-building and led to the creation of representative assemblies, through which citizens could demand protection. Warfare thus increased the expectations of the people from the state.

In the course of making war and state-building, the state formed alliances with specific social classes whose members loaned resources, provided technical services, or helped ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, in return for protection against their own rivals and enemies. Mobilization for war entailed larger state spending on weapons procurement and maintenance of standing armies. The expansion of war-making capacity increased the capacity to extract. The very activity of extraction, if successful, could effectively eliminate or neutralize local rivals.  War making necessitated increased extraction of the means of war – men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or the money to buy them – from the population within that territory. This, in turn, brought fiscal and accounting structures into being i.e., departments for revenue generation and tax collection.  These “multiple strategic choices” yielded a distinctive state apparatus within each major section of Europe.[18]

Mobilization of the society’s resources for war automatically called for new ideas and policies that undermined the ideal of minimal state power and disturbed the balance of political power between different interests.[19] Thus, war making led to state building by creating military forces, law enforcement agencies as well as financial organizations and extending state control over manpower.  Warfare led to the expansion of military organization and war industries. Supporting bureaucracies and educational institutions grew up within the state mechanism to contribute to the process of state building. The establishment of these structures curbed potential rivals and opponents.

The two World Wars, for example, resulted in state expansion in Britain as war mobilization expanded the state’s bureaucratic and fiscal capacity.  The state expanded during wars by incorporating representatives of the business and working classes along with technical experts and strategists etc., into the government bureaucracy. [20] Opposition to a strong government was silenced as more political space was created to usher in new, innovative public policies. The tendencies for state expansion in Britain were weak in periods other than those, “marked by war, its imminence or aftermath.” [21] War enhances the process of state expansion because the enlarged writ of the state, freed from normal constraints, is largely dictated by, “the need for manpower and for material and by the economic adjustments required to provide these.”[22]

In Britain, during the First World War, the working class unrest was directed at the rising prices resulting from war mobilization. In order to contain the unrest the government expanded its writ to set prices and rents and to ensure the proper distribution of necessary items.[23] Within the state, the Treasury lost its dominance over finance as well as the bureaucracy and was transformed into one of the various new competing interests. The state “came to speak not with one voice, dominated by the Treasury and its orthodoxies, but with distinct voices, rival departmental agendas and divergent programs.”[24]

The state continues to expand in the aftermath of a war. Immediately after the Second World War, for example, the need for reconstruction entailed the maximum use of state authority. Most European governments expanded state control over essential economic functions within their respective territories. The biggest banks, public utilities and major industries were nationalized. To improve the standard of living, various social welfare programs were introduced and extended by the state. [25]

In Britain, after the First World War, official committees for planning reconstruction were appointed along with a separate Ministry of Reconstruction. Such measures sanctioned increased state intrusion in the economy and society and tore down fiscal and conceptual restraints on the expansion of the state. The war successfully “displaced the institutional embodiments of bureaucratic conservatism from the centre of policy-making.” This resulted in giving “new clout to interests long excluded from high politics.”[26] Besides munitions, many other ministries were created during the war to administer labour, food, transportation, etc. By the end of the First World War, the state in Britain had expanded because of the additional responsibilities and demands imposed upon it. The new state was now “entangled in society and economy to an unprecedented degree” as the government took over section after section of industry to meet the demands of war supplies. By 1917, the British state controlled not only national activities affecting the military effort but also industrial production, transportation and manufacture.[27]

War also brings about a reorientation in the relationship between the state and   business interests. With the outbreak of conflict, the government realizes the importance of a sustained effort to harness national resources towards war production. This results in state control over labour, allocation of raw material and fixing of prices. [28] After the Second World War, in order to avoid strikes of the sort that had occurred in the First World War, the British government adopted the policy of price control. The 1941 budget accelerated the process of linking wartime policies with measures to reshape postwar society in Britain thereby turning budget-making into a political process instead of an independent procedure undertaken by the Treasury. The financial solution of 1941, thus, “lifted one of the structural barriers to state expansion in Britain.”[29]

Other analysts maintain that the need for political imposition did not arise from within the society but was the outcome of external conflicts. The rise of the modern European nation-state was prompted by the need to wage war on an ever larger scale, thereby heightening the demand for tax extraction, bureaucratic centralization and administrative capacity.[30]Successful state makers dismantled and rebuilt societal structures in keeping with their own agenda. The theory posits that while state and society are inseparable, states are the dominant force geared toward the reconstitution and control of society through imposition of law and order. The state is thus a rational actor engaged in maximizing its power and wealth as well as its administrative and territorial control.[31]

In order to strengthen its ability to extract resources to wage war, a state eliminates its internal rivals. Extraction provides the means to conduct war to terminate or neutralize external enemies and to provide societal protection. Each of these activities i.e., war making, protection, elimination of internal rivals and extraction, are interdependent and reinforce each other.  Thus, a state that successfully eradicates its internal rivals strengthens its ability to extract resources to wage war, and to protect its citizens and supporters.[32]

In the West, warfare made successful state building dependent upon the state’s “ability to secure the consent of key groups in the civil society.”[33] States needed standing armies and material resources for state building activities and the society was forced to comply. The military aspect of state building pertained to conscription, mobilization and war taxes. The states bargained with commercial and economic interests, culminating in a strong bond between the Western state and capitalism. The competing economic interests often resulted in conflict leading to state building.

Whether the society invited the state for protection or the state forced its will on the society, the inescapable reality is that historically the state-society relationship in the West underwent a qualitative transformation during times of war and the corresponding need for mobilization.  Warfare has, thus, been a significant causal factor of state building in the West [34]

Societal Crises

According to the developmental view of state building, the western states emerged primarily to maintain social integration during specific crises in west European societies. The internal crises emanating from feudalism, for example, prompted state building.[35] The state entered into alliances with the feudal aristocracy but simultaneously attempted to destroy feudal domination so as to impose state control over society.[36]

The states asserted their dominance by eliminating existing power systems through an empowered and institutionalized bureaucracy.[37] The western state, for example, became more powerful in the aftermath of the Reformation, by strengthening the power of the magistrates and weakening the authority of religious bodies.

In the last part of the nineteenth century, industrialization accelerated the process of state building in the western world. Incremental urbanization loosened the traditional rural connections as workers flocked to towns and cities. This facilitated centralization of state power. As a new balance of classes and interests emerged, governmental machinery was built to control the increased number of citizens. The western nations reacted to the societal transformation by adapting their traditional institutions to the new circumstances. The state expanded as it coped with resistance from the traditional agrarian, rural and aristocratic power structures by creating and strengthening fiscal and administrative state capacity. In its endeavor to dominate the power systems of the era, the state developed an administrative structure for internal crisis management such as the judiciary, financial system, military and diplomatic institutions etc.[38]

Another school of thought maintains that the domestic demand for effective institutions and policy is not always created by internal conflict. Instead it may be the outcome of “a severe exogenous shock such as a currency crisis, recession, hyper-inflation, revolution or war.”[39] Successful state building and institutional reform occur when society generates demands for strong domestic institutions; this in turn strengthens the hands of the state. The process of state building in the West was accelerated as much by the internal processes of industrialization as by external wars. The societal crises strengthened central authority by demanding regulation of urbanization and industry. Moreover, the state expanded by absorbing previously excluded classes into the community, through the impetus of nationalism. As people become a nation and share in the sovereignty of the state, they simultaneously assist the state to extend its jurisdiction.[40] This evolution of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the modern western state heightened the role of the bureaucracy “justified by the notions of justice and progress.” [41]

Cultural Dynamics

The state may symbolize cultural unity and achieve dominance through metaphorical or cultural performance rather than through state capacity of institutional functioning.[42]According to this theory, the struggle between the western state and society occurred in the cultural milieu. After subduing society through coercion, the state then gained legitimacy by granting certain rights to the citizens and regulated social life by redefining cultural boundaries. This was achieved by the state through a mix of mutual understanding, coercion or indoctrination. The western state developed in part due to the support of the Church and was legitimated by “broad cultural mechanisms.”[43] Later, the separation of state and church played a significant role in the cultural context of state building in the West when religious freedom was institutionalized and granted to the citizens by the state.

Formal institutions and informal cultural values and norms are usually considered separate entities.  However, the development of formal institutions is affected by cultural dynamics. For example, the post-war economic planning agencies of Japan were born out of the “mandarin bureaucratic tradition” specific to the country.[44]

The nationality of an individual is determined on the basis of common ethnicity, religion, language etc. The state takes over the responsibility of protecting cultural norms by granting certain rights to the nation. The establishment of citizen rights in return for citizen obligations to the state, favours state expansion by politicizing the societal institutions of family, religion, education, finance and health etc. The western state expanded its writ as more and more aspects of social life were “incorporated into the general welfare function that is the essence of the western state.” [45]

In the West, institutionalization of public responsibility for social provision has enhanced and enlarged the social, economic and political roles of the state. The process of state building in the western world was, thus, driven by a series of qualitative changes in the cultural relationship between state and society.

Global War on Terror: the Transformed Nature of Warfare

Of the three propositions outlined in this paper, the one germane to the contemporary state expansion in the US is the warfare theory. War, whether internal or external, is the most significant catalyst and a compelling medium for state expansion. Threat to survival necessitates mobilization of resources, both military and non-military, as the society expects the state to take all necessary measures to ensure homeland security. War and national security requirements have proved to be significant sources of state building in the United States. Intensive state building occurred in the aftermath of the Civil War, the two World Wars and the Cold War.[46] It is, however, important to note that only a modified version of the warfare theory is applicable to the current political climate in the United States. There is no neat application of the premise because the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) is a unique enterprise which redefines the very concept of traditional warfare.

Post-9/11 American foreign policy breaks with the containment doctrine of the Cold War era which had divided the world into the US and Soviet spheres of influence through a balance of nuclear terror. The policy of deterrence is no longer considered viable by the Americans in the face of a stateless and amorphous enemy. They consider their adversary capable of acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)   without remorse. The Mutually Assured Destruction strategy of the Cold War years is ineffective against terrorists who glamorize martyrdom.

In the Cold War the dichotomy between the bipolar global structure and ideologies was clear. The enemy could be defined unambiguously and the conflict was conducted by the principal state actors or their proxies. The ideological division was amply reflected in political institutions such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Clearly defined national interests were pursued with pragmatic and generally observable resources.[47] A terrorist on the other hand does not identify himself as a terrorist and terrorism itself is more of a political method than an ideology. It uses violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure by resorting to assassination, hijacking, bombing, kidnapping, intimidation and mass murder to settle political issues.

The competing ideologies of the Cold War, namely, state socialism and liberal capitalism, encouraged the political movements to contain conflicts within the nation states. GWOT on the other hand is transnational and the means of fighting are different from the traditional inter-state rivalry. Terrorism-related violence is not carried out by state agents against opposing military forces. It is instead the non-state actors who perpetrate violence against civilian targets.[48]

GWOT and the Scope for State Expansion in the United States

American institutions are deliberately designed to weaken the central government in order to restrict state activity.[49] Yet, the American state is extremely strong in creation and enforcement of policies and has a number of law enforcement agencies at the federal, state and local level.[50] In the current situation the internal management of the government has been enhanced through institutional integration to fight America’s war on terror within the United States. This new development breaks with the past trend of translating taxes and manpower into military strength to increase the state’s fighting capabilities abroad. Traditional opponents were states or empires whereas the US, in its ongoing global onslaught on transnational terrorism, is faced with a stateless antagonist with global reach. In the absence of a rational adversary, intelligence gathering is America’s first line of defense, logically culminating in expansion of domestic supervision by federal agencies. America does not need expanded military powers to smoke out the terrorists abroad. Through domestic laws the agencies are capable of discovering foreign connections and the coalition partners are then required to capture or eliminate terrorist linkages.

The existing US military capability can successfully engage the enemy in the international arena. GWOT is not being fought with the intention of augmenting American military muscle abroad. By reversing the historic deterrence-based US containment policy, the Bush administration has discarded military conservatism in favor of a new military theory which believes that relatively fewer troops can wage and win wars.  This can be achieved through state of the art technology that can assist in launching attacks and gathering intelligence without risking lives.

The US intelligence agencies are assisting American troops overseas through domestic information gathering thereby enabling the US to confront terrorists without having to significantly enlarge its military capability abroad.  Thus, in pursuance of the US-led Global War on Terror, the expansion of domestic state capacity has resulted in increased societal control, while the contraction of civil liberties is justified for reasons of national security.

9/11 demonstrated that weak states constituted a huge strategic challenge to the developed world.[51] Islamist terrorism and its access to WMDs have added a key security dimension to US domestic policy. A powerful American state is necessary not only to preserve international order but also to enforce order at home. Promotion of democratic institutions abroad, as part of the GWOT mission, is possible only if the art of state-building is re-learned and made more effective domestically. Traditional military power is no longer the only panacea for terrorism; it must combine with state building in order to be effective, for “while we do not want to return to a world of clashing great powers, we do need to be mindful of the need for power.”[52]

Conclusion

Warfare has historically proven to be a major cause of state expansion in the West. As America wages its global war on terrorism, once again the relationship between the state and society has undergone a change. The US public is demanding protection from external and internal aggression and is willing to trade liberty for security. The societal demands, in turn, are serving as a platform for state expansion, leading to empowerment of the central government in the US and successful extraction of national resources to wage GWOT. Since GWOT is an indefinite enterprise, the chances are that the expansion of the state will also continue indefinitely.

GWOT is unprecedented and its implications are somewhat outside the formal ambit of the Warfare theory of state expansion. As the adversary is not a rational actor, playing its designated role in the global political environment, American strategy relies heavily on domestic and international intelligence gathering and sharing. Domestically, this target is being achieved through enhanced state powers over society to control the flow of incoming and outgoing information. The limiting of civil liberties is considered necessary and inevitable and, therefore, secondary to national security.  The events of 9/11 have exposed the vulnerability of the United States because of massive intelligence failure that occurred in the absence of inter-agency coordination. While, the global coalition is expected to help smoke out the terrorists abroad, the US government has enacted security legislations at home to ensure domestic defense.

In the prevailing situation the US national interest is not to enhance its military superiority abroad by waging war; instead the ongoing foreign engagement is dependent on intelligence reports and coordination between the US military abroad and the US domestic intelligence network. By keeping its eyes and ears open, the United States hopes to preempt and thwart terrorist designs and protect the American soil.

GWOT is an unparalleled enterprise necessitating non-traditional strategies and tactics to achieve extraordinary objectives. Like any other war, though, it has become a vehicle for state expansion in the US, serving both national and fundamentalist interests at the expense of constitutional safeguards.


Talat Farooq teaches at the Bahria University, Islamabad. She is also a poet and a social worker.


[1] R. R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World,6th ed.(New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1984)  pp156-191.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid. p 425-445.

[6]J.S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)

[7] Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh “Comparative Perspective of the State” ,Annual Reviews Sociology, 1991, 17:523-49.

[8] Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe,( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)

[9] T. Callaghy, The State Society Struggle (New York, Columbia University Press, 1984)

[10] Ibid.

[11] Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh “Comparative Perspective of the State” ,Annual Reviews Sociology, 1991, 17:523-49.

[12] J.S  Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States,( Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988)

[13] A.D Smith, “State making and Nation Building” in States in History, ed. J. A. Hall, (New York: Blackwell, 1986) pp 228-63.

[14]Brendan O’Leary, Ian Lustick and Thomas Callaghy, ed., Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders(New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2001)pp22.

[15] Ibid.P15.

[16] Ibid.Pp63-64.

[17]James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991)p4.

[18] Charles Tilly “war making and state making as organized crime” in Bringing the State Back, ed.Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda skocpol( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985)p181.

[19]James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991) p66.

[20] Ibid. P67.

[21] Ibid. P 4.

[22] Ibid. P65.

[23] Ibid. P82.

[24] Ibid. Pp 66-67.

[25]Perry, Chase and Von Laue, Western civilization: Ideas, Politics and Society,3rd ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,1988) p797.

[26] James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991)p 67.

[27] Ibid.P71.

[28] Ibid. P69.

[29] Ibid.P137.

[30] . Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe( Princeton: Princeton University Press,1975)

M. Mann.  The Sources of Social Power ,Vol.1(London: Cambridge University Press, 1986)

[31] M. Mann, “The Autonomous power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results” in States in History, ed. J. A. Hall, ( New York: Blackwell, 1986)pp109-36.

[32] Charles Tilly “war making and state making as organized crime” in Bringing the State Back, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda skocpol( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985) pp 169-91.

[33]James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991)p68.

[34] Ibid.P31.

[35] L. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso 1974)

[36] B.Badie and P. Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983)

[37] Ibid.

[38] J.R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)

[39] Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004) p46.

[40]T. H.  Marshal, Citizenship and Social Class ( New York: Doubleday, 1948)

[41] Ibid

[42]George M. Thomas and John W. Meyer,” The Expansion of the State”, Annual Review Sociology, 1984. 10:461:82.

[43] Ibid.

[44]Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004) pp39-4.

[45] J.R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)

[46] Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004)p46.

[47] Walter Isaacson, “ The Return of the Realists”, Times, 20November 2006.

[48]Nicholas Allen Kenney, “Terrorism: How it is Unlike the Cold War”, http://www.unc.edu/depts./diplomat/archives, 10 March 2006.

[49] Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exeptionalism:A Double-Edged Sword( New York: W. W. Norton, 1995)

[50]Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004) Pp8-9.

[51] Ibid. P xi.

[52] Ibid. Pp 162-64.

[52] R. R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World,6th ed.(New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1984)  pp156-191.

[52] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[52] Ibid. p 425-445.

[52]J.S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)

[52] Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh “Comparative Perspective of the State” ,Annual Reviews Sociology, 1991, 17:523-49.

[52] Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe,( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)

[52] T. Callaghy, The State Society Struggle (New York, Columbia University Press, 1984)

[52]  Ibid.

[52] Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh “Comparative Perspective of the State” ,Annual Reviews Sociology, 1991, 17:523-49.

[52] J.S  Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States,( Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988)

[52] A.D Smith, “State making and Nation Building” in States in History, ed. J. A. Hall, (New York: Blackwell, 1986) pp 228-63.

[52]Brendan O’Leary, Ian Lustick and Thomas Callaghy, ed., Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders(New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2001)pp22.

[52] Ibid.P15.

[52] Ibid.Pp63-64.

[52]James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991)p4.

[52] Charles Tilly “war making and state making as organized crime” in Bringing the State Back, ed.Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda skocpol( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985)p181.

[52]James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991) p66.

[52] Ibid. P67.

[52] Ibid. P 4.

[52] Ibid. P65.

[52] Ibid. P82.

[52] Ibid. Pp 66-67.

[52]Perry, Chase and Von Laue, Western civilization: Ideas, Politics and Society,3rd ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,1988) p797.

[52] James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991)p 67.

[52] Ibid.P70.

[52] Ibid.P71.

[52] Ibid. P69.

[52] Ibid.P137.

[52] . Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe( Princeton: Princeton University Press,1975)

M. Mann.  The Sources of Social Power ,Vol.1(London: Cambridge University Press, 1986)

[52] M. Mann, “The Autonomous power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results” in States in History, ed. J. A. Hall, ( New York: Blackwell, 1986)pp109-36.

[52] Charles Tilly “war making and state making as organized crime” in Bringing the State Back, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda skocpol( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985) pp 169-91.

[52]James E. Cronin The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth Century Britain(London: Routledge ,1991)p68.

[52] Ibid.P31.

[52]  L. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso 1974)

[52] B.Badie and P. Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983)

[52] Ibid.

[52] J.R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)

[52] Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004) p46.

[52]T. H.  Marshal, Citizenship and Social Class ( New York: Doubleday, 1948)

[52] Ibid

[52]George M. Thomas and John W. Meyer,” The Expansion of the State”, Annual Review Sociology, 1984. 10:461:82.

[52] Ibid.

[52]Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004) pp39-4.

[52] J.R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)

[52] Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004)p46.

[52]  Walter Isaacson, “ The Return of the Realists”, Times, 20November 2006.

[52]Nicholas Allen Kenney, “Terrorism: How it is Unlike the Cold War”, http://www.unc.edu/depts./diplomat/archives, 10 March 2006.

[52] Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exeptionalism:A Double-Edged Sword( New York: W. W. Norton, 1995)

[52]Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books Ltd.,2004) Pp8-9.

[52] Ibid. P xi.

[52] Ibid. Pp 162-64.